Talk:Southern Tibet

For the discussion about the existence of South Tibet, see Talk:South Tibet dispute.

For the discussion of the region containing South Tibet, see Talk:Arunachal Pradesh.

Target?

This has targetted both Arunachal Pradesh and South Tibet dispute ... seems like a disambiguation page is in order? 70.24.247.54 (talk) 04:44, 9 February 2012 (UTC)

Purpose of the Article?

The information presented in this article is supposed to be covered in Tibet under geography(the first point) and disputes(balance). There is no need to have a separate article for this. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cbk123 (talk • contribs) 12:16, 12 June 2015 (UTC)

China vs British

Duduzh, in this edit, you have changed the text stating Chinese claims to one stating "Chinese and British claims". I am afraid it is WP:UNDUE. Yes, Hsiao-Ting Lin talks about both of them with equal weight in the particular sentence quoted here. But if you read the rest of the paper, there is nothing about British "claims" much less any "professed sovereignties". For instance, he says:

There was a common belief among the policy planners of the government of India that they could no longer go on with an undefined buffer zone of independent tribes between British India and Chinese (or Tibetan) territory. In other words, for New Delhi's part, there had to be a recognised international boundary and not merely a tribal buffer zone.

Until the Simla Convention, the British had only regarded the Assam Himalaya as an "undefined buffer zone". So also did the Tibetans.

Only the Chinese make claims as to the region belonging to China from time immemorial. Fictitious claims are made by China and only China. We can't mix them up with other countries. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 08:55, 10 March 2021 (UTC)

I understand, thank you for the explanation. But Lin himself or herself is still misrepresented by removing context right? If the United Nations said that both Armenia and Azerbaijan are at fault for their war, but someone only wrote that the United Nations said that Armenia is at fault, does that not change the meaning? It could be not worth it to write that Lin said that both claims were largely imaginary but it appears misrepresentative of Lin's statement to select only the Chinese part of that sentence. Your explanation is very informative though. Are there other scholars that can fill in the gap here, so the situation is stated but Lin is not misrepresented? Or more details to be added from Lin to fill in the gap? Duduzh (talk) 02:28, 11 March 2021 (UTC)

I understand what you mean. But in dealing with international relations, it is very common to find sources that write as if all parties are to blame even if only one party is doing the mischief. So, I am kind of used to it. I can try adding another quote that singles out China. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:17, 11 March 2021 (UTC)

Guyot-Rechard's quote that I have now added explains it better. British India's control of the region wasn't "imaginary" but it was mostly "on paper" because they didn't actually administer it. But, on the other hand, this was the same in practically all tribal territories in the Indian subcontinent. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:50, 11 March 2021 (UTC)

Thank you for adding the other quotes. Those look okay to me. I am still uncomfortable with how Lin is presented though, because it is still a distortion of what he/she said. If Lin writes that both are to blame, we should not only write that Lin wrote one is to blame even if others suggest that one is to blame. To me, it seems best to remove the mention of Lin and just name the other two if we do not include Lin's description of both being imaginary. Duduzh (talk) 22:39, 11 March 2021 (UTC)

The line is summarising the entire article of Lin, not just one sentence. As I said, the article substantiates the "imaginary" nature of the Chinese claim, but doesn't do so for the British claim. If you read the article and find this to be wrong, please feel free to bring it up. If you don't have access to the article, please send me email and I can send you a copy. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:54, 12 March 2021 (UTC)

December 2025

@Kautilya3: While idk if this article was ever in a better state, currently it is nothing more than a POVFORK. Please take a look. UnpetitproleX (talk) 04:42, 6 December 2025 (UTC)

I've reverted it to the last good version and done some copy edits. UnpetitproleX (talk) 05:09, 6 December 2025 (UTC)

It is not a FORK because it is only about the term. not the concept. There should be no duplication of content between this page and Arunachal Pradesh, including maps.

I noticed you added Assam. What part of Assam is in dispute? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:40, 7 December 2025 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: See Smith, Jeff M. (2014), "Defining the Dispute", Cold Peace: India-China Rivalry in the Twenty-First Century, Lexington Books, p. 27:

The other notable feature of China’s claim line is that it includes a narrow sliver of the Indian state of Assam north of the Brahmaputra River. This tract of claimed land in Assam appears to be roughly 180 kilometers long and fifteen kilometers wide at its widest point.

This is based on the 1962 Chinese claim line which China continues to use on its official maps. Much of the Chinese claims today are vague and undefined, considering they repeatedly claim the entirety of AP even though their official claim line doesn't. UnpetitproleX (talk) 21:22, 7 December 2025 (UTC)

I see. Can you add this citation then, along with the quotation? This is not widely known. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:34, 7 December 2025 (UTC)

Done, with a longer quote for both AP & Assam. UnpetitproleX (talk) 23:18, 7 December 2025 (UTC)

inclusion of sourced content translated from Chinese Wikipedia and other sources

Should content sourced from Chinese-language Wikipedia and other reliable sources be included in the Southern Tibet article? A recent edit adding sourced material, translated and adapted from the Chinese Wikipedia article and supplemented with additional references, was reverted by @Kautilya3 as a point-of-view edit. The contributor contends that the additions are properly sourced to reliable references and represent viewpoints that are currently underrepresented in the article, and the article right now is biased.

I am opening up an RfC because I do not wish to go into an edit war, with the user.

The core questions for community input are:

1. Does the proposed content meet Wikipedia's reliable sourcing and neutral point of view policies?
2. If the content is reliably sourced, should it be incorporated to ensure the article reflects all significant viewpoints on the subject in proportion to their prominence?
3. If concerns about tone or framing exist, can they be addressed through collaborative editing rather than wholesale reversion?

For reference:

• My Edit
• Kautilya's revert

All editors are welcome to comment. Flyingphoenixchips (talk) 14:48, 5 April 2026 (UTC)

References

Discussion

Comment in support of inclusion I want to address the claim that my previous edit was a POV fork of Arunachal Pradesh. It is not, and here is why.

Southern Tibet and Arunachal Pradesh are not the same topic. They refer to overlapping geography but represent fundamentally different subjects. "Arunachal Pradesh" is an Indian state with its own governance, demographics, economy, and administrative history. "Southern Tibet" (藏南) is a term used in Chinese political, diplomatic, and cartographic discourse to describe a territorial claim. The article covers the history of that claim: Qing-era boundary markers, the Simla Conference and the origins of the McMahon Line, the Republic of China's rejection of the convention, PRC diplomatic positions, the 1962 war from the perspective of the dispute, China's administrative divisions over claimed territory, and the stapled visa issue. None of this material belongs on the Arunachal Pradesh article, which covers a functioning Indian state. Placing Chinese territorial claim history, PRC administrative divisions, and Sino-Indian diplomatic correspondence on the Arunachal Pradesh page would itself be a WP:POV problem.

The content is sourced to reliable references. The article cites academic journals, published books by scholars such as Neville Maxwell, Steven Hoffmann, John Garver, and Taylor Fravel, as well as news coverage from Reuters, BBC, Times of India, and others. Chinese-language academic sources are used where they document the Chinese governmental position, which is standard practice per WP:RS when covering a foreign government's claims. The presence of Chinese-language sources does not make content WP:POV any more than Hindi or English sources would.

Wikipedia already maintains separate articles for overlapping territorial disputes. Kashmir and Azad Kashmir coexist. Northern Cyprus and Cyprus coexist. Western Sahara and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic coexist. In each case, the disputed territory or claim has its own article because the subject matter, sourcing, and encyclopedic scope are distinct. Southern Tibet fits this pattern exactly.

Removing sourced content about a notable territorial dispute does not serve neutrality. Per WP:NPOV, Wikipedia must represent all significant viewpoints in proportion to their prominence in reliable sources. The Chinese claim over this region is one of the most prominent and well-documented territorial disputes in Asia. Refusing to cover it in its own article, while covering the Indian administrative reality in the Arunachal Pradesh article, would itself be a failure of balance. We must thus cover the administrative structure and history from the chinese perspective on this article as well. You can very well include stuff from the Indian perspective if they are well documented as a counter claim

I say this as an Indian editor. I understand the nationalistic sensitivities around this topic, and I recognise that other editors like @Kautilya3 may share those concerns. But our job is to follow policy, not to let national sentiment dictate what sourced content gets included. The material is verifiable, the topic is distinct, and the article follows established Wikipedia conventions for disputed territories.

Flyingphoenixchips (talk) 14:57, 5 April 2026 (UTC)

Is this AI-written? UnpetitproleX (talk) 04:58, 6 April 2026 (UTC)

• This is a malformed RfC, there has been absolutely zero discussion prior to its opening. As such, close and initiate discussion instead. --UnpetitproleX (talk) 05:03, 6 April 2026 (UTC)
• Indeed, as per WP:RFCBEFORE, you need to discuss it before filing an RfC. I suggest you withdraw it.

• As to your expansion of the page, it is clearly a WP:POV expansion because it canvasses Chinese positions that are not internationally accepted, whereas the current text rightly attributes it to the Chinese government.
• As to the question of whether the Chinese scholarly sources are "reliable", please note WP:CONTEXTMATTERS: In general, the more people engaged in checking facts, analyzing legal issues, and scrutinizing the writing, the more reliable the publication. So Chinese scholars, writing in the Chinese language for Chinese audience are basically flying under the radar, without scrutiny from the international scholars. So their claims would be obviously downgraded in that respect. Coupled with the fact that PRC is not known for its freedom of expression, it is reaonable to surmise that only those writings that support the Chinese national position would ever see the light of the day within China, and any dissenting voices would be suppressed. That is a huge POV quagmire that Wikipedia should not get into. So I would say that only those Chinese writings that are published in English in international publications would count as "reliable" (even if they might still suffer from POV).
• Secondly, note that any claims that these scholars make are historical, and WP:HISTRS applies. Only peer-reviewed academic publications would fit the bill, not random website write-ups. Zhao Erfeng's forays into the southeastern Tibet are well-documented, and there is no information that he had established any sovereignty/suzerainty on any part of Arunachal Pradesh. The stable version of the page includes a citation to Hsiao-ting Lin, a Taiwanese-origin scholar who has studied the ROC claims on Sino-Indian border extensively, which concludes that China's sovereignty over the Tibet-Assam frontier thus existed only in cartography and imagination. So, the so-called "Southern Tibet" ("Zhangnan") is entirely imaginary and has no basis in reality.
• Finally, as per WP:POVFORK, two pages cannot exist on the same topic. So any Chinese "Southern Tibet"-related claims need to go into the Arunachal Pradesh page, and not on a separate POV page.

-- Kautilya3 (talk) 07:54, 6 April 2026 (UTC)

I fully agree on calling for a withdrawal of this RfC or otherwise a procedural close for it but I do want to note that it is theoretically possible to make an article on specifically the term "Southern Tibet", if it is notable enough on it's own. ⹃Maltazarian ^{ᚾparley$\lor$investigateᛅ} 23:29, 6 April 2026 (UTC)

I have withdrawn the RfC but noting your objections, I would like to respectfully disagree. Citing Chinese scholarly sources does not mean Wikipedia endorses their position, only that it reports it with attribution. So I very well, support inclusion of Chinese scholarly sources, and arguing against it in many ways amounts to WP:Censorship. Source reliability should be judged case by case under WP:RS, not rejected simply because a source is Chinese-language or published by a chinese guy in China. Also just to remind you as an encyclopedia, Wikipedia can very well cover historical claims from scholarly sources without requiring that they be internationally accepted, or accepted by the Indian government. As an encyclopedia, reporting facts I dont think we need acceptance of the Indian administration on what to include and what not to include Flyingphoenixchips (talk) 14:04, 7 April 2026 (UTC)

There are various criteria for WP:RS and you know them well. Nothing becomes reliable just because it is Chinese, nor does it become unreliable. You are barking up the wrong tree. I suggest you stop mentioning the nationality, and start talking about the reliability criteria. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 15:04, 7 April 2026 (UTC)

The thing is WP:RS policy judges reliability on editorial oversight, fact-checking, and peer review on a case-by-case basis, not on the nationality or language of the publication.. that is why I brought it up in the first place. I agree that Sources 1 and 2 do warrant scrutiny for the institutional reasons outlined above, but Source 3 (University of Macau journal) operates outside the PRC's editorial constraints and survives that criticism entirely. More importantly, WP:CENSORSHIP is relevant here: systematically excluding an entire national scholarly tradition because its conclusions align with that country's government position is not a neutrality policy, it is itself a POV judgment, and it would equally disqualify Indian scholars writing in Indian journals about Indian territorial claims.

The point what I am trying to make here is that, we should also include stuff about China's administrative claims, and how they view the specific history and how they divide the region politically, if we are talking about terminology of the word. We can specifically attribute this to china Flyingphoenixchips (talk) 01:49, 9 April 2026 (UTC)

Indian scholars don't align themselves with national policy; they routinely go against it. They also publish in international journals and with international publishers, and thereby submit to international scrutiny. Their books get reviewed in international journals too. Sory to say, there is no comparison between Indian and Chinese sources.

Your invocation of WP:CENSORSHIP is wrong. That policy says don't rule out content because somebody finds it "objectionable". It doesn't say, include questionable content just because somebody said it.

The point here is that when you are dealing with an international dispute, international scrutiny is required. It doesn't make sense to claim "editorial oversight", when all the oversight is within the same ideological ecosystem. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:29, 9 April 2026 (UTC)

Should the following parts be included?

The main point of contention comes from the following sections. I agree with @Kautilya3 that most of this are from the Chinese side, I would like to note that these works have been cited by other international scholars too. Yes the article clearly attributes this claim only to China, and I Support it because I personally don't see Chinese claim on arunachal as valid. And I accept that I might have bias towards india, but I do not let this define what should be presented on Wikipedia. So What I suggest is still modifying and adding the following section making it clear where this comes from. I feel this should be included either here or in Arunachal Pradesh. I do not see any problem with including this tbh.

Also I had translated the following content from the Chinese language wikipedia, and I have verified the sources.

Tagging @Maltazarian as well since he had participated in this. ̴Flyingphoenixchips (talk) 14:24, 7 April 2026 (UTC)

I don't see anything here that warrants expansion of this article into what will essentially be a POVFORK. The content is better suited at Arunachal Pradesh or Sino-Indian border dispute, but even over there I would argue that we should use the better sources which are available to us, preferably WP:HISTRS. Please note, that per WP:VNOT: "while information must be verifiable for inclusion in an article, not all verifiable information must be included", so far I don't see a strong case for including this content even at the other articles. The dispute has been written about considerably in WP:SCHOLARSHIP, so in my view, it would be WP:DUE to include any content only if it has received due weight in scholarship around this subject. UnpetitproleX (talk) 21:05, 7 April 2026 (UTC)

History

Qing dynasty

Prior to the Qing conquest of Tibet, the 6th Dalai Lama, Tsangyang Gyatso, the effective ruler of Tibet under the Ganden Phodrang government, was born in Tawang, the principal town of the western portion of the region.

In 1904, the Complete Map of Tibet (《西藏全图》), translated by Hu Weide (胡惟德), then Qing ambassador to Russia, was published. Based on this work, cartographer Zou Daijun (邹代钧) made significant revisions to the Tibet section of the Complete Atlas of China and Foreign Territories (《中外舆地全图》). The revised maps showed: (1) the western section of the Sino-Indian border roughly following the watershed, passing east and west of Pangong Lake toward the southwest of Demchok (Baligaz); (2) a central section approximately along the watershed; and (3) an eastern section close to modern maps, with the Lhoyu (Zayu) area noted as "stateless mountain tribes" (无定山族) and attributed to the U-Tsang (前藏) administration without any further internal boundary line.

In the final years of the Qing dynasty, Zhao Erfeng (赵尔丰) carried out the policy of replacing local chieftains with state-appointed officials (改土归流, gaituguiliu) in the Kham and eastern Tibet border regions, establishing Zayu County (察隅县) in Zayu. A boundary marker was erected on the Chinese side of the traditional Sino-Indian customary boundary line at a location called Yabiqu Gong (壓必曲龔, on the Yibi River).

Republic of China

The 1926 Complete Map of the Republic of China, noting "stateless mountain tribes" (无定山族) along the southern Himalayan slopes, in the approximate location of the Southern Tibet region.

In 1912, a Republic of China special envoy to the Sichuan-Yunnan borderlands arrived at Yabiqu Gong and erected a new boundary marker beside the original Qing-era one.

From 1913 to 1914, the Simla Conference was convened at Shimla in British India, attended by representatives of Britain, the Republic of China, and Tibet. Sir Henry McMahon, Foreign Secretary of the Government of British India, and the Tibetan government (Kashag) representative Lonchen Shatra Paljor Dorje exchanged secret correspondence incorporating a new "Indo-Tibetan boundary line" into the conference maps, giving rise to the McMahon Line. This line transferred roughly 90,000 square kilometres of territory historically under Tibetan administration to British India, shifting India's northeastern boundary northward from the foothills at the base of the Himalayas (the traditional customary line recognised by China) to the Himalayan ridge, in some places extending beyond it, and compressing Tibetan territory by over a hundred kilometres.

The Republic of China government representative refused to formally sign the convention, in response to opposition from the central Beiyang Government, thereby rejecting and refusing to recognise it. The Tibetan side also declined to recognise the McMahon Line and the convention, as Britain had not delivered on its promised concessions to Tibet. The Republic of China government subsequently issued multiple statements rejecting the Simla Convention and the McMahon Line.

In 1948, with China embroiled in the Chinese Civil War, the newly independent India considered itself the legal successor to British India's territorial claims following the Partition of India and began deploying troops into the area. China maintained that the Simla Convention had no legal validity and refused to recognise it. In 1949, the Government of the Republic of China relocated to Taiwan following its defeat in the civil war and severed diplomatic relations with India.

During the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the Government of the Republic of China publicly stated on multiple occasions that it had never accepted and firmly opposed the use of the McMahon Line as the Sino-Indian boundary, maintaining its position as what it described as the sole legitimate government of China. The ROC government also formally protested the United States government's recognition of the McMahon Line.

People's Republic of China

In the process of handling the border dispute, both China and India relied on maps as primary evidence for their respective territorial claims, whether in correspondence and talks between Zhou Enlai and Jawaharlal Nehru, in official diplomatic notes, or in inter-governmental negotiations. The PRC government argued that India's drawing of the Sino-Indian boundary line was a product of British imperialist aggression and expansion in modern history, while the Government of India characterised China's border cartography as "cartographic aggression," meaning the use of maps to manufacture territorial claims.

On 2 February 1951, Indian forces, acting in accordance with the territorial claims of the Dominion of India, occupied the Tawang Tract and expelled the Tibetan officials appointed by the local Tibetan administration. In 1954, the Indian government established the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) over the region and amended its official maps, formally reclassifying the McMahon Line from "undemarcated boundary" to "demarcated boundary" for the first time. By 1960, Indian forces had established full control south of the McMahon Line.

During the Sino-Indian War of October-November 1962, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) temporarily seized most of the Southern Tibet area, including the major towns of Tawang, Bomdila, Mechuka, and Walong, advancing to positions near the traditional customary line. The PLA subsequently withdrew unilaterally to positions north of the McMahon Line, seeking Indian recognition of Chinese sovereignty and a negotiated boundary settlement rather than attempting to hold the territory by military force. By 1964, Indian forces had reoccupied the entire region, and the two armies have maintained positions near the McMahon Line since that time.

In 1972, India redesignated the administrative structure of the region as the Arunachal Pradesh Union Territory. In February 1987, India proclaimed the establishment of Arunachal Pradesh as a full state. The PRC has repeatedly stated that it does not recognise the McMahon Line as a legitimate boundary, nor the state of Arunachal Pradesh, and has demanded that India withdraw all military personnel stationed beyond the line.

Recent developments

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the Sino-Indian border situation has gradually stabilised, and negotiations over the border dispute have proceeded through formal diplomatic channels. As of April 2007, China and India had held ten rounds of talks at the level of Special Representatives for the boundary question. The Southern Tibet issue nonetheless remains unresolved. All official maps published by the PRC continue to depict the area under Indian administration as Chinese territory.

On 4 June 2008, the 14th Dalai Lama stated that Tawang is a part of India and acknowledged the validity of the McMahon Line as established by the 1914 Simla Convention between Tibetan, Indian, and British representatives. The Chinese government condemned this statement and regarded it as contrary to China's territorial position.

In recent years, both China and India have increased infrastructure construction in the region. China has issued official Chinese-language place names for numerous towns and villages in the disputed territory. India has condemned this policy as an attempt to assert territorial claims through administrative renaming.