Hamilcar II

For other uses, see Hamilcar.

Not to be confused with Hamilcar I of Carthage.

Commander in chief King of Carthage Hamilcar II Hannonid
Carving of Hamilcar during his execution created in c. 1630 by Johann Philipp Abelin
16th King of Carthage
Reign	330 BC – 309 BC
Predecessor	Gisgo of Carthage
Successor	Bomilcar (titular)
Born	Unknown, likely in 350s Carthage, Africa
Died	309 BC Syracuse, Italy
Cause of death	Execution of Hamilcar II
Issue	Bomilcar (adopted)
Battles/Wars	Greco–Punic conflicts Battle of Crimissus Battle of Africa Battle of Himera Siege of Gela Battle of Syracuse Siege of Syracuse
Punic	𐤇𐤌𐤋𐤊, (ḥmlk, lit. 'Gracious')
Dynasty	House of Hannonides
Father	Gisgo of Carthage
Religion	Punic religion
Occupation	Commander-in-chief

Hamilcar II (Punic: 𐤇𐤌𐤋𐤊‬, ḥmlk, 4th century BC–309 BC) was a Carthaginian military leader. The son of Gisgo, the grandson of Hanno I the Great, and a member of the influential Hannonid dynasty. In the second half of the 4th century BC, he held senior positions in Carthage. In 311 BC , he was given command of the troops in Sicily during the war with Syracuse, which at that time was led by the tyrant Agathocles. After the victory at the Battle of Himera, most of Sicily came under Hamilcar's control. The army of the Carthaginians and their allied Sicilians laid siege to Syracuse from land and sea.

Origins and Etymology

Hamilcar was a member of the influential Carthaginian Hannonid dynasty. The grandson of Hanno the Great and the son of Gisgo, he held the highest government office. Diodorus Siculus calls him "king of Carthage". This does not mean that the Hannonids and Hamilcar possessed the unlimited royal powers characteristic of the Magonids in Carthage in the 6th-5th centuries BC. Power was in the hands of oligarchs, among whom the most influential was Hamilcar who possibly held the position of suffet.

Despite his aristocratic origins and high position in one of the most powerful states in the Mediterranean, virtually nothing is known about Hamilcar's life. Information about him is contained in Greek and Roman sources, which cover only Hamilcar's final years, when he commanded troops in Sicily during the Greco-Carthaginian War of 311–306 BC. At the outbreak of the war, according to Diodorus Siculus, Hamilcar was the most outstanding among other military leaders.

Reign

The beginning of the war with Syracuse

After the collapse of the alliance of Sicilian cities against the tyrant Agathocles of Syracuse, the latter began to subjugate the Sicilian city- states. In Messina, with the assistance of Agathocles, a change of power took place. The supporters of the Syracusan tyrant were victorious. Accordingly, the large city fell under the control of Agathocles without a fight. On the eastern coast, he captured Tauromenium. After a series of victories, Agathocles began preparations for an attack on Acragas. The enemies of the Syracusan tyrant chose Dinocrates as their leader, an aristocrat and former friend of Agathocles, whom Agathocles had spared during the massacre of 317/316 BC. Dinocrates appealed to Carthage for help, asking it to intervene before Agathocles conquered all of Sicily.

The Sicilians' main complaints, as Marcus Junianus Justin points out, concerned not so much Agathocles as the commander-in-chief of the Carthaginian forces in Sicily, Hamilcar (his namesake). They called the former a tyrant and despot, and the latter a traitor who, having accepted a bribe from Agathocles, made a deal with him that was disadvantageous to Carthage. They also complained that the Carthaginians' inaction would lead to the complete subjugation of Sicily to Syracuse, which had always been hostile to Carthage. The Council of One Hundred and Four, the equivalent of the Senate in Carthage, recalled the previous commander, appointing his namesake, Hamilcar, son of Gisgo, to the vacant position. The Carthaginians realized the danger of uniting Sicily under the leadership of a single man and entered the war.

Landing in Sicily, Battle of Himera

Main article: Battle of the Himera River (311 BC)

Map of the cities of Sicily during Antiquity

Before leaving Carthage, Hamilcar was provided with 130 triremes and two thousand Carthaginian militiamen, many of whom were of noble birth, ten thousand soldiers from the African territories under Carthage, a thousand mercenaries, two hundred cavalry from Etruria, a thousand Balearic slingers, a large sum of money for military operations, as well as supplies of ammunition and provisions. The campaign began inauspiciously for Hamilcar. His fleet was caught in a storm. Sixty triremes and two hundred supply ships sank. After reaching Sicily, Hamilcar added to his army detachments from allied islanders, as well as troops from cities under Carthage. According to Diodorus Siculus, the army under the leadership of the Carthaginian commander consisted of 40 thousand infantry and 5 thousand cavalry.

The armies of Hamilcar and Agathocles encamped on the banks of the Himera River. The Carthaginians set up camp on the hill of Ecnomus, and the Syracusans in the fortress of Phalarion. The river flowed between the two armies, and each side refrained from attacking for a long time. The Greeks decided to attack first. Agathocles devised a plan to force the enemy into battle under unfavorable conditions. Local skirmishes periodically broke out between the detachments of the warring sides. Agathocles positioned some of his soldiers in ambush. When a small detachment of Syracusans crossed the river and stole some of the enemy's cattle, the Carthaginians began to pursue the retreating Greeks. At this moment, the Syracusans ambushed them, putting them to flight. Agathocles gave the signal for a general offensive.

The Syracusans reached the enemy positions. They toppled the palisade and stormed the camp. The Carthaginians, having no time to prepare for battle, succumbed to panic. Their resistance was disorganized. At this point, Hamilcar introduced his Balearic slingers. Agathocles' soldiers continued their advance on the camp and were close to capturing it. By a stroke of luck, reinforcements from Africa arrived to aid the Carthaginians and immediately attacked the advancing Syracusans. According to Polyaenus, the arrival of the reinforcement ships was no coincidence, but a military ploy by Hamilcar. This author attributes Agathocles' attack to information received by the Syracusan tyrant that the Carthaginian fleet had sailed for Syracuse. The Greek strategist, according to Polyaenus, hoped to defeat the enemy army, part of which had fled on ships. The tide of battle was turned. The Greeks began to retreat. They were forced to run forty stades (~7 km) across flat terrain back to their camp. The soldiers, exhausted during the battle, were pursued by the Carthaginian cavalry. According to Diodorus, the Greek soldiers were so exhausted that, having reached the river, they greedily drank the salt water from it, which is why many died. The losses of both sides in the battle, according to Diodorus, amounted to seven thousand Syracusans and 500 Carthaginians and allies.

After the lost battle, Agathocles gathered the remnants of his army, burned the camp, and retreated to Gela. He initially intended to return to Syracuse, but later changed his plans. He decided to remain in Gela to distract Hamilcar's army from marching on Syracuse, where the harvest was underway. Hamilcar began a siege of Gela, but soon realized its futility. Strong fortifications had been built around Gela, and food supplies had been plentifully stockpiled within the city itself. Thus, Gela was able to withstand a siege for a long time. Hamilcar lifted the siege and began to occupy the cities and fortified points subordinate to Agathocles. Camarina , Leontini, Catana, Tauromenium, Messina, and others went over to Hamilcar's side. Thus, practically all of Sicily was in Hamilcar's hands with the exception of Syracuse.

Siege of Syracuse

Main article: Siege of Syracuse (311–309 BC)

Agathocles, although he had returned with his soldiers to Syracuse, was in dire straits. The Carthaginians had captured virtually all of Sicily, and Syracusan allies had defected to Hamilcar. The city was blockaded by land and sea. The Syracusans lacked the strength to attempt battle beneath the walls of their home city. Then Agathocles decided on a bold move. He equipped sixty ships and waited for the opportune moment. The Syracusan tyrant kept his plans secret. It was assumed that Agathocles intended to plunder the Carthaginian-held areas of Sicily or to flee to Italy. The Carthaginian commander also failed to discern the enemy's plans, but just in case, he ordered the city blockaded from the sea. The Syracusan soldiers were forced to wait on their ships for several days. Then, when several grain ships attempted to enter the city, the Carthaginian fleet was distracted by their pursuit. Seeing that the harbor mouth was clear, Agathocles ordered the ships to put to sea at full speed. The Carthaginians initially assumed that the Syracusan fleet had come to the aid of the grain-laden cargo ships and formed up in battle formation. When they saw the enemy fleet retreating to the open sea, they began pursuit. The pursuit ceased during the night. The grain-laden ships entered the city at this time. The date of this eventAugust 14, 310 BC is known precisely because a solar eclipse occurred the following day, the timing of which can be calculated mathematically.

Agathocles' calculations were entirely justified. The Syracusan believed that the Carthaginians, living in luxury and prolonged peace, and inexperienced in dangerous battles, would be easily defeated by men rigorously trained in many wars. The Carthaginians' Libyan allies, long obligated to pay various taxes, eagerly seized the opportunity for a successful uprising. The Syracusan army, appearing unexpectedly in the heart of Carthage's dominions, was able to plunder the lands unravaged by war and abundant with wealth. After Agathocles' victory at the Battle of White Tunis, Carthage found itself in a difficult situation. Ambassadors were sent to Hamilcar demanding that he allocate troops to defend Carthage.

Hamilcar decided to seize Syracuse by ruse. He ordered the ambassadors to remain silent about what had happened in Africa and began spreading rumors of Agathocles' complete defeat. The general even sent ambassadors to the besieged city. The ambassadors carried the prows of Agathocles's burned ships, which were supposed to confirm the destruction of the Syracusan army. There are two conflicting accounts. According to one version, a certain Diognetus began sowing panic in the city. Antander, whom Agathocles had left in charge of the defense during his absence, ordered the arrest of the troublemaker. According to the second version, Antander proposed surrendering the city at a war council, and the mercenary commander, Erymnon, convinced the others to hold out until they learned for sure what had really happened. Soon, a ship sent by Agathocles with news of the victory in Africa arrived in the city. Despite pursuit by enemy ships, it managed to enter the harbor. While these events unfolded at sea, the townspeople watched with interest. Hamilcar decided to take advantage of this. He sent a detachment of soldiers, who managed to scale the walls and enter the city. In the ensuing battle, the Carthaginians were annihilated before the main forces arrived to help them. A distraught Hamilcar had no choice but to continue the siege. He was also forced to send 5,000 of his soldiers to help Carthage.

The following year, 309 BC, Hamilcar decided to storm the city . Ancient sources attribute the attack to either a prophecy or a dream the commander had about dining in Syracuse the following day. The Syracusans learned of the enemy's plans and set up an ambush. The assault, which Hamilcar had planned to begin at night, failed. Faced with unfamiliar narrow passes and an unfavorable troop position, the Syracusans, who had previously occupied an advantageous position, were able to sow panic among the attackers. Hamilcar maintained his composure and attempted to hold back the retreating soldiers. The pursuing troops managed to capture Hamilcar alive. The Carthaginian commander was handed over to the relatives of the dead. They shamefully paraded him through the city in chains and executed him. The head was then sent to Africa to Agathocles. The Syracusan commander ordered that Hamilcar's head be shown to the Carthaginians, which significantly lowered their morale.

See also

• Mago III
• History of Carthage
• Hannibal Mago

Sources

Primary sources

• Valerius Maximus (2007). Memorable Deeds and Sayings. Translated by S. Yu. Trokhachev. Saint Petersburg: Saint Petersburg State University Press. ISBN 978-5-288-04267-6.

• Diodorus Siculus (2000). Bibliotheca historica. Antichnoe nasledie. Translated by O. P. Tsybenko. Moscow: Labirint.

• Polyaenus (2002). A. K. Nefyodkin (ed.). Strategemata. Saint Petersburg: Evraziya. ISBN 5-8071-0097-2.

• Cicero (1985). "De Divinatione". In G. G. Mayorov (ed.). Philosophical Treatises. Translated by M. I. Rizhsky. Moscow: Nauka.

• Justin (2005). Epitome of Pompeius Trogus' Historiae Philippicae. Saint Petersburg: Saint Petersburg State University Press. ISBN 5-288-03708-6.

Secondary sources

• Berve, Helmut (1997). The Tyrants of Greece (PDF). Rostov-on-Don: Feniks. ISBN 5-222-00368-X.

• Tsirkin, Yuli B. (2001). From Canaan to Carthage. Moscow: AST. ISBN 5-17-005552-8.

• Huß, Werner (1985). Geschichte der Karthager. Munich: C. H. Beck. ISBN 3-406-30654-3.

• Consolo Langher, Sebastiana Nerina (1976). "La politica di Agatocle e i caratteri della tradizione dal conflitto con Messana alla battaglia presso il fiume Himera (315–310 A.C.)" (PDF). Archivio storico messinese. 34.

• Consolo Langher, Sebastiana Nerina (1992). "Eknomos e la valle dell'Himera nelle vicende storiche tra VII e IV secolo A.C. fino ad Agatocle" (PDF). Archivio storico messinese. 60.

• Meister, Klaus (1984). "Agathocles". The Cambridge Ancient History. Vol. 7.1 (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press.

• Ray, Fred Eugene Jr. (2012). Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century B.C. Jefferson, NC; London: McFarland. ISBN 978-0-7864-6973-4.
• Smith, William, ed. (1873). "Hamilcar". A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology. London: John Murray.
• Lenschau, Thomas (1912). "Hamilkar 5". In Wissowa, Georg (ed.). Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft (in German). Vol. VII, Zweite Hälfte (VII, 2). Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung.
• Geus, Klaus (1994), Prosopographie der Literarisch Bezeugten Karthager, Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, Vol. 59, Studia Phoenica, No. 13, Leuven: Peeters, ISBN 9789068316438. (in German)
• Huss, Werner (1985), Geschichte der Karthager, Munich: C.H. Beck, ISBN 9783406306549. (in German)