Battle of Elli

Battle of Elli
Part of the First Balkan War
Battle of Elli, Vasileios Hatzis.
Date 16 December [O.S. 3 December] 1912 Location Off the Dardanelles, Aegean Sea 40.20000°N 26.40000°E / 40.20000; 26.40000
Belligerents
Kingdom of Greece	Ottoman Empire
Commanders and leaders
Pavlos Kountouriotis	Ramiz Bey
Strength
1 armoured cruiser 3 ironclad battleships 4 destroyers	3 battleships 1 ironclad 1 protected cruiser 4 destroyers
Casualties and losses
2 killed	18 killed 41 wounded 1 battleship damaged

The Battle of Elli (Greek: Ναυμαχία της Έλλης, Turkish: İmroz Deniz Muharebesi) or the Battle of the Dardanelles was a naval battle fought on 16 December [O.S. 3 December] 1912, during the First Balkan War in the Aegean Sea, off at the entrance to the Dardanelles Strait and the island of Imbros, between Ottoman and Greek naval forces. The Ottoman navy aimed to break the Greek blockade at the entrance of the Dardanelles. The battle, in which the Greeks, under the command of Pavlos Kountouriotis, consisted of one battleship cruiser, three pre-dreadnoughts, and four destroyers, while the Ottomans, under the command of Ramiz Numan Bey, consisted of two pre-dreadnoughts, two battleship corvettes, one cruiser, and four destroyers, was the largest naval engagement of the Balkan Wars.

The Ottoman fleet, having sailed through the Dardanelles, encountered the Greek fleet patrolling the area. The battleships that formed the main force of the fleets engaged in combat. The Greek battleship Averof, using its speed advantage, separated from the other battleships and engaged the Ottoman fleet alone. Following this, both sides ceased fighting and retreated to their ports. The battle, which lasted over an hour and resulted in minor damage to both sides' ships, ended militarily inconclusively, with both sides declaring victory. The Ottoman fleet was ineffective in the battle due to poorly maintained ships, lack of training, and disagreements among commanders, while the Greek ships achieved a strategic success by preventing the Ottomans from entering the Aegean Sea. After the battle, the Greeks focused on occupying more islands in the Aegean, maintaining their strategic advantage in the northern Aegean Sea. The Ottoman navy, unable to break the Greek blockade, remained in the Dardanelles, later making renewed efforts to gain control of the Aegean Sea.

Background

One of the greatest contributions to the success of the Kingdom of Greece in the First Balkan War came from its navy. Operating in the Aegean Sea, the Greek navy sank the battleship corvette Feth-i Bülend off Thessaloniki on October 18th and forced a Turkish gunboat to self-sabotage off Kidonia on November 9th. The Greek navy exerted great pressure on the Ottoman Empire's supply lines in the Aegean, preventing the Ottoman army from transporting troops across the Aegean. While the Balkan armies deployed 670,000 soldiers, the Ottomans were only able to bring 350,000 soldiers to the front, and 250,000 soldiers from Anatolia and Syria remained in İzmir and various parts of Syria due to transportation problems. Greece refused to sign an armistice with the Ottoman Empire and together with the Kingdoms of Bulgaria and Serbia, decided to continue blockading the Dardanelles Straits. The Ottomans, on the other hand, sought to achieve a naval victory both to lift this blockade and to boost the morale of its citizens, whose spirits had been broken after their defeats in land battles. For this purpose, the armored fleet of the Ottoman Navy, which had previously been stationed on the coasts of the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea against Bulgarian forces, was sent towards the Dardanelles and began to prepare intensely for battle. The Greek naval command aimed to achieve a final victory against the Ottomans, but would only engage in battle if the Ottoman navy entered the Aegean Sea; otherwise, it would not force them into battle. The Greek Ministry of the Navy had the idea of attacking the Dardanelles with small torpedo boats, but these plans were not implemented.

The decision to launch the operation

On November 21, 1912, the Greek navy, most likely under the direction of Admiral Kunduriotis and Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, landed troops on Mytilene with permission from the United Kingdom. On November 23, when a Greek torpedo boat entered the port of Ayvalık, a Black Sea merchant ship sank itself, believing it was about to be fired upon. The following day, the Ottoman High Command received intelligence that the Greeks were planning a landing in the Gulf of Saros under naval protection and that Bulgarian forces in Thessaloniki were being transported to Alexandroupoli on Greek steamers. All these developments brought the issue of the Ottoman navy's deployment to the Aegean Sea back to the forefront. On November 25, the task of supporting the army flanks was left to old ships such as the Iclaliye and Necm-i Şevket, and the navy was ordered to go to Çanakkale. Although the Ministry of the Navy did not object to this order, it reported that the Bulgarians were preparing positions on the ridges in the Mimarsinan region and that it would be better to remain in the Büyükçekmece region and protect the army's flanks. On the same day, the Ministry of the Interior, based on information from the notables of Burhaniye, assessed that the Greek forces coming from Mytilene had turned north from the Çandarlı area, and that this movement could be preparation for a possible Saros landing. The Navy commander, Colonel Tahir Burak, did not think a landing would take place; The Acting Commander-in-Chief, however, did not share the same opinion as the Navy commander and wanted the Navy to abandon its duty of protecting the army and sail into the Aegean in case of a possible landing.

Since armistice negotiations began on November 25, the Ottoman navy was ordered not to fire unless subjected to enemy fire. At the suggestion of the Ministry of the Navy, the change of the navy commander was discussed on November 27 and 29. On November 29, the acting Commander-in-Chief, Nazım Pasha, ordered the navy to immediately go to Çanakkale, that the main force should not operate until the Hamidiye joined, and that only destroyers should attack the Greek forces in front of the strait. The next day, the battleships Barbaros Hayreddin and Turgut Reis, the destroyers Numûne-i Hamiyet, Gayret-i Vataniye, Samsun and Basra, the torpedo boats Demirhisar, Sultanhisar and Hamidabat, and the repair ship Tirimüjgan departed for Çanakkale. Mecidiye was in the Black Sea, while the other ships were undergoing repairs in the Golden Horn. On December 7, the acting commander of the navy, Colonel Tahir Burak, was dismissed, and his deputy, Colonel Ramiz Bey, was appointed in his place. On November 11, an independent division consisting of four destroyers was formed, and the commander of the Hamidiye, which was under maintenance, Captain Hüseyin Rauf (Orbay), was appointed to command it. The fact that the commander of the navy was a supporter of the Freedom and Accord Party and the commander of the independent division was a supporter of the Committee of Union and Progress, and that they could not agree with each other for political reasons, reduced the coordination of the Ottomans.

Forces

Ottoman Empire

Barbaros Hayreddin

Turgut Reis

The Ottoman Navy, consisting of two Brandenburg-class battleships, the Barbaros Hayreddin and Turgut Reis, the battleship corvettes Asar-ı Tevfik and Mesudiye, the battleship cruiser Mecidiye, and four destroyers, entered the Dardanelles Strait. Although the Ottoman ships had a numerical advantage of 9 to 8, none of these ships, some dating back to the 1890s and acquired from retired German naval vessels, were capable of competing with the modern 1910-built Greek battleship Georgios Averof and other more modern Greek ships. Although the Ottomans tried to acquire a ship of the type of the new German armored cruiser SMS Blücher or the battle cruiser SMS Moltke to counter the Averof attack, this plan was shelved due to the high cost, and instead they acquired the SMS Kurfürst Friedrich Wilhelm (Barbaros Hayreddin) and SMS Weißenburg (Turgut Reis), which were retired from the Imperial German navy in the 1890s. In the summer of 1912, the maintenance of these ships was neglected due to the Ottomans' financial situation their telephones were not working, the ammunition elevators and rangefinders were removed, the pumps were corroded, most of their watertight doors were no longer able to close, and the personnel's training and tactical knowledge were insufficient.

Kingdom of Greece

Hydra

Spetsai

Psara

At the start of the war, the combined strength of the Greek navy was relatively weak compared to the Ottomans. Although the Greek and Ottoman ships were nearly equal in number, the slow speed of the older Greek ships and the Ottomans' ability to retreat to the Dardanelles Strait if necessary created a disadvantage for the Greeks in terms of being able to fight whenever and wherever they wanted. The Greek navy used the port of Mudros on the island of Lemnos as its forward base. Its main force consisted of the modern battleship Georgios Averof and the battleships Idra-class Idra, Spetsai, and Psara. The Idra-class were ironclads ordered in 1885 following the Greek navy's failure against the Ottomans during the Cretan Revolt of 1866-1869. In addition, a patrol force consisting of four destroyers, two torpedo boats, and a submarine under the command of Colonel Bratsanos was based at Bozcaada and patrolled the Dardanelles Strait. Greek destroyers were superior to Ottoman destroyers in both tonnage and firepower. The most important deficiency of the Greek navy was training; one-third of the ships in the light fleet (six destroyers and the Delfin submarine) joined the fleet after the start of the First Balkan War.

According to Zisis Fotakis, the Greeks had two advantages. The first advantage was the Georgios Averof, the fastest ship on this front. Its speed was 9 knots faster than the older French-built battleships in the fleet, so it could be used independently of the other ships. The second advantage was the 310-ton French-built submarine Delfin. It joined the fleet after the start of the war, its crew training was weak, but it was a significant threat thanks to the Ottomans' lack of weapons or training against submarines. However, it did not participate in this battle because it was the only submarine in the Greek arsenal and was given many different missions.

Forces engaged

Ottoman fleet	Greek fleet
Main force Main battle fleet 1st Destroyer Division 2nd Destroyer Division 3rd Division Commander Col. Ramiz Lt. Cmdr. Hüseyin Rauf Lt. Col. Hakkı Eşref 4 battleships 4 torpedo boats 1 torpedo cruiser 4 destroyers 3 destroyers 1 cruiser 1 repair ship 1 hospital ship 1 minelayer	Main force Main battle fleet Dardanelles patrol Tenedos detachment Commander Adm. Pavlos Kountouriotis 1 armoured cruiser 3 battleships 3 destroyers 2 destroyers 4 destroyers

Battle

Fleet movements during the battle: The blue ships (Greek fleet) attempt to cross the T of the red ships (Ottoman fleet) at the entrance to the Dardanelles. The Ottoman fleet advances in line ahead, led by the flagship Barbaros Hayreddin. The faster armoured cruiser Georgios Averof detached from the slower battleships and attempted to cross the Ottoman line independently. The Ottoman fleet then turned back and withdrew under the protection of the Dardanelles fortifications.

The loading mechanism of one of Georgios Averof's guns after being struck by an Ottoman shell.

On December 14, the acting commander of the Ottoman Navy, Colonel Ramiz, held a meeting with all the ship commanders on the battleship Barbaros. Battle plans were prepared at this meeting. According to the plan, the conflict would take place in the triangle of Imroz-Dardanelles-Bozcaada, within the range of fortified positions. The Greek navy went out to sea on December 14th because of the Mecidiye's operation, spent the night of December 14–15 north of Imbros, observed the strait on December 15th, then sent some destroyers to Bozcaada for resupply and spent the night of December 15–16 north of Imbros with its main force. It was waiting for the Ottoman fleet to go out to sea, and if they did not, it planned to resupply from the coal ships stationed on Bozcaada.

At 06:00 on 16 December 1912, the main Greek force was advancing north of Imbros in a formation consisting of the main battle line, led by Averof, followed by 3 Idra-class ships, and 4 destroyers (Leon, Panthir, Yeraks, Aetos) shielding the Dardanelles side of this line. At 07:00, the first destroyer division under the command of Hüseyin Rauf moved, and five minutes later the second destroyer division under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Hakkı Eşref. Due to engine failure, Basra joined the third division. Due to dense fog, the parties did not see each other during the departure of the Ottoman fleet. At 08:15, the First Destroyer Division spotted the main Greek force, immediately returned and reported the enemy presence to Colonel Ramiz, and Commander Hüseyin Rauf, assuming that the Greeks were aiming to make a T-shaped passage, suggested that the fleet sail towards Kumkale, passing close to Seddülbahir. The fortified position command also informed Colonel Ramiz that 4 battleships and 5 destroyers were off Zığındere, and that 5 destroyers and a submarine were off Bozcaada. Colonel Ramiz did not find Rauf's proposal suitable, as he thought that the 240 mm guns of the Ertuğrul and Orhaniye batteries would prevent the enemy fleet from approaching.

Admiral Kunduriotis received the first news about the Ottoman fleet from the Velos, one of the destroyers patrolling the strait . After the fog briefly cleared, the destroyer spotted the Mecidiye and concluded that other Ottoman destroyers were also in the area. The smoke rising over the strait gave the impression that the entire Ottoman force had set sail. The departure of the Reşitpaşa hospital ship from the strait shortly afterwards strengthened the Greek commander's belief. As the Greek fleet began preparing for battle, the destroyers on Bozcaada were also ordered to quickly join the main force.

As the Ottoman fleet exited the strait on a course of 247.5, at 09:05, while passing Seddülbahir, it saw the Greek force directly in the bow direction, at a distance of 12,000 meters. The Greek fleet had also seen the Ottomans at approximately the same time. The sea was calm, the sun was behind them, and the light southwesterly wind was carrying the smoke from the chimneys towards the Greeks, giving the Ottoman ships a more advantageous position. Thinking that the Greek fleet was trying to draw them towards it for a submarine attack, Colonel Ramiz changed his course to the west at 09:20, increased his speed to 10 miles, and ordered that a torpedo attack be prepared. At 09:35, he changed his course to the northwest. Upon this move by the Ottomans, Kunduriotis also turned his course north, while the Georgios Averof, superior in speed compared to all other Ottoman and Greek ships, was at the forefront of Admiral Kunduriotis's battle line. The slower and older Idra-class battleships were together, waiting for the enemy ships to approach. Meanwhile, the Ottoman fleet turned north; however, during this turn, the Mesudiye moved 500 m outside the battle line towards the Greeks, and the Asar-ı Tevfik took its place. At 09:40, both lines were on lines approaching each other to the north. The distance between them was measured as 14 km by the Greeks and 8 km by the Ottomans. The Ottoman line was slightly ahead of the Greeks, and it was possible that four Ottoman ships would fire on the Averof at once.

The first shot was fired at 09:40 by Barbaros Hayreddin, which raised the "start fire" flag. Turgut Reis, following behind, joined the battle when he arrived at the point where Barbaros Hayreddin had started firing. Mesudiye, upon arriving at the same point, was unable to turn due to a minor problem with its rudder and approached within 500 meters of the enemy line, while Asar-ı Tevfik took the position of the third ship. This incident caused the Greek ships to miss the chance to make a T-shaped passage, and the fleet slowed to 6 knots so that Mesudiye could take its place. Although the first shots seemed accurate, the accuracy of the artillery fire could not be increased because Mesudiye and Asar-ı Tevfik also joined the battle and, as previously agreed, aimed at Georgios Averof, making it unclear which shell was fired from which ship. The Greeks similarly focused their fire on Barbaros Hayreddin. The first hit was made by Mesudiye, a 234 mm shell hitting the smokestack of the Averof, killing one soldier, wounding six, and damaging various pieces of equipment. Shortly after, a 280 mm shell from the Barbaros Hayreddin hit the port bow turret of the Georgios Averof, rendering it unusable. Realizing he could not achieve results against the Ottomans from a distance, Kunduriotis decided to separate the Georgios Averof from the slow battleships and put the Ottoman line into a T-formation. It increased its speed to 20 miles and set a course of 22.5. The Ottoman line did not make a counter-maneuver; the Georgios Averof approached within 5,000 meters of the line. At this time, the Greek destroyers also came within gun range; since the Ottoman destroyers were not in the area, the battleships had to open fire on both the Georgios Averof and the destroyers simultaneously. At the same time, a Greek shell pierced the port side of the Barbaros Hayreddin, exploded on the armored deck, blasted a steam pipe, started a fire, and killed a soldier. Two minutes later, a second shell hit the hatch, shattering the rangefinder and wounding a soldier.

By 10:07, the Ottoman battleships were heading north at 10 knots; the Averof was 3 km from the port bow of the Barbaros, and three Greek battleships were 7 km from the Barbaros's side. The Ottoman First Destroyer Division was approximately 4 km from the Averof. Believing the battle was turning against him, the Ottoman commander decided to turn back, rotating each ship 180 degrees in place to expedite the turn. This maneuver required a readjustment of the artillery fire; nevertheless, at 10:20, the Ottoman ships had hit the Averof with three heavy shells: one cracked the armored deck, one exploded on the bridge, and one struck an unarmored area on the port bow. The maneuver, completed at 10:25, reversed the order of the ships in the Ottoman battle line. Faced with the situation, Kunduriotis decided to cease fire and join the old battleships, joining the Idra-class battleships at 10:30 and raising the ceasefire flag at 10:50. At 11:55, the Averof and Idra-class battleships met and set sail for Mudros. The Ottoman fleet continued southeast for a while, and after the damage assessment was completed at 11:05, seeing no impediment to fighting, it turned northeast to engage the Greeks again. Due to the Averof's lack of response and the Mesudiye and Asar-ı Tevfik's inability to exceed 8 miles per hour, they returned to Çanakkale.

The fleet, leaving the First Destroyer Division at Karanlık Liman, anchored at Nara Point at 14:30. Seeing suspicious clouds on the horizon, the First Destroyer Division immediately weighed anchor and conducted a reconnaissance operation at a speed of 15 knots in the west-northwest direction; at 15:50 it opened fire on a boat thought to be protecting submarines off Yeniköy, and after a second shot it retreated after being subjected to fire from the Greek flotilla around Tavşan Island. The destroyers anchored at Nara at 17:30. The Greek navy also anchored at Mudros Harbor at 21:55.

Aftermath

Georgios Averof, now preserved as a museum ship.

The battle ended inconclusively from a military standpoint, with both sides declaring victory. The Ottomans had the flag used by Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha in the Battle of Preveza brought from the naval museum and hoisted it on the mast of the battleship Barbarossa Hayreddin, while the Greeks held a parade in the presence of the naval commander in Georgios Averof. The Greeks maintained their advantageous position in the Northern Aegean. The Ottoman navy remained in the Dardanelles Strait because it could not break the Greek blockade, and later made efforts to regain control of the Aegean Sea.

Both sides suffered very little damage in the battle. Apart from one large and one small shell hitting Barbaros Hayreddin, the Ottoman ships were undamaged; one soldier was killed and one wounded. Due to their age, some malfunctions had occurred due to the shock of their own artillery fire. Georgios Averof had taken five large, fifteen medium and small shell hits, its foremast and bow mast were damaged, one soldier was killed and one wounded. Spetsai had one large and three small hits; Idra had one hit. While the Ottoman ships were taken for repairs at Cape Nara, the Greek ships were able to remain at sea.

The battle was reported in the Greek press as a great victory. The Akropolis newspaper of December 4th ran the headline "The Turkish navy withdrew in response to Greek fire," writing that the navy reflected the spirit of the 1821 War of Independence; similar reports appeared in other newspapers. In contemporary Greek historiography, the battle is also seen as a victory that had a significant impact on the outcome of the war. In naval circles, however, Admiral Kunduriotis was criticized for "unnecessarily" risking the Averof by exposing it to artillery fire. King George I of Greece wrote to the admiral in a telegram:

I am obliged to advise you to exercise caution and maturity. For God's sake, please do not act rashly. It is not permissible for such a valuable commander and admiral to endanger his own life, the lives of our sailors, and our ships in this way. Do you think about what will happen to poor Greece if the ships are lost? Long live the fleet of the valuable commander Kunduriotis!"

— King George to Pavlos Kountouriotis

Years later, when Kunduriotis wrote about the matter, he responded to the accusations by saying, "Warships are not ornaments. History shows us that no nation can rule the seas without considering the endangerment, and even the sinking if necessary, of its ships as fate."

The political situation in the Aegean Sea required the Ottoman navy to engage the Greeks again, while the Greeks needed to quickly seize the islands of Lesbos and Chios before the Ottoman offensive. After the Battle of Elli, the Greeks decided to occupy Lesbos first, by sending all their auxiliary cruisers to Lesbos, because it was ideal for blockading the Gulf of İzmir and the Ayvalık region. On December 17, the Ottoman forces on Lesbos requested assistance from Çanakkale in the face of the Greek offensive, but they did not receive reinforcements. The idea of sending the Ottoman navy to İzmir was also not implemented because Bozcaada was under Greek control. The Ottoman navy would once again face the Greek navy in the Battle of Lemnos, a month later, for dominance of the Aegean. The Greek cruiser Elli is named after this battle. It is the largest naval battle of the Balkan Wars.

See also

• Greek cruiser Elli (1912)
• Greek cruiser Elli (1935)
• Greek frigate Elli (F450)

Sources

• Büyüktuğrul, Afif (1974). Ottoman Naval War History (PDF) (in Turkish). Vol. 4. Ankara: Naval Forces Command, General Staff. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2020-10-08. Retrieved 2026-07-08.
• Emir, Ali Haydar (1932). The Turkish Fleet in the Balkan War (PDF) (in Turkish). Istanbul: Deniz Matbaası. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2020-10-13. Retrieved 2026-07-08.
• Erickson, Edward J.; Bush, Brighton C. (2003). Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–1913. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 9780275978884.
• Fotakis, Zisis (2005). Greek Naval Strategy and Policy, 1910–1919. Routledge. ISBN 9780415350143.
• Gardiner, Robert, ed. (1979). Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1860–1905. Greenwich: Conway Maritime Press. ISBN 9780831703028.
• Gardiner, Robert; Gray, Randal, eds. (1985). Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1906–1921. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 9780870219078.
• Hall, Richard C. (2000). The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War. Routledge. ISBN 9780415229463.
• Işın, Mithat (1946). The Naval War of the Balkan War, 1912–1913 (in Turkish). Ankara: Deniz Basımevi.
• Koliopoulos, John S.; Veremis, Thanos M. (2010). Modern Greece: A History since 1821. Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 9781405186810.
• Langensiepen, Bernd; Güleryüz, Ahmet (1995). The Ottoman Steam Navy, 1828–1923. London: Conway Maritime Press. ISBN 9780851776101.
• Stewart, William (2009). Admirals of the World: A Biographical Dictionary, 1500 to the Present. McFarland. ISBN 9780786438099.
• Willmott, H. P. (2009). The Last Century of Sea Power. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. ISBN 9780253352149.

Further reading

• Erickson, Edward J.; Bush, Brighton C. (2003). Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–1913. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 0275978885.
• Fotakis, Zisis (2005). Greek Naval Strategy and Policy, 1910–1919. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-35014-3.