Talk:Rohingya genocide

43,000

The upper limit of 43,000 killed appears to be incorrect. TIME arrives at this figure by adding together the number of children with one missing parent and two times the number of children with two missing parents. The report cited by TIME actually states: "According to Bangladeshi government figures, out of approximately 688,000 new arrivals since 25 August at the time of APHR’s visit, over 36,000 children were reported to have lost at least one parent and over 7,700 were reported to have lost both parents, though protection actors that APHR spoke with explained that some unaccompanied children may simply be separated from their parents" (p. 3). Thus, the report itself already warns against equating missing parents with deaths, and, more importantly, the 36,000 cannot be added to the 2 x 7,700, since the latter are almost certainly included in the former ("at least one parent"). Apart from that, it is also rather strange that the number of children with at least one missing parent in TIME (28,300) does not match the number given in the source (36,000). Am I missing something? DaWalda (talk) 23:41, 22 December 2025 (UTC)

Ah. It was late yesterday. What I was missing is that TIME seems to have subtracted the children with two missing parents from those with at least one missing parent without stating so, thus arriving at the 28,300 figure, which is not mentioned anywhere in the report. Well. But it still remains the case that the report explicitly warns against equating missing parents with those killed. If there are no objections, I would simply remove the 43,000 figure next week and provide better sourcing for the 25,000 figure with e.g. Macmanus et al. 2018, p. 14 fn 8; Mulaj 2025, p. 956. DaWalda (talk) 07:52, 23 December 2025 (UTC)

This figure is already cited as an upper limit for the number of deaths. The number of missing people seems to be a credible upper bound for deaths. CamAnders (talk) 14:43, 23 December 2025 (UTC)

the article literally states in the first line that: more than 43,000 Rohingya parents have been reported lost, presumed dead. - this is the upper limit for deaths which is cited. I don't find anything incorrect here. WinKyaw (talk) 15:31, 23 December 2025 (UTC)

Well, yes—the TIME article is reproduced correctly. However, the article does not accurately reflect its own underlying source, which only refers to missing people and warns that they may simply be missing (not dead). I've dug back into the literature again. I still believe that the figure of 43,000 should be removed from the table, but partly for different reasons than before:

As far as I can tell, most authors avoid precise estimates, but those who do generally cite the approximately 24,000 reported by from OIDA (p. 69): Bakali 2021, p. 54 ("approximately 24,000 Rohingya"); Islam/Rahman 2022, p. 136 ("more than 23,962"); Karim 2020, p. 8 ("at least 24,000"); Mulaj 2025, p. 956 ("an estimated 25,000 Rohingya"); Uddin 2019, p. 11 = Uddin 2022, p. 71 ("more than 25,000"). This is clearly the majority view.

There are two minority positions. Some cite the ~10,000 from the IFFM, p. 8: Lee 2021, p. 1: ("at least 9,000 Rohingya men"); Ochab/Alton 2022, p. 113 ("10,000 deaths being a conservative estimate").

Others cite the 43,000 from the ASEAN report. I've now searched more extensively for these. I found only two. In the first case, the source does not endorse the figure; in the second, it includes the necessary caveat:

• Kinseth 2019, fn 37: "Pinpointing the precise death toll remains difficult, with estimates varying widely. Groups like [MSF] have estimated at least 10,000 people were killed, while TIME has extrapolated that at least 43,000 parents may have been killed.
• Adams 2019, p. 10 + fn 24 = Adams 2019b, p. 441 + fn 15: "A report by [ASEAN], based on findings by the Bangladesh government, calculated the approximaate death toll during the so-called 'clearance operations' to be 43,000 Rohingya adults. [...] It was noted, however, that some unaccompanied refugee children may have simply lost contact with their families while fleeing Myanmar."

Now, first, I think it's hard to justify including the minority estimate of 43,000 in our table while not listing the minority figure of 9,000 as the lower bound, using 25,000 instead.

At the same time, the 9,000 shouldn't be mentioned either—it's even more problematic than the 43,000: it ultimately traces back to MSF, p. 7, which talks about "9,400 people … including at least 6,700 killed"—but this count only covers deaths during the first month of the violence. MacManus et al. 2018, p. 14 fn 8, extrapolated these findings forward and arrived at a total of 22,000–25,000 deaths, broadly consistent with OIDA's estimates.

Second, I still believe that the 43,000 figure would at the very least require Adams's caveat.

(Additionally, third, what bothers me personally even more now than before is that TIME makes more out of its ASEAN source than the source itself supports. TIME's calculation seems methodologically flawed to me: deriving an upper bound from missing parents ignores that many children were also killed (MSF reports 730 children under five alone among its 6,700 deaths in the first month, see p. 4). By TIME's logic, the total would far exceed 43,000.)

I think, weighing everything, 22,000–25,000 is the best option for the table, despite the existence of both lower and higher minority estimates. That said, I'm not strongly attached to this—if someone raises an objection, I'm happy to let it rest. DaWalda (talk) 14:03, 24 December 2025 (UTC)

I've edited accordingly, since I agree with DaWalda's assessment. (t · c) buIdhe 01:27, 31 December 2025 (UTC)