Draft:Shining Path
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Communist Party of Peru Partido Comunista del Perú | |
|---|---|
| Abbreviation | PCP (official) PCP-SL (unofficial) |
| Leaders |
|
| Founder | Abimael Guzmán |
| Founded | 1969 |
| Split from | Peruvian Communist Party – Red Flag |
| Succeeded by | Militarized Communist Party of Peru (splinter group) |
| Armed wing | People's Guerrilla Army (EGP) |
| Ideology | |
| Political position | Far-left |
| International affiliation | Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (defunct) |
| Colors | Red |
| Slogan | ¡Viva la Guerra Popular! ¡Guerra Popular hasta el comunismo! ("Long live the People's War! People's War until communism!") |
| Party flag | |
The Shining Path (Spanish: Sendero Luminoso, SL), officially the Communist Party of Peru (Spanish: Partido Comunista de Perú, PCP), is a Marxist–Leninist–Maoist guerrilla organization in Peru. Abimael Guzmán, a university philosophy professor, founded the group in 1969. In 1980, the Shining Path initiated an internal armed conflict to overthrow the Peruvian state and establish a communist "New Democracy". The government of Peru, the United States, the European Union, and Canada designate the group as a terrorist organization.[1][2]
The Shining Path originated from a split within the Peruvian communist movement. Rejecting the electoral participation of other left-wing parties, Guzmán built a clandestine organization centered at the National University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga in the empoverished Ayacucho region.[3] The group's ideology, known as "Gonzalo Thought", required absolute submission to Guzmán and advocated for violence as a necessary tool for revolution.[4] The Shining Path rejected universal human rights. During the conflict, the group assassinated rival left-wing politicians, trade unionists, community leaders, and peasants who opposed them.[5]
During the 1980s, the Shining Path expanded across the Andean highlands and into the Amazon basin. The group funded its operations by taxing the illicit cocaine trade.[6] The Peruvian government deployed the Armed Forces in response, and state security forces committed massacres and forced disappearances.[7] The Shining Path's attempts to control the rural economy and its executions of civilians led indigenous and peasant communities to form armed self-defense militias, known as rondas campesinas.[8] As these militias and the military pushed the group out of rural areas, the Shining Path shifted its operations to Lima, where it used car bombs and assassinations in the capital's shantytowns.[9]
On September 12, 1992, the National Directorate Against Terrorism (DINCOTE) captured Guzmán and the majority of the central committee in Lima.[10] Guzmán subsequently called for a peace accord in 1993, which caused the organization to splinter. A remnant faction currently operates in the Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (VRAEM) region, where it is involved in drug trafficking.[11] In 2003, the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) estimated that 69,280 people died or disappeared during the conflict. The commission concluded that the Shining Path was responsible for approximately 46 percent of the total casualties, though the statistical methodology used to determine this figure has been the subject of debate.[12][13][14]
History
[edit]Origins and early organizing (1969–1979)
[edit]The Shining Path originated from a schism within the Peruvian Communist Party. Following the Sino-Soviet split in 1964, the party divided into a pro-Soviet faction (PCP-Unidad) and a pro-Chinese faction (PCP-Bandera Roja). Abimael Guzmán, a philosophy professor at the National University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga in Ayacucho, led a regional committee within Bandera Roja. In 1969, Guzmán and his followers broke away to form the Communist Party of Peru – Shining Path.[3][15]
The group's development was closely tied to the socio-economic conditions of Ayacucho, an impoverished agrarian region. The reopening of the University of Huamanga in 1959 attracted provincial, mestizo, and indigenous youth seeking social mobility through education. Guzmán capitalized on this demographic, recruiting heavily among students and teachers who faced limited employment prospects in the region's stagnant economy.[16]
During the 1970s, the Shining Path isolated itself from other left-wing organizations and social movements. While other Marxist groups participated in trade unions and engaged with the agrarian reforms of the military government of Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968–1975), the Shining Path rejected the reforms as "fascist" and refused to participate in the 1978 Constituent Assembly or the 1980 democratic elections.[17] Instead, the group focused entirely on building a clandestine cadre structure in preparation for an armed insurgency.
Armed conflict (1980–1992)
[edit]
On May 17, 1980, the eve of Peru's first democratic presidential elections in twelve years, Shining Path militants burned ballot boxes in the town of Chuschi, Ayacucho. This marked the beginning of the group's "people's war."[18] Initially, the government of Fernando Belaúnde Terry dismissed the group as common criminals and deployed police units to the region. As the insurgency expanded its control over rural Ayacucho through assassinations and sabotage, the government declared a state of emergency in late 1982 and deployed the Armed Forces.[19]
The military implemented a counterinsurgency strategy that resulted in widespread human rights abuses. The years 1983 and 1984 were the deadliest of the conflict, characterized by massacres, extrajudicial executions, and forced disappearances committed by state security forces against the peasant population.[20][7] Facing military pressure and growing resistance from peasant militias (rondas campesinas), the Shining Path expanded its operations into the central highlands and the Amazon basin. In the Huallaga Valley, the group taxed the illicit cocaine trade to finance its military operations.[6]
By the late 1980s, during the presidency of Alan García, Peru experienced a severe economic crisis and hyperinflation. The Shining Path capitalized on the collapse of state services and shifted its strategic focus to Lima. The group carried out bombings of electrical infrastructure, assassinated political rivals, and detonated car bombs in commercial districts, such as the 1992 Tarata bombing in Miraflores, which killed 25 civilians.[9][21]
Capture of Guzmán and decline (1992–present)
[edit]
On April 5, 1992, President Alberto Fujimori suspended the constitution and dissolved Congress, centralizing power in the executive branch with the backing of the military.[22] Five months later, on September 12, 1992, the National Directorate Against Terrorism (DINCOTE) captured Guzmán and several high-ranking Central Committee members in a safe house in the Surquillo district of Lima.[10] DINCOTE's Special Intelligence Group (GEIN) had been monitoring the apartment since a number of suspected Shining Path militants had visited it. An inspection of the garbage of the apartment produced empty tubes of a skin cream used to treat psoriasis, a condition that Guzmán was known to have.[23]
The capture severely weakened the highly centralized organization. In 1993, Guzmán publicly called for peace talks with the Peruvian government from prison. This caused a schism within the Shining Path. A faction led by Óscar Ramírez Durand ("Comrade Feliciano") rejected the peace accord and formed "Sendero Rojo" (Red Path) to continue the armed struggle. Ramírez was captured by authorities in 1999.[24]
The remaining militants retreated to the Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (VRAEM) region. Under the leadership of Víctor Quispe Palomino ("Comrade José") and his brother Jorge ("Comrade Raúl," who died in 2021), this remnant faction established a stronghold in the dense jungle of Vizcatán.[11] To finance their operations, the group formed alliances with local drug trafficking clans, providing armed escorts for cocaine shipments heading toward Brazil and Bolivia.[11] Seeking to distance themselves from Guzmán's legacy and regain local support, the Quispe Palomino faction denounced Guzmán as a traitor and rebranded the group as the Militarized Communist Party of Peru (MPCP).[25] Despite ongoing military operations against them and their transition toward organized crime, the MPCP continues to utilize child soldiers and carry out ambushes against Peruvian security forces in the VRAEM.[11][25]
Organization and tactics
[edit]Structure, family networks, and women
[edit]The Shining Path was organized using a "concentric construction" model. At the center of the organization was the Communist Party, which maintained absolute political and ideological control over the group's other branches. The party's armed wing, the People's Guerrilla Army (Ejército Guerrillero Popular, EGP), formed the second ring, divided into Principal, Local, and Base forces.[26]
The outermost ring consisted of the United Front, which operated through "generated organisms" (organismos generados). These were civil organizations created by the party to recruit specific demographics. Recruitment frequently occurred along family lines, with militants enrolling their siblings, spouses, and children.[27] Augusta La Torre, Guzmán's wife and the party's second-in-command, played a central role in this recruitment by founding the Women's Popular Movement in 1974. La Torre utilized this generated organism to mobilize women across the country, framing the armed struggle as a means of female emancipation. Consequently, women comprised a high percentage of the Shining Path's militant base and leadership, despite the party's patriarchal internal dynamics.[28][29]
The group maintained strict internal discipline through the Maoist practice of "criticism and self-criticism," in which militants were required to publicly confess their ideological errors and submit to party reprimands.[30] Militants were also expected to adhere to "the quota" (la cuota), the ideological commitment to sacrifice their own lives for the revolution. The Shining Path leadership framed the loss of its own fighters not as military defeats, but as necessary blood sacrifices that would purify the party and guarantee its ultimate victory.[31]
Relationship with the peasantry and indigenous groups
[edit]During the early 1980s, the Shining Path gained initial sympathy in parts of the southern highlands by executing cattle rustlers, abusive merchants, and corrupt local officials.[32] However, this support rapidly declined as the Shining Path attempted to restructure the rural economy. Following Maoist doctrine, the group prohibited peasants from taking their agricultural surpluses to regional markets, mandating that communities grow only enough food to sustain the guerrilla columns. This policy threatened the material survival of the peasantry.[33]
The Shining Path also suppressed indigenous cultural and political practices. The group viewed Andean culture as a remnant of feudalism and sought to replace traditional communal authorities, such as the varayoq (staff holders), with young party militants.[34] They prohibited religious festivals, closed Evangelical churches, and banned the consumption of alcohol.
The Shining Path's treatment of indigenous populations in the Amazon basin was particularly severe. In the regions of the Ene and Tambo rivers, the group established totalitarian camps where they held thousands of indigenous Asháninka people captive.[25] Within these camps, the group subjected indigenous women to sexual slavery and forced pregnancies. The children born in these camps, or abducted from local villages, were indoctrinated in "popular schools" and trained as child soldiers, known within the party as pioneritos.[25]
In response to the economic strangulation and extreme violence, peasant and indigenous communities organized armed self-defense patrols known as rondas campesinas. Beginning in 1983, these militias allied with the Peruvian Armed Forces to expel the Shining Path from their territories.[8] The Shining Path retaliated against the rondas with mass executions, such as the 1983 Lucanamarca massacre, in which guerrillas killed 69 peasants.[35]
Urban tactics
[edit]
As the rondas campesinas and the military pushed the Shining Path out of its rural strongholds in the late 1980s, the group shifted its focus to Lima, Peru's capital and richest region. The organization concentrated its efforts on the capital's barriadas (shantytowns), which housed roughly half of the city's population.[36]
In the barriadas, the Shining Path sought to infiltrate and co-opt existing grassroots organizations, such as community soup kitchens and the Glass of Milk program.[37] To eliminate political competition and establish total control over these neighborhoods, the group systematically assassinated rival left-wing politicians, trade unionists, and community leaders who opposed their presence. Notable victims included Enrique Castilla, a union activist, and María Elena Moyano, a well-known community leader in the district of Villa El Salvador who had publicly organized peace marches against the insurgency.[38][39]
In the capital, the group also utilized car bombs to destroy economic infrastructure and government buildings. To demonstrate its control over the urban population, the Shining Path frequently enforced "armed strikes" (paros armados), threatening to kill public transportation drivers and business owners who opened their doors during the designated strike days.[9]
Ideology
[edit]Gonzalo Thought
[edit]The Shining Path's official ideology was "Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, Gonzalo Thought." The group's founder, Abimael Guzmán, adapted Maoist doctrine to the Peruvian context, arguing that Peru was a "semi-feudal and semi-colonial" country that could only be transformed through a protracted people's war.[40] The ultimate objective of this war was to encircle the cities from the countryside, destroy the existing state, and establish a "People's Republic of New Democracy."[41]
Within the organization, "Gonzalo Thought" was treated as an infallible, scientific truth rather than a standard political platform. Guzmán was elevated through an intense cult of personality to the status of the "Fourth Sword of Marxism," placing him historically alongside Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, and Mao Zedong.[4] Party militants were required to sign letters of absolute submission to Guzmán and his ideology.[42]
The ideology emphasized the necessity of extreme violence to achieve political objectives. Guzmán taught that the revolution required a "blood quota" (la cuota), meaning that militants had to be entirely willing to sacrifice their own lives and kill others to advance the party's goals.[43][44]
Rejection of human rights
[edit]The Shining Path explicitly rejected the concept of human rights. The group's literature characterized the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights as "bourgeois" and "counterrevolutionary" tools used by imperialist powers to maintain global hegemony and suppress socialist revolutions.[45]
Instead of individual human rights, Guzmán advocated for "people's rights" (derechos del pueblo). He defined this concept exclusively as the right of the working class to seize state power through violence and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat.[46] Under this framework, the party claimed a monopoly on historical truth and categorized any individual or organization outside its direct control as an enemy of the revolution.[5]
This ideological stance provided the justification for the group's use of extreme violence against non-combatants. Because the Shining Path did not recognize the neutrality of civilians or the legitimacy of other political actors, it systematically targeted those who did not submit to its authority. Rival left-wing politicians, grassroots community leaders, trade unionists, and peasants who resisted the group's directives were classified as agents of the state and routinely assassinated.[5]
International influence
[edit]
The Shining Path's ideological foundation was heavily influenced by the Chinese Communist Party and the Cultural Revolution. Abimael Guzmán and Augusta La Torre traveled to China in 1965 and 1967, respectively, to observe Maoist policies.[47] During his 1965 visit, Guzmán attended a military training school in Nanjing, where he received instruction in explosives and guerrilla warfare alongside other international communist figures.[48] Following these visits, the Shining Path adopted Mao Zedong's strategies of protracted people's war and the encirclement of cities from the countryside.[49]
The group received no official material aid from foreign governments, relying instead on minor financial contributions from small Maoist solidarity groups in the United States and Europe.[50] In 1984, the Shining Path joined the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM), a global coalition of Maoist organizations that included factions from Turkey, Bangladesh, and the United States.[51] RIM promoted the Shining Path as a primary model for communist revolution, and its members occasionally traveled to Peru to meet with the Shining Path's Permanent Committee.[52][53] The party also maintained an international presence through expatriate networks; Guzmán's brother-in-law, Javier Esparza, served as the group's primary representative in Europe from Sweden.[54]
The Shining Path's application of Maoist theory influenced other communist insurgencies, most notably in Nepal. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), which launched a civil war in 1996, was ideologically encouraged by the Shining Path's insurgency through their shared membership in RIM.[55] The Nepali Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal adopted the ideological concept of the "Prachanda Path" as a direct tribute to Guzmán's "Gonzalo Thought".[56] The international promotion of Gonzalo Thought also reached China, where unauthorized graffiti praising Guzmán appeared on university walls.
Aftermath and Truth and Reconciliation Commission
[edit]Following the collapse of Alberto Fujimori's government in 2000, interim President Valentín Paniagua established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to investigate human rights abuses committed during the internal armed conflict between 1980 and 2000.[57] In its 2003 Final Report, the TRC estimated that 69,280 people died or disappeared during the conflict.[12][13] The commission concluded that the Shining Path was the primary perpetrator, responsible for approximately 46 percent of the total killings, while the Peruvian state and its allied militias were responsible for 30 percent.[13] The TRC noted that 79 percent of the victims were rural indigenous people. The role of existing socio-economic and racial divisions in the conflict's violence is also noted in the Final Report.[58]
The TRC was the first truth commission in Latin America to systematically include a gender perspective in its investigations.[59] It documented 538 specific cases of rape, though it estimated that a majority of the 7,426 women registered as victims of other abuses also experienced sexual violence.[60] The commission found that while the Peruvian armed forces used rape systematically as a weapon of war and interrogation, the Shining Path's use of sexual violence differed.[61] Although the Shining Path's official doctrine forbade rape, the group engaged in forced marriages, forced pregnancies, forced prostitution, and sexual slavery within its camps.[62][63] The group also systematically targeted and murdered homosexual and transgender individuals in the Amazon region as part of a moral campaign to enforce hetero-normativity.[64] Despite the TRC's documentation, subsequent judicial prosecutions for conflict-related sexual violence have been rare. Scholars attribute this impunity to institutional sexism, racism, and a lack of political will within the Peruvian judiciary.[65]
The TRC's casualty estimates and attribution of responsibility have been the subject of academic debate. The TRC used multiple systems estimation (capture-recapture methods) to extrapolate the total death toll from 25,000 documented killings.[13] In 2019, independent scholar Silvio Rendón published a reanalysis of the TRC's data, arguing that the commission's indirect statistical methodology introduced an upward bias in the Shining Path's casualty figures. Rendón estimated a lower total of 48,049 killings and concluded that the Peruvian state, rather than the Shining Path, was responsible for the majority of the deaths.[66][67] This reanalysis was subsequently refuted by Daniel Manrique-Vallier and Patrick Ball, two of the original quantitative analysts for the TRC. They argued that Rendón's methodology was flawed and noted that his estimated death toll for the Shining Path (15,089) was lower than the absolute number of Shining Path victims already documented by the Peruvian government (17,687), rendering his conclusions impossible.[68] Rendón published a rejoinder defending his direct estimation method and arguing that the additional government data remained provisional.[69]
In a 2024 interview published by Action on Armed Violence, Rendón discussed his findings with economist Michael Spagat. During the exchange, Rendón argued that the TRC's original methodology relied on an unorthodox "indirect estimation" by subtraction that artificially inflated Shining Path casualties. He further rebutted Manrique-Vallier and Ball's defense, noting that to maintain their original figures, the TRC analysts had relied on a biased "Census for Peace" dataset.[70] Rendón pointed out that this census had been collected exclusively for financial reparations and systematically undercounted victims of state violence, as civilians feared being labeled terrorist sympathizers if they reported military abuses.[70]
See also
[edit]References
[edit]- ^ U.S. Department of State 2021.
- ^ Council of the European Union 2005.
- ^ a b Stern 1998, p. 64.
- ^ a b Degregori 2012, p. 89.
- ^ a b c Stern 1998, p. 434.
- ^ a b Stern 1998, p. 213.
- ^ a b Degregori 2012, p. 53.
- ^ a b Stern 1998, p. 232.
- ^ a b c Burt 2007, p. 96.
- ^ a b Starn & La Serna 2019, p. 265.
- ^ a b c d InSight Crime 2024.
- ^ a b Boesten 2014, p. 3.
- ^ a b c d Rendón 2019a, p. 2.
- ^ Spagat 2024.
- ^ Degregori 2012, p. 39.
- ^ Degregori 2012, p. 97.
- ^ Stern 1998, p. 71.
- ^ Gorriti 1999, p. 17.
- ^ Stern 1998, p. 387.
- ^ Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 2003, p. 133.
- ^ Starn & La Serna 2019, p. 180.
- ^ Burt 2007, p. 165.
- ^ Rochlin 2003, p. 71.
- ^ Degregori 2012, p. 35.
- ^ a b c d Villasante 2019.
- ^ Stern 1998, p. 176.
- ^ Heilman 2010, p. 156.
- ^ Heilman 2010, p. 158.
- ^ Boesten 2014, p. 24.
- ^ Gorriti 1999, p. 29.
- ^ Degregori 2012, p. 143.
- ^ Stern 1998, p. 131.
- ^ Stern 1998, p. 133.
- ^ Stern 1998, p. 134.
- ^ Stern 1998, p. 143.
- ^ Burt 2007, p. 94.
- ^ Burt 2007, p. 112.
- ^ Burt 2007, p. 1.
- ^ Burt 2007, p. 115.
- ^ Degregori 2012, p. 168.
- ^ Degregori 2012, p. 81.
- ^ Degregori 2012, p. 88.
- ^ Degregori 2012, p. 142.
- ^ Degregori 2012, p. 141.
- ^ Stern 1998, p. 432.
- ^ Stern 1998, p. 431.
- ^ Starn & La Serna 2019, pp. 45–47, 57.
- ^ Lovell 2019, p. 4.
- ^ Lovell 2019, pp. 319–321.
- ^ Starn & La Serna 2019, p. 31.
- ^ Lovell 2019, p. 393.
- ^ Starn & La Serna 2019, p. 200.
- ^ Lovell 2019, p. 394.
- ^ Starn & La Serna 2019, p. 144.
- ^ Lovell 2019, pp. 393–394.
- ^ Starn & La Serna 2019, p. 268.
- ^ Boesten 2014, p. 69.
- ^ Boesten 2014, pp. 72–73.
- ^ Boesten 2014, p. 78.
- ^ Boesten 2014, pp. 23–24.
- ^ Boesten 2014, pp. 24–25.
- ^ Boesten 2014, p. 4.
- ^ Boesten 2014, p. 149.
- ^ Boesten 2014, p. 64.
- ^ Boesten 2014, pp. 118–120.
- ^ Rendón 2019a, p. 1.
- ^ Rendón 2019a, p. 5.
- ^ Manrique-Vallier & Ball 2019, pp. 1–2.
- ^ Rendón 2019b, p. 1.
- ^ a b Overton, Iain (2 April 2024). "The Peruvian TRC named a surprising group as the primary perpetrator in Peru's civil war. Professor Mike Spagat talks to Dr Silvio Rendon about how the TRC got it wrong". AOAV. Retrieved 4 July 2026.
Bibliography
[edit]- Boesten, Jelke (2014). Sexual Violence in War and Peace: Gender, Power, and Post-Conflict Justice in Peru. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. ISBN 978-0-8135-6262-9.
- Boutron, Camille; Constant, Chloé (2013). "Gendering Transnational Criminality: The Case of Women's Imprisonment in Peru". Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society. 39 (1): 177–195. doi:10.1086/670827. S2CID 146747514.
- Burt, Jo-Marie (2007). Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru: Silencing Civil Society. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-230-60699-0.
{{cite book}}: Check|isbn=value: checksum (help) - Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (2003). Informe Final (Report) (in Spanish). Lima: CVR.
- Council of the European Union (2005). Council Common Position 2005/936/CFSP (Report). Official Journal of the European Union.
- Degregori, Carlos Iván (2012). How Difficult It Is to Be God: Shining Path's Politics of War in Peru, 1980–1999. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. ISBN 978-0-299-28924-9.
- Gorriti, Gustavo (1999). The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. ISBN 978-0-8078-4676-6.
- Heilman, Jaymie Patricia (2010). "Family Ties: The Political Genealogy of Shining Path's Comrade Norah". Bulletin of Latin American Research. 29 (2): 155–169. doi:10.1111/j.1470-9856.2009.00321.x.
- InSight Crime (28 May 2024). "Shining Path". InSight Crime Foundation. Retrieved 3 July 2026.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link) - Lovell, Julia (2019). Maoism: A Global History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. ISBN 978-0-525-65604-3.
- Manrique-Vallier, Daniel; Ball, Patrick (2019). "Reality and risk: A refutation of S. Rendón's analysis of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission's conflict mortality study". Research & Politics. 6 (1): 1–5. doi:10.1177/2053168019835628.
- Rendón, Silvio (2019a). "Capturing correctly: A reanalysis of the indirect capture–recapture methods in the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission". Research & Politics. 6 (1): 1–8. doi:10.1177/2053168018820375.
- Rendón, Silvio (2019b). "A truth commission did not tell the truth: A rejoinder to Manrique-Vallier and Ball". Research & Politics. 6 (2): 1–4. doi:10.1177/2053168019840972.
- Rochlin, James F. (2003). Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. ISBN 1-58826-106-9.
- Starn, Orin; La Serna, Miguel (2019). The Shining Path: Love, Madness, and Revolution in the Andes. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN 978-0-393-24758-2.
{{cite book}}: Check|isbn=value: checksum (help) - Stern, Steve J., ed. (1998). Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980–1995. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. ISBN 978-0-8223-2217-7.
- U.S. Department of State (2021). Country Reports on Terrorism 2020 (Report). Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State.
- Villasante, Mariella (2019). "La guerra en el VRAEM: los problemas del Estado para restablecer la paz". Revista Ideele (in Spanish) (284).
External links
[edit]
Media related to Shining Path at Wikimedia Commons
Category:1960s establishments in Peru Category:Anti-American sentiment in South America Category:Anti-revisionist organizations Category:Anti-imperialist organizations Category:Banned communist parties Category:Communist parties in Peru Category:Entities added to the Consolidated List by Australia Category:Internal conflict in Peru Category:Maoism in South America Category:Maoist parties Category:Organisations designated as terrorist by the European Union Category:Organisations designated as terrorist by Japan Category:Organizations based in Latin America designated as terrorist Category:Organizations based in South America designated as terrorist Category:Organizations designated as terrorist by the United States Category:Organisations designated as terrorist by New Zealand Category:Political parties established in the 1960s Category:Rebel groups in Peru Category:Terrorism in Peru Category:Organizations designated as terrorist by Canada
