Talk:Spoiler effect
Add topic | Spoiler effect rhetoric was merged into this article. The discussion was closed on 16 June 2026 with a consensus to merge. The original page is now a redirect to this article. Its history now serves to provide attribution for the content in this article, and it must not be deleted as long as this article exists. |
| Spoiler campaign was merged into this article. The discussion was closed on 3 September 2024 with a consensus to merge. The original page is now a redirect to this article. Its history now serves to provide attribution for the content in this article, and it must not be deleted as long as this article exists. |
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[edit]- Alternative voting systems which avoid the spoiler effect include instant runoff voting, also known as single transferable vote.
This is wrong on two accounts:
- IRV and STV are not the same thing. The first is a single-winner system; the second is a multi-winner system. The second reduces to the first in the case of a single district.
- IRV and STV can suffer from the spoiler effect. For example, if the "p-ist" vote was split between 3 p-ists, the most popular and "major party" p-ist could be eliminated early, even though they would handily beat the winning q-ist.
— Preceding unsigned comment added by DanKeshet (talk • contribs)
Incorrect citation/reference
[edit]I'm not a wiki editor, so I don't know the reference specifics. However, I noticed in the first reference it was incorrectly attributed to the editors. Specifically "A spoiler effect occurs when a single party or a candidate entering an election changes the outcome to favor a different candidate." Which is found on page 379 and according to page iv is in the section "Empirical examples of voting paradoxes" written by Marek M. Kaminski.
The original book is a collection from different authors and with MLA the specific author has to be stated. ~2025-35386-46 (talk) 19:22, 21 November 2025 (UTC)
Possible outdated tense
[edit]As of 3/7/26, the article says, "Barry Burden argues that they have almost no chance of winning the 2024 election but are often motivated by particular issues." Should this be past tense? Also, to me at least it is unclear who he is talking about. ~2026-14872-60 (talk) 17:33, 8 March 2026 (UTC)
Proposed merge with Spoiler effect rhetoric
[edit]
Rated voting systems
[edit]I believe that the following text from the lede needs clarification:
- Rated voting systems are not subject to Arrow's theorem, allowing them to be spoilerproof so long as voters' ratings are consistent across elections.[1][2][3][4]
Specifically, if I give too much approval/rating to someone other than my favorite, even if that approval/rating is less than I give to my favorite, that could put that other candidate in front of my favorite to win the election. Isn't that an example of the spoiler effect that does very much exist in rated voting systems? —Quantling (talk | contribs) 16:45, 1 October 2026 (UTC)
References
- ↑ Miller, Nicholas R. (2019-04-01). "Reflections on Arrow's theorem and voting rules". Public Choice. 179 (1): 113–124. doi:10.1007/s11127-018-0524-6. hdl:11603/20937. ISSN 1573-7101.
- ↑ "The Spoiler Effect". The Center for Election Science. 2015-05-20. Retrieved 2017-01-29.
- ↑ Poundstone, William. (2013). Gaming the vote : why elections aren't fair (and what we can do about it). Farrar, Straus and Giroux. pp. 168, 197, 234. ISBN 9781429957649. OCLC 872601019.
IRV is subject to something called the "center squeeze." A popular moderate can receive relatively few first-place votes through no fault of her own but because of vote splitting from candidates to the right and left. ... Approval voting thus appears to solve the problem of vote splitting simply and elegantly. ... Range voting solves the problems of spoilers and vote splitting
- ↑ Morreau, Michael (2014-10-13). "Arrow's Theorem". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 2024-10-09.
One important finding was that having cardinal utilities is not by itself enough to avoid an impossibility result. ... Intuitively speaking, to put information about preference strengths to good use it has to be possible to compare the strengths of different individuals' preferences.