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Battle of Taro (1814)

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Battle of Taro (1814)
Part of Italian campaign of 1813–1814

Image of Taro river the location of the Battle of Taro River, April 1814
Date13–15 April 1814
Location
Taro, modern day Italy
45°00′08″N 10°15′21″E / 45.0022°N 10.2558°E / 45.0022; 10.2558
Result Coalition victory[1]
Belligerents
Commanders and leaders
Strength
5,700[2]–9,800[3] 18,000[4]–30,000[2]
Casualties and losses
Heavy Minimal
Battle of Taro (1814) is located in Mediterranean
Battle of Taro (1814)
Location within Mediterranean
Battle of Taro (1814) is located in Italy
Battle of Taro (1814)
Battle of Taro (1814) (Italy)

The Battle of the Taro took place between 13 and 15 April 1814 , in the final stages of the Italian Campaign, and saw the Austro–Neapolitans fight against the Franco–Italian forces for the possession of the Taro river, essential to reaching Piacenza. The victory of Murat's forces was in any case superfluous, since the following day, for reasons completely unrelated to the outcome of the battle, the Viceroy of Italy, Eugène de Beauharnais, signed a convention that put an end to the armed conflict.

Background

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After the catastrophic outcome of the Russian Campaign, Bonaparte's army was in very bad conditions and the other European powers took advantage of the situation to declare war on the hated Emperor of the French.[5] After an initial phase in which the numbers of the allies seemed to be sufficient to defeat Napoleon's forces, a mass levy helped to smooth out the differences between the two armies and Napoleon's tactical and strategic superiority over the other generals allowed him to begin to push back the Russian and Prussian forces, winning two hard-fought battles of Lützen and Bautzen. Not long after this battle, the Austrians, who had remained neutral until then, promoted an armistice, trying to restore peace in Europe,[6][7][8] while secretly trying to understand which of the two factions would have the upper hand on the other to finish the war on the winner's bandwagon.[9]

Battle of Lützen

The negotiations did not lead to any concrete result, especially because of Bonaparte's obstinacy, hesitant to give in to Austrian demands and too proud to understand that his army could not continue to resist indefinitely the more experienced, more numerous and more motivated coalition forces.[10] At the end of the truce, Austria entered the war on the side of the coalition powers, abandoning the alliance established with Napoleon only two years earlier.[11] Because of this defection, a new front opened in the south, along the borders between the Kingdom of Italy, the Illyrian Provinces and the Habsburg Empire itself. The Emperor of the French chose his stepson Eugene to lead the military operations in this theatre.[12][13]

Initially on the attack, the Franco-Italian forces were soon forced to retreat following Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig the subsequent defection of Bavaria opened the possibility of an attack on the rear of Eugene's army, forcing the viceroy to make a strategic retreat along the Adige line[14]which Napoleon's army managed to maintain a solid defensive line for three long months.[a] Meanwhile, Marshal Murat, King of Naples, tested the waters to change sides intolerant of his brother-in-law's continuous interference in the management of the internal affairs of his kingdom and wishing to keep his crown, Murat accepted an agreement with Austria, which guaranteed him the maintenance of the throne in exchange for an active participation in the war.[16] The actual entry of the Neapolitans into the conflict took place only on 15 February, a few days after the battle of Mincio.[17][18]

Prelude

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Battle of the Mincio

After the entry of Neapolitan forces into the war, the Emilia-Romagna front, which until then had been dominated only by Nugent's corps, saw the arrival of numerous units of Murat's army. Soon, the Austrians and Neapolitans reached an agreement to assign Murat command of the entire Austrian contingent beyond the Po. Initially, the Austro-Neapolitan forces prepared to build a bridge over the river near Sacca. This was completed in the last days of February, and an attempt was made to cross the river, but Bonnemains' forces repelled General Metzko's troops.[19][20][21] In general it can be said that, although the Neapolitans and the Austrians were allies, there was very little mutual trust and the collaboration between the two armies was at the very least difficult on more than one occasion, the Austrians moved expecting a supporting maneuver from their allies, without receiving an adequate response from the Neapolitan contingents and vice versa.[22] Bellegarde, in an attempt to encourage Murat's collaboration, appealed directly to the Emperor of Austria, having a letter written formally committing him to recognize the French Marshal as the legitimate king of Naples. The letter had the desired effect.[23]

Battle of Saint-Maurice

In the first days of March, Nugent's Austrians had been defeated by Grenier, who with a brilliant but risky maneuver had driven them out of Parma, forcing them to retreat first to the Enza and then to the Secchia, while the Franco-Italian divisions pushed beyond the city, even occupying Reggio. Murat contacted Bellegarde's lieutenant and planned an immediate response, with the aim of driving the French back to their previous positions.[24][25] The Austro-Neapolitan forces attacked with force the Franco-Italians of General Severoli, who was seriously wounded in the clash, on 7 March near San Maurizio.[26] The victory went to the coalition, although Murat's risky decisions allowed the Franco-Italians to obtain an agreement, thanks to which they were able to carry out an orderly retreat to the Taro positions.[27] Despite his entry into the war on the side of the coalition, Joachim Murat's behavior remained questionable, if not completely ambiguous he kept himself informed of the progress of the war in France through the Moniteur, and when he learned of Napoleon's success in his maneuver against Blücher, he slowed down his military operations in Emilia and even considered renouncing his alliance with Austria and returning to orbit among the satellite states of France.[28] Negotiations were even opened with Eugene,[29] although these failed due to the unattainable demands of the King of Naples.[30]

It was only when the news of the surrender of France, with the officialization of the Treaty of Fontainebleau (1814), reached Murat's mind to renew the offensive, proposing to Nugent's Austrians to cross the Taro, which had been the Franco-Italian line of defense south of the Po for over a month. This surprised the Austrians quite a bit, who were quite astonished by Murat's sudden willingness to attack after a long period of general inactivity. In fact, Napoleon's capitulation would be made known only a few days later and Murat's informants in France had managed to give him the news a few days in advance.[31] The position of the Taro was in fact very uncomfortable and complicated to defend, since the river is fordable for almost its entire length, ergo the French knew that at the first significant Austro-Neapolitan offensive they would have to retreat. However, it was their intention to hinder the passage of enemy forces on the river and then gradually retreat towards more solid positions.[32]

Battle

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April 13: The crossing of the Taro

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Painting of Castelguelfo Castle

The Austro-Neapolitan forces had been concentrated in Parma on 12 April. The manoeuvre had been carried out without a hitch, even if excessively slowly.[33] The following day the coalition army left the city. Nugent's division, reinforced by three battalions and a squadron of Neapolitan cavalry, advanced divided into three columns on the left the first column was commanded by General Gober and was supposed to cross the river at Medesano and then go up towards Noceto; on the right there was Colonel Bourguignon's column, which was supposed to ford at Grugno and then turn left towards Fontanellato to take Castelguelfo from behind, and finally the column led by Nugent himself, which was supposed to advance directly on Castelguelfo followed by General Carrascosa 's men.[34]

After a brief bombardment, the central column split in two and attempted to cross. The water reached the soldiers' shoulders and some Neapolitan soldiers were swept away by the current. However, the left column, entrusted to General Starhemberg, crossed about a kilometre from Ponte di Taro, reaching the other bank first. They immediately set out towards Castelguelfo, where they quickly managed to force the Franco-Italians to cease resistance and flee. The brief but intense fight handed over two companies of Italian riflemen to the Austrians.[35] Bourguignon's troops crossed the river shortly afterwards, encountering some resistance at Grugno, where a battalion of the 106th had positioned itself before retreating towards Borgo San Donnino. The crossing of Gober, however, was relatively uneventful, with only a few guard pickets and a small group of cavalry facing them.[36]

Austrian uhlans in 1800

Once reunited at Castelguelfo, the two central semi-columns resumed their forward march. The excellent work of the Austrian cavalry, however, was not enough to discourage the fierce resistance of the Franco-Italians, who methodically and in perfect order, retreated from village to village as the enemy advanced. The Franco-Italian army first took up positions at Parola, then at Borgo San Donnino, crossed the Stirone, and then took up position at Alseno. Only at the end did Napoleon's forces retreat to Fiorenzuola, where they clashed for a long time with the Austrian commander's column. Nugent's men, exhausted by the long march and weakened by their enemies' resistance, were almost outflanked when, fortunately for them, Bourguignon's right column reached them, stabilizing the situation. With the arrival of the new Austrian forces, the Franco-Italians ceased the fighting, which had now been going on for almost fifteen hours. Maucune, warned by a company of hunters of the arrival of Gober's column, was forced to order a retreat beyond the Nure: his position was too exposed and he feared being surrounded. His men abandoned the town without worrying about being pursued. That same evening, Fiorenzuola was occupied by Nugent and Carrascosa's men; Murat's Royal Guard positioned itself in Borgo San Donnino while the Austro-Neapolitan outposts were positioned on the Arda.[37]

The difficulties encountered by the Austrians are partly to be blamed on Nugent himself the three initial columns were too far apart from each other and although Bourguignon's column managed to reach the central column when needed, Gober's was slowed down by the poor roads and arrived in Fiorenzuola only when the action had long since concluded.[38]

General Maucune had withdrawn his outposts to Cadeo and taken up a good position on the left bank of the Nure , leaving at Pontenure only a small outpost and at Cadeo only a few lookouts supplied by weak pickets. About four in the afternoon, the vanguard of the central column reached Pontenure, which the French evacuated almost without a fight. But as soon as the Austrian vanguard emerged from the village, it was met by the fire of a battery of six guns positioned on the left bank of the river and by skirmishers, covered by trenches or masonry. The defensive position of the French was excellent: carefully chosen, well prepared, and difficult to approach.[38]

14 April

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Plan of the Borgoforte pontoon bridge in 1726

To distract the French forces from the advance towards Piacenza , Murat had devised a diversionary maneuver on Sacca taking advantage of the limited numbers of the French, he had left a column in the rear on the 13th, ordering them to cross the Po. Despite Neapolitan artillery fire, the French successfully managed to stop the enemy column, capturing 220 soldiers, including 7 officers, with about forty killed and as many wounded. The subsequent news of Maucune's retreat towards Piacenza was soon accompanied by the order to cease activities on the Po and return to the right bank of the river.[39]

At the same time, Eugene thought of attacking Murat's rear by making a sortie into the territories occupied by him. He sent General Paolucci with 11 companies to reconnoitre Guastalla. Although the brigade of Neapolitan General d'Ambrosio was stationed in the area, the French forces leaving Borgoforte managed to cross the river in broad daylight and accomplish their mission, conquering Suzzara , Begozzo and Casoni, before meeting and pursuing six Neapolitan companies and putting them to flight towards Guastalla, where a Neapolitan battalion protected them. In the evening, the French retreated without being disturbed. The toll was 80 dead, wounded and missing.[40]

General Nugent in 1826

While the fighting was going on at Sacca and near Guastalla, the Austro-Neapolitans organised themselves to continue their advance towards Piacenza. At midday, Nugent's division resumed its march in the same formation as the previous day. The first column under the command of Colonel Gavenda moved to the left towards San Giorgio Piacentino. On the right, Lieutenant Colonel Bourguignon headed towards Muradello to occupy the bridge over which the road from Cremona to Piacenza passes. The rest of the troops formed the central column, under the personal command of Nugent, and marched towards Pontenure, with Starhemberg's brigade in the lead, followed closely by Gober's brigade which acted as support.[41] Starhemberg immediately reinforced his vanguard, which was forced to halt and seek cover, with two battalions, one of them acting as a reserve. After an hour of fighting, the French suddenly went on the offensive a rather large detachment, having crossed the river shortly after Pontenure, attacked the vanguard and the two battalions that had been deployed in the nearby village. These battalions, under pressure, were beginning to give way when they were joined and supported by the reserve battalion. The arrival of fresh forces forced the French to return to the other bank of the river.[42]

Meanwhile, a column detached from Nugent and led by Lieutenant Colonel Werklein, had managed to cross the river and drive the French from the bridge, who then retreated to Borghetto. Taking advantage of this retreat, Werklein had immediately attacked and pushed back far behind a French battalion of about 400 men stationed near Palazzo Tedeschi, charged with covering the extreme left of the French lines. The two Austrian columns which formed the wings of the deployment, having found no opposition, were on the point of completing their movement, when night put an end to the fighting. Once again faced with the threat of encirclement, General Maucune gave the order to fall back on Piacenza and take up position at San Lazzaro.[42]

15 April

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King Joachim Murat of Naples

On the morning of April 15, General Nugent, carrying out Bellegarde's orders, had met with Generals Rambourg and Dedem and forwarded them the proclamations signed and published by the members of the French provisional government. Shortly afterwards, the King of Naples, on his way to join Nugent's vanguard, sent a new parlementaire to inform the two generals that he wished to have a personal interview with them. But this parlementaire returned after a while, bringing as a reply that it had been impossible to find and reach the two French soldiers, both of whom had set out on reconnaissance: this was an unmistakable sign that they did not intend to enter into negotiations, or at least that they did not believe they had the authority to do so.[43]

All the diplomatic movements had wasted so much time that it was only around four in the afternoon that Murat gave the order to attack the convent of San Lazzaro, strongly entrenched by the French. The three columns of Nugent's division advanced immediately the central column took the village of San Lazzaro after a brief but intense battle; on the right, the Radetzky Hussars moved, forcing the French to abandon the plain between San Lazzaro and the Po, pursuing them to the walls of Piacenza. The left column faced a column of nearly a thousand men near Podenzano, which Colonel Gavenda attacked and forced to evacuate the village. On the left, a column of nearly a thousand Frenchmen opposed Colonel Gavenda's march near Podenzano: attacked by the Austro-Neapolitans, the French evacuated the village. Nevertheless, their resistance was notable even during the retreat and Gavenda managed to reach the current Galleana and push on to the San Raimondo gate only towards evening.[44]

Aftermath

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The losses on both sides are subject to much debate on the first day of fighting, the bloodiest, French sources attest between 300 and 400 losses for the Napoleonic troops and between 800 and 900 for the Austro-Neapolitans, while Austrian sources report diametrically opposed figures, with 300 casualties among the allies and 900 losses among the Napoleonic troops, of which 400 were prisoners.[45] In the following days, the losses were much more contained for both sides.[46]

From a purely military point of view, the French had to retreat further, abandoning the Taro and Nure lines, taking refuge in Piacenza to defend the Po crossing and keep Nugent and Murat's forces at bay. Despite the new favourable position of the coalition forces, there was no time to exploit the acquired advantage[47] the following day, having heard of the surrender of Napoleon and France itself, Eugene judged it superfluous to continue the armed struggle. Having invested General Zucchi with full powers, he had him sign a convention that put an end to the armed struggle.[48][49] These agreements would be revised a week later when the viceroy himself signed a new convention in Mantua, consenting to the military occupation of Lombardy and sanctioning the end of the Kingdom of Italy.[50]

See also

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Footnotes

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  1. ↑ The Austrians attempted to attack the Franco-Italians, but the successes of Eugene's forces in the battles of Caldiero[15] and San Michele led to a prolonged stalemate, partially broken only by the entry into the war of Murat's Neapolitans.

References

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  1. ↑ Zannoni, Mario (2007). "The Battle of the Taro River (13–15 April 1814)". The Journal of Napoleonic Association Italy: 1–21.
  2. 1 2 de Vaudoncourt 1817, p. 181–182.
  3. ↑ Pier Paolo Mendogni. Storia di Parma e della Val di Taro (PDF) (in Italian). Retrieved 30 June 2026.
  4. ↑ Pier Paolo Mendogni. Storia di Parma e della Val di Taro (PDF) (in Italian). Retrieved 30 June 2026.
  5. ↑ Coppi 1834, p. 19–20.
  6. ↑ Hugo 1837, p. 113.
  7. ↑ Cust 1863, p. 34–35.
  8. ↑ Coppi 1834, p. 22–26.
  9. ↑ Hugo 1837, p. 115–117.
  10. ↑ Cust 1863, p. 79.
  11. ↑ Cust 1863, p. 81.
  12. ↑ Coppi 1834, p. 45.
  13. ↑ Bodart 1908, p. 138.
  14. ↑ Hugo 1837, p. 157–160.
  15. ↑ Bodart 1908, p. 465.
  16. ↑ Johnston, R. M. (1904). "Lord William Bentinck and Murat". The English Historical Review. 19 (74). Oxford University Press: 263–280. doi:10.1093/ehr/XIX.LXXIV.263.
  17. ↑ Coppi 1834, p. 115.
  18. ↑ Vignolle 1817, p. 138.
  19. ↑ de Vaudoncourt 1817, p. 165–166.
  20. ↑ Coppi 1834, p. 115–116.
  21. ↑ Vignolle 1817, p. 150–151.
  22. ↑ Weil (4) 1902, p. 325–327.
  23. ↑ Coppi 1834, p. 116–117.
  24. ↑ de Vaudoncourt 1817, p. 168–169.
  25. ↑ Coppi 1834, p. 116.
  26. ↑ Weil (4) 1902, p. 331–333.
  27. ↑ de Vaudoncourt 1828, p. 475–476.
  28. ↑ Baratelli 1815, p. 32–33.
  29. ↑ Weil (4) 1902, p. 427–429.
  30. ↑ Weil (4) 1902, p. 444.
  31. ↑ Baratelli 1815, p. 34.
  32. ↑ Weil (4) 1902, p. 505.
  33. ↑ Weil (4) 1902, p. 502.
  34. ↑ Weil (4) 1902, p. 505–506.
  35. ↑ Weil (4) 1902, p. 506.
  36. ↑ Weil (4) 1902, p. 507.
  37. ↑ Weil (4) 1902, p. 507–508.
  38. 1 2 Weil (4) 1902, p. 508.
  39. ↑ Weil (4) 1902, p. 512–513.
  40. ↑ Weil (4) 1902, p. 514–515.
  41. ↑ Weil (4) 1902, p. 516.
  42. 1 2 Weil (4) 1902, p. 517.
  43. ↑ Weil (4) 1902, p. 523.
  44. ↑ Weil (4) 1902, p. 523–524.
  45. ↑ Nafziger, George F.; Gioannini, Marco (2001-10-30). The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813–1814. Bloomsbury Publishing USA. p. 218. ISBN 978-0-313-07531-5.
  46. ↑ Weil (4) 1902, p. 524.
  47. ↑ Botta 1824, p. 559.
  48. ↑ Botta 1824, p. 561.
  49. ↑ von Helfert 1894, p. 38–39.
  50. ↑ Botta 1824, p. 562–564.

Bibliography

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