Talk:Armenian genocide

Note to self: new sources

• Akçam, Taner (2023). "The Armenian Genocide: An Overview". The Cambridge World History of Genocide: Volume 3: Genocide in the Contemporary Era, 1914–2020. Cambridge University Press. pp. 67–92. ISBN 978-1-108-76711-8.
• Akçam, Taner (2024). "Top-Down and Local Violence in the Late Ottoman Empire: The Role of Security Concerns and a Century of "Accumulated Experience"". Journal of Genocide Research. 26 (2): 121–141. doi:10.1080/14623528.2022.2127488.

Target

The name should be changed from "Ottoman Armenians" to "Armenians in the Ottoman Empire". ~2026-24260-80 (talk) 14:01, 20 April 2026 (UTC)

Why? ~2026-23770-81 (talk) 08:15, 24 April 2026 (UTC)

Ottoman Armenians means pro-Ottoman Armenians. for example, Ottoman Albanians are also pro-Ottoman. ~2026-25917-12 (talk) 13:23, 28 April 2026 (UTC)

I don't think that is how the term is generally used in English. "Ottoman Armenians" is commonly understood to mean Armenians who lived in or were subjects of the Ottoman Empire, just as "Ottoman Greeks" or "Ottoman Jews" refers to those populations rather than implying political support for the Ottoman state. Could you provide a reliable linguistic or historical source supporting the interpretation that "Ottoman Armenians" means "pro-Ottoman Armenians"?

Goldie1141 (talk) 21:52, 29 July 2026 (UTC)

Use of the term "ethnonationalist"

The description of the Republic of Turkey as an "ethnonationalist Turkish state" appears to be a contested characterization rather than an uncontested fact. Could the editors clarify which reliable secondary sources explicitly support this wording? If the term reflects the view of particular scholars, would it be more neutral to attribute it (e.g. "described by X as an ethnonationalist state") instead of stating it in Wikipedia's voice? My understanding is that Kemalism ( the founding ideology of Republic of Turkey) has also been described by many scholars as a civic/cultural form of nationalism rather than an ethnonationalist ideology.

Goldie1141 (talk) 21:51, 29 July 2026 (UTC)

Please explain how carrying out a genocide against a caste-based religious group—to the extent that the country is now upwards of 88% Muslim/78% Turkish—is anything but ethnonationalism? The genocide was embraced as part of the process of "Turkification", that is the establishment of an ethnostate with an ethnically Turkish and Sunni Muslim majority, Christian Armenians and Kurdish Turks were slaughtered to that end, and the Kurdish culture has been systemically oppressed ever since (Kurds in Turkey). WLLSTRR (talk) 09:46, 1 August 2026 (UTC)

The issue is not whether the Armenian genocide occurred, but whether the phrase "ethnonationalist Turkish state" is the most neutral way to describe the Republic of Turkey in Wikipedia's own voice. "Turkishness" (Türklük) has generally functioned as a modern national and civic concept in republican ideology rather than a strictly ethnic category. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's famous statement was "Ne mutlu Türküm diyene" ("How happy is the one who says 'I am a Turk'"), not "How happy is the one who is a Turk." The distinction is significant because it frames Turkish identity as one of civic identification rather than biological ancestry. It is also noteworthy that figures such as Nihal Atsız, who explicitly advocated racial Turkish supremacism and pan-Turkist ethnonationalism, were prosecuted during the 1944–45 Racism-Turanism trials rather than having their ideology adopted as official state policy. This does not mean republican policies were free from discrimination or assimilationist elements, but it does suggest that equating Kemalist civic nationalism with ethnic supremacism oversimplifies a complex scholarly debate. If reliable secondary sources describe Turkey as an ethnonationalist state, Wikipedia should attribute that characterization to those scholars rather than present it as an uncontested fact. @WLLSTRR: Goldie1141 (talk) 16:42, 1 August 2026 (UTC)

OK, so first of all all forms of nationalism have both national and civic elements. Second, in practice the state was heavily ethnonational, for example expelling non Turkish people and preventing others from returning home, bans on church operations outside of Istanbul, the population exchange with Greece (based entirely on religion and not whether the individual felt Turkish or not), citizen speak Turkish campaign, the wealth tax, etc etc... (t · c) buIdhe 18:06, 1 August 2026 (UTC)

@Buidhe:

A: The 1923 population exchange, agreed between Greece and Turkey under the Lausanne Convention, illustrates that the early Turkish Republic did not consistently define "Turkishness" as an ethnic category. The convention required the compulsory exchange of populations primarily on the basis of religion rather than ethnicity or language. As a result, Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians, such as many Karamanlides, were transferred to Greece, while numerous Muslims who were not ethnically Turkish, including Pomaks and Muslim Romani, were resettled in Turkey.

B: The Wealth Tax of 1942 was formally imposed on both Muslims and non-Muslims. Although historians widely agree that its implementation disproportionately burdened non-Muslims, the legislation itself was not restricted to non-Muslims.

C: Supporters of the campaign argued that promoting a common public language was necessary for nation-building and state cohesion in the newly established Republic. Whether the campaign should be interpreted as civic nation-building, linguistic assimilation, or ethnonationalism remains a matter of historical interpretation.

D: The compulsory transfer of Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians to Greece alongside the admission of non-ethnic Turkish Muslims, including Pomaks and Muslim Romani, indicates that the legal criterion of the Lausanne population exchange was religion rather than ethnicity. This complicates any interpretation that the exchange was based solely on ethnic Turkishness.

Even if one concludes that the Republic's policies were ethnonationalist in practice, "ethnonationalist Turkish state" remains an analytical characterization. My concern is not whether the Republic implemented discriminatory or assimilationist policies. Rather, I question whether describing the Republic simply as an "ethnonationalist Turkish state" in Wikipedia's own voice accurately reflects the range of reliable scholarship. Given this complexity and the scholarly debate over whether Kemalist nationalism is best characterised as civic, ethnic, or a combination of both, I believe the article should either attribute the label to specific scholars or omit it from Wikipedia's own voice. Goldie1141 (talk) 18:24, 1 August 2026 (UTC)

Whilst Turkey may have historically opened its borders to Muslim settlers, as you say, non-ethnic Turkish Muslims, your point that the Lausanne Convention expelled ethnic Turks who practised Christianity proves that it was an ethnostate: trimming its ethnic population of what it saw as an anomaly or deficiency, ironically perpetuating the Caliphate that its deposed Sultan had advocated for. The only ethnic group which Turkey didn't expel—Kurdish Muslims—is now the target of the same xenophobic violence, and you would argue that it's not an ethnostate? As you've described, there is a plethora of literature which caters to people's interest on the topic, but the broad consensus remains that the Republic of Turkey is an "ethnonationalist Turkish state", and Wikipedia should reflect that. Examine the Hamidiye regiments, non-Turkish Muslim cavalry units who roamed the border, a group like that would be described as "nomadic" rather than an explicit extension of the Turkish state. There is an entire subheading in the article for Turkification ("Ethnonational identity") which explains that—from its inception—the Republic of Turkey embraced Turkification. Why does it interest you to undermine this classification? @Goldie1141 @Buidhe WLLSTRR (talk) 18:38, 2 August 2026 (UTC)

I do not think it is accurate to state that "the only ethnic group which Turkey didn't expel was Kurdish Muslims." The compulsory population exchange under the Lausanne Convention was based primarily on religion rather than ethnicity. Numerous non-Turkish Muslim communities, including Circassians, Laz, Zazas, Bosniaks, Pomaks, Muslim Albanians, Muslim Romani, Tatars, and Hemshin Muslims, were not expelled and became citizens of the Republic. Likewise, Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians, such as many Karamanlides, were transferred to Greece despite their language. This demonstrates that religion, citizenship, and nation-building also played important roles in determining membership in the new Republic. I also do not think the Lausanne Convention, by itself, proves that the Republic was an ethnostate. That is an interpretation rather than a historical fact, and historians have debated whether Kemalist nationalism is best understood as civic nationalism, ethnic nationalism, assimilationist nationalism, or a combination of these. The existence of Turkification policies and discriminatory measures is not, in itself, sufficient to establish that one characterization is the only accepted one.

I am also unsure why the Hamidiye Regiments are relevant here. They were an institution of the late Ottoman Empire, not the Republic established in 1923. Moreover, while many recruits came from triba Kurdish communities, the Hamidiye Regiments were state-sponsored irregular cavalry units rather than merely "nomadic" groups.

It is also worth noting that the early Republic did not pursue a policy of excluding all non-ethnic Turkish populations. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the population upheavals in eastern Anatolia, Kurdish communities continued to live in, and in some cases were resettled into, areas that had previously had substantial Armenian populations to the point of Nationalist Armenians refer East Anatolia as " Western Armenia " while Kurdish nationalists refers East Anatolia as "Kurdistan". If the Republic's defining principle had simply been ethnic Turkish exclusivity, this historical reality would itself require explanation. This again illustrates that the relationship between ethnicity, religion, citizenship, and nation-building in the early Republic was more complex than a single label suggests.

My personal interest is not relevant to the content dispute. My concern is whether the article reflects Wikipedia's policies on neutrality, due weight, and attribution. I would make the same argument regardless of the country involved. If the description "ethnonationalist Turkish state" reflects an uncontested scholarly consensus, then it should be straightforward to demonstrate that through reliable secondary sources. If the scholarship is more nuanced or divided, then I believe the article should reflect that accordingly.

You have referred several times to a "broad consensus." Could you provide the secondary academic sources that establish this consensus? I am aware that many scholars discuss Turkification, assimilation and ethnic nationalism, but I have also encountered scholarship describing Kemalist nationalism as civic, republican, territorial, or as combining civic and ethnic elements. If the scholarship is genuinely mixed, then Wikipedia should reflect that complexity or attribute the characterization to the scholars who use it.

My argument is not that no scholars describe the Republic as ethnonationalist. Rather, I question whether that characterization is sufficiently uncontested to appear in Wikipedia's own voice without attribution. If multiple respected historians instead describe Kemalist nationalism as civic, territorial, republican, or as a hybrid of civic and ethnic nationalism, then the lead should reflect that diversity of scholarly interpretation. @WLLSTRR and Buidhe:

Goldie1141 (talk) 19:49, 2 August 2026 (UTC)