Edge Rewrite
// HTMLRewriter · presentation

This page was redesigned at the edge.

Cloudflare fetched the original article and streamed it through HTMLRewriter to apply an entirely new visual system without rebuilding the source page.

Jump to content

Parallel voting

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected from Supplementary Member)
A diagram of a common mixed system using parallel voting. The local tier (here FPTP) and the list tier have no compensation.

In political science, parallel voting or superposition refers to the use of two or more electoral systems to elect different members of a legislature. More precisely, an electoral system is a superposition if it is a mixture of at least two tiers; one portion of a legislature is elected using one method, while another portion is elected using a different method, with all voters participating in both. Thus, the final results are produced by filling the seats using each system separately based on the votes, with the separate groups of elected members meeting together in one chamber.

A system is called fusion (not to be confused with electoral fusion) or majority bonus, if it is an independent mixture of two system without two tiers. Superposition (parallel voting) is also not the same as "coexistence", in which different districts in the same election use different systems. Superposition, fusion and coexistence are distinct from dependent mixed electoral systems like compensatory (corrective) and conditional systems.

Most often, parallel voting involves the use of two separate systems to elect two separate groups of members, such as a winner-take-all system with party-list proportional representation (PR).[1] First-past-the-post voting alongside PR is a common pairing in parallel voting, but many other combinations are possible.

The proportion of list seats compared to total seats ranges widely; for example 30% in Taiwan, 37.5% in Japan and 68.7% in Armenia.[2]

Under the most common form of parallel voting, a portion of seats in the legislature are filled by the single-member first-preference plurality method (FPP), while others are filled by proportional representation.[3] Parallel voting can use other systems besides FPP, and can have any mixture of winner-take-all, semi-proportional, and proportional components. For this reason, parallel voting is not always mixed-member majoritarian. For example, parallel voting may use a two proportional systems like STV and list-PR and then it would not be mixed-member majoritarian, and a majority bonus system (which is not the same as parallel voting) may also be considered mixed majoritarian. In addition, some mixed-member majoritarian systems are not parallel, in that they allow for compensation between the two components, for example this is the case in South Korea and Mexico.

Advantages and disadvantages

[edit]

Representation for smaller parties

[edit]

The major critique of parallel systems is that they tend to be disproportional. Large parties can win very large majorities, disproportionate to their percentage vote.

Parallel voting systems allow smaller parties that cannot win individual elections to secure at least some representation in the legislature; however, unlike in a proportional system they will have a substantially smaller delegation than their share of the total vote. This is seen by advocates of proportional systems to be still unfair towards constituents of smaller parties. If there is also a threshold for list seats, parties which are too small to reach the threshold are unable to achieve any representation, unless they have a very strong base in certain constituencies to gain individual seats.

Those who favour majoritarian systems argue that supplementary seats allocated proportionally increases the chances that no party will receive a majority in an assembly, leading to minority or coalition governments.[citation needed] The largest parties may need to rely on the support of smaller ones in order to form a government. Those who favour proportional representation see this as an advantage as parties may not govern alone, but have to compromise.

Two types of representatives

[edit]

Because voters have two votes, one for a constituency candidate and one for a list, there is a critique that two classes of representatives will emerge under a parallel voting system: with one class beholden to their electorate seat, and the other concerned only with their party. Some consider this as an advantage as local as well as national interests will be represented. Some prefer systems where every constituency and therefore every constituent has only one representative, while others prefer a system where every MP represents the electorate as a whole as this is reflected in the electoral system as well.

Compared to MMP and AMS

[edit]

Parallel systems are often contrasted with mixed-member proportional systems (MMP) or the additional member system (AMS).[4] The party is sure to elect the candidates at the top of its list, guaranteeing safe seats for the leadership. By contrast, under the MMP or AMS system a party that does well in the local seats will not need or receive any compensatory list seats, so the leadership might have to run in the local seats. Certain types of AMS can be made de facto parallel systems by tactical voting and parties using decoy lists, which (other) MMP systems generally prevent.

Strategic voting

[edit]

Strategic voting is relevant under parallel voting with strategic voting in each of the parallel systems and contamination effects between the parallel systems.[5] The FPP part incentivizes the formation of a two-party system.[5] Parallel voting tends to create a dominant-party system.[6] Smaller parties are still disadvantaged as the larger parties still predominate. Voters of smaller parties may tactically vote for candidates of larger parties to avoid wasting their constituency vote. Smaller parties close to the threshold may refrain from voting for their preferred party in favour of a larger party to avoid wasting their list vote as well.

A party that can gerrymander local districts can win more than its share of seats. So parallel systems need fair criteria to draw district boundaries. Under MMP a gerrymander can help a local candidate, but it cannot raise a major party’s share of seats, while under AMS the effects of gerrymandering are reduced by the compensation.

Current use

[edit]

Parallel voting is currently used in the following countries:[7]

Country Body Members elected in constituencies Members elected by proportional representation Other members
Total % System Total % System Total System %
Andorra Andorra General Council 14 50% PBV 14 50% List PR
Japan Japan House of Representatives289 62% FPTP176 38% List PR
House of Councillors 147 60% SNTV 98 40% List PR
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan Majilis 69 30% FPTP 69 70% List PR
Lithuania Lithuania Seimas 71 50% TRS 70 50% List PR (largest remainder method): open lists
Mongolia Mongolia[8] State Great Khural78 62% BPV48 38% List PR: closed lists
Nepal Nepal House of Representatives 165 60% FPTP 110 40% List PR: closed lists
Philippines Philippines House of Representatives253 80% FPTP63 20% List PR (Hare quota): closed lists
Bangsamoro Parliament 32 40% FPTP 40 50% List PR 8 10%
Russia Russian Federation State Duma225 50% FPTP225[9][10] 50% List PR (Hare quota): closed lists
Senegal Senegal National Assembly 105 64% FPTP 60 36% List PR (largest remainder method)
Taiwan Taiwan (Republic of China) Legislative Yuan 73 65% FPTP 34 30% List PR 6 SNTV for indigenous seats 5%
Tajikistan Tajikistan Assembly of Representatives 41 65% TRS 22 35% List PR
Thailand Thailand House of Representatives400 80% FPTP100 20% List PR

Philippines

[edit]

The Philippines' electoral system for Congress is an exceptional case. Political parties running for party-list seats are legally required to be completely separate from those running in constituency seats. Furthermore, political parties are capped at 3 seats (out of 20% of seats, or about 60 seats). As a result, the mixed-member system utilized in the Philippines is not representative at all of the share of the vote that "normal" political parties obtain (even amongst mixed-member majoritarian systems), let alone for those in full proportional representation systems.

For countries with limited recognition

[edit]
Country Body Members elected in constituencies Members elected by proportional representation
Total % System Total % System
South Ossetia South Ossetia Parliament 17 50% FPTP 17 50% List PR

For dependencies

[edit]
Country Body Members elected in constituencies Members elected by proportional representation Other members
Total % System Total % System Total System %
Realm of New Zealand Niue Niue Assembly 14 70% FPTP 6 30% Plurality block voting (BV)
British overseas territories Anguilla Anguilla House of Assembly 7 54% FPTP 4 31% Plurality block voting (BV) 2 2 ex officio 15%
Turks and Caicos Islands Turks and Caicos Islands House of Assembly 10 48% FPTP 5 24% Plurality block voting (BV) 6 4 appointed, 2 ex officio 28%
British Virgin Islands British Virgin Islands House of Assembly 9 60% FPTP 4 27% Plurality block voting (BV) 2 2 ex officio 13%

For subnational legislatures

[edit]
Country Body Members elected in constituencies Members elected by proportional representation
Total % System Total % System
Argentina Argentina Córdoba Province, Argentina Legislature of Córdoba Province 26 37% FPTP 44 63% List PR
Río Negro Province Legislature of Río Negro Province 24 52% List PR 22 48% List PR
San Juan Province, Argentina Chamber of Deputies of San Juan 19 53% FPTP 17 47% List PR
Santa Cruz Province, Argentina Chamber of Deputies of Santa Cruz 14 58% FPTP 10 42% List PR

Former use

[edit]

Former proposals

[edit]

In New Zealand, the Royal Commission on the Electoral System came to the conclusion that parallel voting would be unable to overcome the shortcomings. The total seats won by a party would likely remain out of proportion to its share of votes—there would be a "considerable imbalance between share of the votes and share of the total seats"—and it would be unfair to minor parties (who would struggle to win constituency seats).[15] In the indicative 1992 electoral referendum, parallel voting was one of four choices for an alternative electoral system (alongside MMP, AV and STV), but came last with only 5.5 percent of the vote. An overwhelming majority of voters supported MMP, as recommended by the Royal Commission, and the system was adopted after the 1993 electoral referendum. In another referendum in 2011, 57.77% of voters elected to keep current the MMP system. Among the 42.23% that voted to change to another system, a plurality (46.66%) preferred a return to the pre-1994 SMP system. Parallel voting was the second-most popular choice, with 24.14% of the vote.[citation needed]

References

[edit]
  1. "Parallel —". aceproject.org. Retrieved 2022-04-21.
  2. Reynolds et al (2008), Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, pg. 104
  3. Royal Commission on Electoral Systems (1986), Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System: towards a better democracy, Wellington N.Z.: Government Printing, pg. 33.
  4. Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context. 2016. doi:10.1353/book.52095. ISBN 9780472121588.
  5. 1 2 Herron, Erik S; Nishikawa, Misa (2001). "Contamination effects and the number of parties in mixed-superposition electoral systems". Electoral Studies. 20 (1): 63–86. doi:10.1016/S0261-3794(00)00002-0. Retrieved 2026-08-08.
  6. Moser, Robert G.; Scheiner, Ethan (2004). "Mixed electoral systems and electoral system effects: controlled comparison and cross-national analysis". Electoral Studies. 23 (4): 575–599. doi:10.1016/S0261-3794(03)00056-8. Retrieved 2026-08-08.
  7. Reynolds et al. (2008), Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, pg. 30–33
  8. Smith, Marissa. "Parliamentary Elections 2024: Yet Another New Election System". Mongolia Focus. University of British Columbia. Retrieved 2024-04-19.
  9. Herszenhorn, David M. (2013-01-03). "Putin Orders New System for Russian Parliamentary Elections - NYTimes.com". The New York Times. Retrieved 2014-09-09.
  10. Since the 2016 election, and from 1993 to the 2003 election.
  11. Gallagher 2011, p. 185; Gallagher 2014, p. 18.
  12. Lublin, David. "Albania". Election Passport. American University. Retrieved 24 March 2016.
  13. Election Rigging and How to Fight It Journal of Democracy - Volume 17, Number 3, July 2006, pp. 138-151.
  14. "Key Points of Newly Adopted Constitution". Civil Georgia. 27 September 2017. Retrieved 27 September 2017.
  15. Royal Commission on Electoral Systems (1986), Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System: towards a better democracy, Wellington N.Z.: Government Printing, pg. 39.
[edit]