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Sahara Thunder

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Sahara Thunder
TypeSubsidiary[a]
IndustryImport-export
Founded7 December 1992; 33 years ago (1992-12-07)
HeadquartersTehran, Iran
Area served
Russia, China, Venezuela, Persian Gulf, Oman, Ghana, Syria
Key people
Hossein Bakhshayesh (managing director)
Products
OwnerMinistry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics
ParentMinistry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics
Websitesaharathunder.com
Archived official website
Footnotes
[1][2][3][4]

Sahara Thunder,[b] officially known as Tondar Sahra Trading Company,[5][c] is an Iranian import–export trading company. It serves as a front company for the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), overseeing its commercial activities related to the design, development, manufacture, sale, finance, and transfer of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to foreign countries, explicitly Russia.[1] The company is also responsible for the shipment and sale of Iranian commodities, including oil and gas, to Russia, Venezuela, and China.[6]

History

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Sahara Thunder was incorporated on 7 December 1992 in Iran. It is headquartered in Tehran.[3] The company operates as an import-export trading entity and, according to U.S. and European sanctions authorities, has allegedly functioned as a commercial front for MODAFL throughout its operational history.[1]

Sahara Thunder was initially incorporated for the purpose of construction, and contract with activities in sectors including oil, gas, and building construction, according to archived versions of its website. However, it allegedly shifted its focus on military weapons.[2][7]

Operations

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Sahara Thunder is active across multiple industries including agriculture, construction, electronics, mining, petroleum and petrochemicals.[4] Its products include spike strips, cables, crushing equipment, wires, valves, and construction materials. In 2015, the company sent a delegation of businessmen to Syria where they signed memoranda of understanding to stabilize Syria's economic development and to export Iranian-manufactured goods to Ghana, Oman, and other countries in the Persian Gulf region. As of January 2023, shareholders of Sahara Thunder included the Iran-based company Etemad Tejarat Misagh.[4]

The company also operated in the construction of oil refineries, pipelines, dams, bridges, tunnels, power plants, railway infrastructure, and industrial facilities. In the petrochemical sector, it listed products including ammonium nitrate, polyethylene, methanol, urea, polypropylene, sulfur, and monoethylene glycol among its activities.[8] It also supplied industrial explosives and related materials for industrial and civil engineering projects, as well as agricultural and food products.[8] Its activities also include the supply of chemical substances, and road construction materials.[8]

UAV supply

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MODAFL is accused by the U.S. Department of the Treasury for cooperating with Russia to finance and produce Iranian-designed one-way attack UAVs at the SEZ Alabuga facility in Russia under a $1.75 billion contract, and as of late 2022, Russian officials were negotiating a deal specifically for Sahara Thunder to deliver and produce thousands of UAVs per year at that facility.[1] The Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS) report published in May 2025, drawing on leaked records, alleged that Sahara Thunder worked in extensive collaboration with Alabuga JSC to supply the Russian military with Iranian-made drones in the early stages of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[9][10] This collaboration, according to C4ADS, allowed Russia to rely on drone imports in the early years of the war while simultaneously developing its own domestic production capacity.[9]

Global networks

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Shipping

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Sahara Thunder maintains an international shipping and logistics network used for the transportation of Iranian commodities and commercial goods. The network includes shipping, port-management, and maritime-service companies based in Iran, India, and the United Arab Emirates.[4]

The company used the Cook Islands-flagged vessel CHEM for multiple shipments through agreements with the India-based Zen Shipping & Port India Private Limited.[4][11] The vessel was managed by the UAE-based Safe Seas Ship Management FZE, while ship-management services were also provided by the Iran-based Arsang Safe Trading Co. The network also included maritime and logistics firms such as Asia Marine Crown Agency, Sea Art Ship Management (OPC) Private Limited, Trans Gulf Agency LLC, and Coral Trading EST., which were connected to cargo transportation, port services, and commodity trade associated with Sahara Thunder's operations.[4]

Payment networks

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The C4ADS report alleged that Alabuga JSC paid for equipment and services through a combination of wire transfers routed via the United Arab Emirates and gold shipments.[9] Reuters separately mapped the key locations where tankers used by Sahara Thunder transferred oil from Iran and the UAE to Venezuela, northern Russia, and ports in China, suggesting the geographic reach of the company's commodity trade network.[2]

Money laundering

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Sahara Thunder is also accused by the United States Department of the Treasury for cooperating with the supply division of Iran's Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) in financial operations involving exchange houses and front companies used to move revenue from Iranian oil sales.[4] The Treasury alleged that the company received $93 million multiple foreign currency transfers through firms linked to Iranian-Turkish money changer Seyyed Mohammad Mosanna'i Najibi & Co., including several Hong Kong-based companies such as Meishur Limited, Turpami Limited, and Xaster Co., Limited since 2020 to 2023.[4] The U.S. authorities also alleged that Sahara Thunder transferred funds through exchange firms and intermediary companies connected to MODAFL-related financial networks.[4]

Email server breach

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On 4 February 2024, an online hacktivist group called the PRANA Network accused of working against the Iranian government,[12] claimed to have breached the email servers of Sahara Thunder,[13] retrieving a large number of documents related to military technology transfers between Iran and Russia.[14] The documents also disclosed on two previously undisclosed areas of Russian–Iranian military cooperation: the supply of surveillance aircraft to Iran and the localisation of Shahed drone production in Russia.[14]

Surveillance airship procurement

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The leaked documents allegedly revealed that the company had been engaged in negotiations with Dolgoprudny Design Bureau of Automation (DKBA), a Russian state enterprise specialising in airship technology for the supply of surveillance equipment to Iran, under a project the Iranian side internally called Damavand.[14] Communications between the two sides spanned several years beginning in 2020, were interrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic, and resumed following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[14] The documents also disclosed the involvement of Iranian diplomatic personnel in Moscow in facilitating the procurement.[14]

Shahed drone localisation

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Separately, the obtained documents provided new details on attempts to establish Shahed drone manufacturing capacity inside Russia, including visits by Russian defence industry personnel to Iranian production facilities and reciprocal trips by Iranian specialists to Russia for training purposes.[14] The documents indicated that payment for drone-related deliveries was made partly in gold and partly through a UAE-based intermediary, Generation Trading FZE.[14] Michael Knights of the Combating Terrorism Center alleged that the breach also exposed that vessels within Sahara Thunder's shipping network were owned by MODAFL and used to move sanctioned Iranian oil products.[13] The OFAC designated Sahara Thunder approximately three months after the breach, on 25 April 2024.[1]

Sanctions

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On 25 April 2024, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Treasury Department added Sahara Thunder to its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, freezing its assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting transactions with U.S. parties.[4] It also designated its associated shipping network as part of a coordinated action with the United Kingdom and Canada.[1][15] The Treasury's press release accused Sahara Thunder as the main front company overseeing MODAFL's commercial activities and stated that many of the UAVs it had helped design, develop, manufacture, and sell had been transferred to Russia for use in its war against Ukraine.[1]

It was also added to the European Union's sanctions list in connection with Russia's invasion of Ukraine. According to Iran Watch, the company is subject to the EU Financial Sanctions Files and listed in the Official Journal of the European Union entities list, with the designation recorded on 29 January 2026. The designation subjects the company to asset freezing and other financial restrictions under EU law.[3][16]

Three company officials Kazem Mirzai Kondori, Hossein Bakhshayesh, and Hojat Abdulahi Fard were also sanctioned in the same action.[1]

Profile

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Company profile
S. No. Name Role Ref.
1 Hossein Bakhshayesh
(born 22 May 1964)		 Managing director [17][1]
2 Kazem Mirzai Kondori
(born 11 July 1958)		 Official of Sahara Thunder [17][1]
3 Hojat Abdulahi Fard
(born 22 December 1964)		 Board member of Sahara Thunder; representative of Etemad Tejarat Misagh [17][1]

Notes

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  1. ↑ Legally registered as a company in Iran and has been described as a "private limited company" in sanctions records, multiple official sources state that it is subordinate to, a subsidiary of, or a front company for Iran's Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics.[1]
  2. ↑ Persian: شرکت تندر صحرا, romanized: Tondar Sahrâ
  3. ↑ Persian: شرکت بازرگانی تندر صحرا, romanized: Sherkat-e Bâzargâni-ye Tondar Sahrâ, also known as Tondar Sahara Co., Thunder Desert Trading Company, Tondar Sahra Private Limited Company or Sahara Thunder Company PJS[3]

References

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  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 "Treasury Targets Networks Facilitating Illicit Trade and UAV Transfers on Behalf of Iranian Military". U.S. Department of the Treasury. 2019-03-26. Retrieved 2026-06-09.
  2. 1 2 3 Dutta, Prasanta Kumar (2025-01-07). "How Iran moves sanctioned oil around the world". Reuters. Retrieved 2026-06-09.
  3. 1 2 3 4 "Sahara Thunder". OpenSanctions.org. 1992-12-07. Retrieved 2026-06-09.
  4. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 "Sahara Thunder". Iran Watch. 2024-04-25. Retrieved 2026-06-09.
  5. ↑ Rezaei, Hamed. "شرکت بازرگانی تندر صحرا". saharathunder.com. Archived from the original on 2021-01-20. Retrieved 2026-06-09.
  6. ↑ "Treasury targets networks facilitating illicit trade and UAV transfers on behalf of Iranian military". Norton Rose Fulbright. 2024-04-25. Retrieved 2026-06-09.
  7. ↑ Rezaei, Hamed. "شرکت تندر صحرا-محصولات". saharathunder.com. Archived from the original on 2015-07-02. Retrieved 2026-06-09.
  8. 1 2 3 Rezaei, Hamed. "شرکت بازرگانی تندر صحرا". saharathunder.com. Archived from the original on 2015-02-23. Retrieved 2026-06-09.
  9. 1 2 3 "Russia and Iran struck drone production deal to bypass sanctions". Iran International. 2025-05-29. Retrieved 2026-06-09.
  10. ↑ Shereikis, Nick (2025-05-29). "Airborne Axis". C4ADS. Retrieved 2026-06-09.
  11. ↑ "3 Indian companies under US sanctions for 'illicit trade' and ties with Iran". Business Today. 2024-04-27. Retrieved 2026-06-10.
  12. ↑ "'It can fly for as long as you want' Russia selling Iran airships similar to the Chinese 'spy balloon' shot down over U.S., leaked documents show". Meduza. 2024-03-22. Retrieved 2026-06-09.
  13. 1 2 Hummel, Kristina (2025-04-30). "Iraqi Oil and the Iran Threat Network". Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Retrieved 2026-06-09.
  14. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Yapparova, Lilia (22 March 2024). "It can fly for as long as you want". Meduza. Retrieved 9 June 2026.
  15. ↑ "Sanctions List Search". Sanctions List Search. 1992-12-07. Retrieved 2026-06-09.
  16. ↑ "Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/262 of 29 January 2026". eur-lex.europa.eu. Retrieved 2026-06-09.
  17. 1 2 3 "Counter Terrorism Designations; Iran-related Designations; Non-Proliferation Designations; Russia-related Designations". Office of Foreign Assets Control. 1960-09-09. Retrieved 2026-06-09.
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