Talk:Unity of science

no way

No way, Jose! The two concepts are RADICALLY different. ...

I do not know who wrote the above sentence, but could you clarify a bit? What is so radical about the dirence between the Unity of Science idea and the Unified Science idea of the Vienna circle people? Mabelis 13:19, 27 June 2006 (UTC)

against combining the two

The Unified Science page seems more like a disambiguation page; if Unity of science were going to be re-labeled "unified science", the page would need to be under a slightly different name – like Unified Science (movement) or (concept) or (philosophy) or maybe just unified science in lowercase.

Either way, the Unified Science page should probably include unity of science (whatever it ends up being called) in its list of possible meanings. --Woozle 19:12, 30 July 2006 (UTC) (Addendum: I'd like to see more about the arguments against unified science, as it was my understanding that all the branches of science must be mutually consistant, or at least not contradictory, in order to be called science. Am I missing the point?)

Has it been shown that all the branches of science are at least non-contradictory? Entries like Interpretations_of_quantum_mechanics seem to suggest that some branches of science are not, in themselves, internally consistent. This seems to suggest that a task of assessing, say, whether quantum mechanics is mutually consistent with the branches of science that deal with physiological or ecological metabolism, would be challenging. Sholto Maud 11:44, 31 July 2006 (UTC) (Addendum: so it seems that science is not "unified" at the moment, and that unification is an on-going, emergent property of scientific inquiry.)

The review of Physics continues at Talk:Physics/wip

Some time ago a group of editors set up a "work in progress" page (at Talk:Physics/wip) to hammer out a consensus for the Physics article, which for too long had been in an unstable state. Discussion of the lead for the article has taken a great deal of time and thousands of words. The definitional and philosophical foundations seem to cause most headaches; but progress has been made. Why not review some of the proposals for the lead material that people are putting forward, or put forward your own, or simply join the discussion? The more contributors the better, for a consensus. – Noetica 01:59, 6 November 2006 (UTC)

Update: Concrete proposals have now been put forward, arising from recent discussion aimed at producing a stable and consensual lead section for the Physics article. We have set up a straw poll, for comments on the proposals. Why not drop in at Talk:Physics/wip, and have your say? The more the better! – Noetica 22:30, 13 November 2006 (UTC)

Problems with recent edit and the scope of this article

@Vixorim: Thank you for your recent edit, which I reverted. Its main flaw is that it seems to be more about the (im)possibility of a theory of everything, rather than about the (dis)unity of science, which is a question in philosophy of science. Your edit shares this flaw with a previous edit in March 2025, so I wonder if you are the author of both edits. (You don't have to confirm or disconfirm that.) The tone of the most recent edit is also not right; the tone is too prescriptive for a subject that is so diverse in positions. The edit in March 2025 included some issues that were nevertheless possible to integrate into the article, but I am struggling to see how to integrate anything from this most recent edit.

Have you read either of the following two sources? They are in the references and further reading sections of this article.

• Cat, Jordi. "The unity of science". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ISSN 1095-5054. OCLC 429049174.
• Hooker, C. A. (2000). "The unity of science". In Newton-Smith, William H. (ed.). A companion to the philosophy of science. Blackwell companions to philosophy. Vol. 18. Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 540–549. doi:10.1002/9781405164481.ch78. ISBN 0631170243. OCLC 42428744.

These are two reliable summary sources that indicate what the scope of the subject of this article should be, although both sources may engage in more original research than is appropriate for Wikipedia (per WP:NOR), so they serve only as indicators of subject scope and not writing style. Perhaps you could read those articles and think about how to rewrite your edit in a way that is not prescriptive and that is already discussed in the philosophical literature on unity of science as summarized in those sources (or other similar summary sources on the subject)? Or you could consider whether another article such as Theory of everything is a better place for what you want to contribute? Biogeographist (talk) 22:15, 20 July 2026 (UTC) See also Tahko's text, cited below. Biogeographist (talk) 20:55, 23 July 2026 (UTC)

@Biogeographist Hi, i'm the editor of both. My main goal in this edit was Non-linear modeling concept. I was aware of my latest edit problems, so i've commented on your talk page for a review. I know wikipedia is not my personal notebook, But I'm in some stages of paradigm shift in my life since i have OCPD, and on CBT therapy i should increase my awareness of IMPERFECT. With analogy and formal epistemology i try to understand imperfectionalism.I don't know how to explain what's inside my mind, With approximation theory and Limit, we can only guess better and better models. I found analogy is like fractal in some concepts, maybe you should explain why Unity of science and Theory of everything are not related? I see their goal is reaching perfect and complete description of world. In mathematics (as an axiomatic system) there's no end on infinity in reduction in geometry, but in physics by Planck units, specifically the Planck length, you must put a limit on your measurement. That's pulling my mind into philosophy on mathematics. But my mind locked on one question:

The mathematics as a formal system is all about _abstract world_, Physics heavily relies on most precise Axiomatic system that we call mathematics for defining the behavior of _Concrete world_, there's is a magical relation between mathematics and physics. As i know pure mathematics is stuck on those formal world and applied mathematics is when you want to use analogy between this abstract concepts and what you see in reality that are nature phenomenons and we call this process mathematical modeling, Unity of science comes from logic and Theory of everything comes from physics as a concrete world. i try to combine Logic and Physics with Mathematics terms as a bridge. this is why i suggested an edit previously about Complex systems and problem of emergence. I want to suggest an edit in this article and explain Limit in mathematics, Approximation theory, and None linear methodology. these are main subjects in applied mathematics about not reaching COMPLETE. ~2026-40679-93 (talk) 10:15, 21 July 2026 (UTC)

Since i was kid i've tried to be polymath and learn everything. as a teen i searched whole web and waste lots of time and energy of an impossible thing. i just try to prevent others from this mistake by editing article and internal linking for explaining this to readers. before my edit in several months ago, nobody in this very fundamental article wrote about complex systems and emergence. ~2026-40679-93 (talk) 13:47, 21 July 2026 (UTC)

Consider the current first two sentences of this article:

The unity of science is a thesis in philosophy of science that says that all the sciences form a unified whole. The variants of the thesis can be classified as ontological (giving a unified account of the structure of reality) and/or as epistemic/pragmatic (giving a unified account of how the activities and products of science work).

The first sentence says that the unity of science is a thesis that science forms a unified whole. But there are different ways that science could form a unified whole: thus the second sentence differentiates between ontological and epistemic/pragmatic variants of the thesis.

Your main concern in your edit seems to be with the (im)possibility of producing a unified mathematical model of reality, which, as I said, sounds more like (criticism of) a theory of everything, but could be considered (criticism of) a kind of formulation of the unity of science that Tuomas Tahko calls theoretical unity or unity of formalism. However, this kind of formulation does not exhaust the subject of the unity of science and should not be treated as if it is the only meaning of the unity of science.

See Figure 1 in: Tahko, Tuomas E. (2021). Unity of science. Cambridge elements in the philosophy of science. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108581417. ISBN 9781108713382. OCLC 1204142197. There Tahko tentatively identifies the following types of formulation of the unity of science:

1. "Ontological models of unity, as the name suggests, concern the ontological structure of reality. They are intended to be objective models about how reality is structured, whether levelled or not."
   1. "Reductive ontological unity suggests that all entities reduce to some base class of entities, typically, those of fundamental physics."
   2. "Non-reductive ontological disunity suggests that reality may be structured into non-reductive levels that are connected, for instance, by compositional relations, where the composed entities are a genuine addition to reality."
2. "Epistemic/pragmatic models of unity concern the structure of scientific theories and are hence guided by epistemic, explanatory, or pragmatic considerations relating to scientific practice."
   1. "Theoretical unity (or unity of formalism) suggests that a certain set of distinct phenomena may be (approximately) described in terms of a unified formal (mathematical) framework."
   2. "Eliminative semantic unity suggests that all predicates of higher-level sciences are identical to predicates of (fundamental) physics; hence all higher-level explanations are, in principle, replaceable by lower-level (physical) explanations."
   3. "Non-eliminative semantic disunity suggests that higher-level or special science predicates cannot be identified with predicates of physics (traditionally because of arguments from multiple realisation); hence higher-level explanations cannot be dispensed with and a type of pluralism is allowed. However, this view is typically combined with the idea that all higher-level predicates refer to entities that can be understood as being linked to lower-level entities (e.g., by using compositional or mechanistic explanations). This type of combination of non-eliminative semantic disunity and non-reductive ontological disunity is often called non-reductive physicalism."

Furthermore, I am not sure that theoretical unity is best conceived only in terms of mathematical formalism; this is contested and would need to be justified. See, in contrast, the distinction between syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic views of the structure of scientific theories, in: Winther, Rasmus Grønfeldt. "The structure of scientific theories". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ISSN 1095-5054. OCLC 429049174. On the pragmatic view, formal mathematical frameworks are not sufficient for understanding science.

You mentioned the principle of the imperfection of our knowledge/science: this is generally known as fallibilism. This does not necessarily preclude the unity of science in some sense. Science could be imperfect yet unified.

Regarding your autobiographical note about trying to be a polymath and learn everything: I don't think this is bad, as long as it is not just an OCPD symptom. It can be a good aspiration motivating lifelong learning if you understand that it is an orienting ideal and not something that can be completely realized. The writer Scott H. Young discussed this in his 2008 blog post "The goal of learning everything": "Even learning a small fraction of everything can have huge benefits that ripple outwards towards every other area of life." The general benefits of learning are also one justification for continued research in basic science. Biogeographist (talk) 20:55, 23 July 2026 (UTC)