Talk:Physicalism

Physical monism vs David Deutsch and Sean M. Carroll's Absolute rationalism (old rationalists irrationally believed in soul as a simple (philosophy) without any elaboration of its Brodmann-like modalities and correct wiring = connectome [or how it works without them])

David Deutsch and Sean M. Carroll use physicalism to simply mean absolute rationalism. Many (not all) Croatian atheists overfocus on aspects of monism when they use the term physicalism.

No Mention of Quantum Mechanics?

It seems very odd this article makes no mention of quantum mechanics, considering that it's the best description of the fundamental nature of reality that science currently provides, as well as the profound implications the theory has to the question of what it means for something to be "physical" in the first place. Is that purposeful? Surely at least a brief mention of wave function collapse and entanglement would be an important addition. Betamaleparticle (talk) 00:25, 30 January 2022 (UTC)

a) Do you have any reliable sources that discuss "wave function collapse and entanglement" in connection with physicalism?

b) This article is about physicalism, not physics.

c) It's not clear that any of the views and arguments discussed in the article would change if we lived in a strictly Newtonian world with no quantum mechanics. Jibal (talk) 07:38, 9 January 2023 (UTC)

There should be an objections/criticism section

I think the article should feature a section which mentions some common objections, criticism or attempts to refute physicalism. I am not an expert on the topic, just saying that the article feels incomplete without this. 213.175.38.130 (talk) 14:08, 27 March 2024 (UTC)

A critique of this thesis, as it is presented (that «everything is physical»), if anyone is interested, is the pointing of the fact that, in fact, «the physical» is not a concept with a semantically clear or well defined meaning, unless, as Hempel's dilemma points, the case we were talking about the concept "the physical" as handled by a future ideal physics (in which case today we do not yet know even close what such a meaning of "the physical" would be and, therefore, in that case, such a meaning would not be the one we currently handle for the expression «the physical» when emitting this pseudo-thesis). Apart, etymologically, "physical" would mean nothing but "natural", term that is typically defined negatively, by mere contrast to "the supernatural"; this way, the thesis «everything is physical», where «physical» is defined as a synonymous with «natural», would be too a semantically circular thesis and, therefore, a semantically empty thesis. Regards. 84.121.82.221 (talk) 11:40, 16 October 2024 (UTC)

Separate physicalism to: physical monism and physical logicism (unitary logic is wrong for many neologicists)

Typically many people argue for hours and their main argument is different definitions of a noun. This is very common because people have emotions for terms. 2A02:2149:8A2D:F400:301D:6D07:4B97:3B35 (talk) 17:36, 18 May 2024 (UTC)

A critique

A critique of this thesis, as it is presented (that «everything is physical»), if anyone is interested, is the pointing of the fact that, in fact, «the physical» is not a concept with a semantically clear or well defined meaning, unless, as Hempel's dilemma points, the case we were talking about the concept "the physical" as handled by a future ideal physics (in which case today we do not yet know even close what such a meaning of "the physical" would be and, therefore, in that case, such a meaning would not be the one we currently handle for the expression «the physical» when emitting this pseudo-thesis). Apart, etymologically, "physical" would mean nothing but "natural", term that is typically defined negatively, by mere contrast to "the supernatural"; this way, the thesis «everything is physical», where «physical» is defined as a synonymous with «natural», would be too a semantically circular thesis and, therefore, a semantically empty thesis. 84.121.82.221 (talk) 11:39, 16 October 2024 (UTC)

This article is imprecise, unclear, badly structured and of unusually low quality to the point of being unsound.

This article is unclear, badly structured, argumentative in a way that appears to clash with Wikipedia's guidelines of neutral writing (rule 9, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Ten_simple_rules_for_editing_Wikipedia), and under-cited.

The most glaring example is the section "Supervenience-based definitions of physicalism". The expression "supervenience-based definitions of physicalism" is not common in the philosophical literature and is clumsy and potentially misleading. The section reads badly, is unclear, and argumentative. Most of what is said here should be at under a "critique" section at the bottom of the article, not included in the main text as an explanation of physicalism.

Secondly, the notion of supervenience is badly introduced. Supervenience is not a particular kind of physicalism. it is a particular relation often discussed and invoked in the context of physicalism. Specifically, supervenience is (commonly) the idea "that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in some physical respect" (Davidson 1980).

Similarly, the section "Realisation physicalism" adds nothing or very little to the article. Like the expression "supervenience phsyicalism", the expression "realisation physicalism" is not common in contemporary philosophy. The fact that this section is only 1 sentence long with no reference to further in-depth article is itself a sign that this section is a low-quality addition to the article.

The section "Token physicalism" is clumsily worded at times and plain wrong at other times. (1) "Token physicalism is the proposition that "for every actual particular (object, event or process) x, there is some physical particular y such that x = y". It is intended to capture the idea of "physical mechanisms"." - what is meant by "It is intended to capture the idea of physical mechanisms"? And where does this claim come from? This sentence seems either non-sensical or just plain wrong in the context. (2) "Token physicalism is compatible with property dualism, in which all substances are "physical", but physical objects may have mental properties as well as physical properties." This is true, but clumsily put. All (or most) physicalists would also say that physical objects have mental properties - only that they mean something very different when they say this, than the property-dualists do. For non-philosophy readers entering Wikipedia the current formulation seems clearly misleading. (3) "Token physicalism is not however equivalent to supervenience physicalism. First, token physicalism does not imply supervenience physicalism because the former does not rule out the possibility of non-supervenient properties (provided that they are associated only with physical particulars)." is wrong or at best imprecise. Token physicalism does entail philosophical supervenience - as it is normally understood. If every particular mental event/process/object x has some physical particular y such that x = y, this describes a supervenient relation. Any change to y entails a change to x ergo it is a case of supervenience (Davidson 1980).

Type physicalism is introduced under the section reductive physicalism (which is appropriate), but the explanation of type physicalism - especially regarding how it differs to token physicalism - is unclearly put. Consider the essential assertion of type-physicalism "for every actually instantiated property F, there is some physical property G such that F=G" compared to the essential assertion of token-physicalism "for every actual particular (object, event or process) x, there is some physical particular y such that x = y". What is the difference between these two sentences? (There is one, but it is subtle and not well-explained).

The sentence "First, token physicalism does not imply supervenience physicalism because the former does not rule out the possibility of non-supervenient properties (provided that they are associated only with physical particulars)." is non-sensical, or, at best extremely clumsy. Token physicalism does entail philosophical supervenience - as it is normally understood. If every particular mental event/process/object x has some physical particular y such that x = y, this describes a supervenient relation. Any change to y entails a change to x ergo it is a case of supervenience.

The latter parts of the article (from "Reductionism and Emergentism") is in general of much higher quality than the sections preceding them, but the article as a whole is in dire need of a large revamp and would be severely improved with the inclusion of a "criticism" section at the bottom. 2A01:CB00:389:3E00:E589:82AC:240D:6777 (talk) 02:03, 25 November 2024 (UTC)

I've reverted your omnibus stripping of the article. If you may, please make some more moderate changes piecemeal so others may review them as such. I think many of your criticisms are dead-on, but you ultimately did more damage both in terms of content and style than was really justified by packaging everything into a WP:FAITACCOMPLI. Remsense ‥ 论 12:51, 4 March 2025 (UTC)

Fair enough. I am unfamiliar with editing norms. 2A01:CB00:389:3E00:E589:82AC:240D:6777 (talk) 13:10, 4 March 2025 (UTC)

Please create the page physical pluralism = pluralistic physicalism

The dominant MAIN English noun is physical pluralism.

Logical pluralism doesn't include the supernatural, only infinite logical systems. Most of them are mutually exclusive. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A02:587:4F03:200:245E:9A41:B384:5D47 (talk) 21:36, 19 September 2025 (UTC)

The subordinate synonyms are:
physicalist pluralism, pluralistic physicalism, variable multiphysics (not multiphysical monism), etc.

Pluralistic physicalists have various ideas each:

• cosmological monism is wrong (axiomatic and logical monism are wrong due to mutual exclusions of alternative logical systems); infinite universes exist due to their logical self-causation (existence from logical achievability and not from the supernatural or the nothing which doesn't have any potential and it's not the void spacetime)
• nonparallel universes: the vast majority of the universes are mathematically unrelated (the omnimultiverse = the universal multiverse doesn't exist due to mutual exclusions)
• high & low-order Everettism: Everettism (manyworldness) doesn't only produce separate universes, but even single universes aren't a single reality because different observers have different degrees of certainty about the particle arrangement information of the different chunks of the Universe = this is supported both observationally and mathematically. The simple Everettism = only clear-cut separate worlds exists but each single world is un-Everettian = the typical popularization is wrong.
• The mind is yielded by the personhood-yielding computer-brain. Not all parts of the brain contribute equally to the thinking process. No unprocedural soul exists. The computers which aren't connected they aren't connected simply because supernaturalists say it. Many separate brains exist and not a single [w]holistic one.
• Other points I missed, but most of them are hyponymic/subordinate to the major ones.

2.84.223.103 (talk) 08:50, 30 April 2025 (UTC)

Physicalist text written to theists

(It's not soapboxing. It exposes the problem of physical aseity and the criteria of it. We should create the page.)

(the "impersonal God" is the quantum foundations; here a physicalist speaks to a theist)

Mental processing and quantum processing = logical processes, establish impersonal processing as "God," as the logical foundations. This is because the Brodmann areas that attribute personhood are, one by one, impersonal. This is something that theists do not understand. Any information-processing process releases Landauer's entropic heat, and a truly reversible computer cannot be built without catastrophic axiomatic consequences (a paradoxical universe without life), i.e., without any entropic losses. The impossibility of the supernatural is inferred from its inherent atautoticity/αταυτοτικότητα/non-identity, because it has no thorough physical foundation with specific characteristics for it to exist. Metaphysical ignorance does not settle as knowledge of a teleological violation of logic, i.e., supernatural. There is a study on the criteria of physical self-existence (physical aseity) based on various logically feasible physics (in plural), which leads to infinite universes, most of which are not mathematically related, and there is no God–thinker. There is no extra-systemic (= exosystemic) free will, but only intra-systemic (= endosystemic) logicoprocedural feasibility per system. 2A02:587:4F03:200:245E:9A41:B384:5D47 (talk) 21:23, 19 September 2025 (UTC)

Physicalism rejects the supernatural, not logical pluralism

Many physicalists accept the cosmological logical pluralism per some universes which have different physics. Logical pluralism doesn't include the supernatural.

If the single theory of our universe = logical monism per universe is achievable is an open question in physics. Logical pluralism per universe (or monism; it's an open question in physics) doesn't include the supernatural.

How pluralistic monism of existence can work in physicalism? We are complicated phenomena but not something separate from the phenomena (it's an open question in physics if there is a single formula [here ontological formula; not mere description] for everything).

The article isn't honest and rigorous to explain that monism and pluralism are too many separate bipoles like the bipole "physicalism–supernaturalism" and the bipole "logical pluralism vs. logical monism". Physicalism is only strictly monistic on the bipole "physicalism–supernaturalism" and it chooses physicalism. Physicalism is open = undecided on the bipole "logical pluralism vs. logical monism". Different physicalists have different opinions, but the physicalist movement is open on the bipole "logical pluralism vs. logical monism"; nowadays logical pluralism is stronger because it is mathematically supported (see: axiom of choice; we can create infinite allomathematics = mathematics with some different axioms or at least one different).

The article isn't rigorous and honest. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A02:587:4F03:200:245E:9A41:B384:5D47 (talk) 21:50, 19 September 2025 (UTC)

Against physicalism? but in real life people give opposing definitions

David Deutsch uses it in the sense "logical mechanisms", not as anti-Everettian or other general monism.

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About the philosophical zombie which mimics a person with one or few modalities:

Then build a digital person with many modalities.

About The Many-Subjects Argument against popular Physicalism (people give conflicting definitions):

Fuck the idealized philosophical monism about everything.

One thinker can be a monist on one subject and a pluralist on another.

Trying to defend any philosophical view before thinking about how things truly are leads to mistakes.

Separate people have separate brains.

Brains work systemically. Separate brains generate separate personhoods

because no Brodmannian activity can be substantiated outside them.

The environment is interpreted differently by different brains because they don’t have the exact same structure and function.

Trying to defend something before to define it is a fallacy.

Consciousness has various definitions.

Usually we mean an active well functional brain.

Not all Brodmann areas are equally important for personhood; losing the feeling of touch doesn't change us much (momentarily, because every impairment has an impact; and if we're born impaired we have a rewired brain).

Consciousness is an illusion of a healthy enough or healthily functioning brain.

Separate humans experience separately this illusion because they don’t have connected Brodmann areas, and a connection wouldn't cancel the denser neural groupings thus the separate brains.

Future digital persons with Brodmannian brain can be designed to experience high cognitive entanglement because they will be differently built than biological people.

Removing Brodmann areas (see: Mark Solms, South African psychoanalyst) deemed to contribute less to personhood would maintain a decreased consciousness state (personhood is gradient). Very small neuronal systems start to become machine-like and impersonal.

Trying to defend a philosophical idea before rigorously analyzing each system and condition is a wrong way to think.

Erroneous arguments against physicalism

1. Digital brains with genuinely differentiated Brodmannian modalities are impossible to be built, and if they are some Brodmann modalities will never have a computational alternative because human brains don't work computationally.

2. All physicalists are universal monists (monists about absolute everything). All physicalists reject the many-worlds interpretation. All physicalists believe in the unsubstantiated universal mind = without any procedures to do it, all minds are one.

3. All physicalists are absolute antipartialists. Personhood is gradient (see separately: brain lesions, animal brains). Only maximal and absent personhood exist according to all physicalists. (Mark Solms explains the Brodmann areas most and least important for personhood/consciousness in a procedurally active brain). ~2025-39349-04 (talk) 16:09, 9 December 2025 (UTC)

The many‑subjects argument against "omnimonistic physicalism" isn't against physicalism

Most physicalists aren't omnimonists (monists about every single thing).

• educational physicalism is based on simplification and many times on works of its opponents
• mocking and disparaging simplifications are way more prevalent than metaphysical naturalism as it is according to facts

We aren't our brains. We are our brains in action. Not all cells and Brodmann areas contribute the same to thinking. Partial phenomena like data-processing which never was exported to the conscious awareness exists and the vast majority of physicalists who are nom-omnimonistic accept it.

If you lower very much the physicalist into something he is not you will win. But the point isn't to win or to be part of an ideology. The whole point is to factually understand. (It is true that many philosophers say silly things including pseudorationalists as the claim that digital Brodmannian brains with genuine differentiation and richness per Brodmann area are impossible because physics allows it but we have to spread obviously wrong views to write pointless books and supposedly hinder people who don't read them and continue to evolve everything achievably evolveable.). ~2025-43464-99 (talk) 00:16, 30 December 2025 (UTC)

Debunking the ultra stupid [Frank Jackson] Mary argument

A hypernymic/high-order understanding is that the fact some human exists doesn't mean they immediately know anatomy without styding it (A doesn't cause B). Different data-processing isn't tautological for a Brodmann-type brain with many interconnected data-processing modalities/ brain areas. The fact you can read about colors without seeing them and probably making some systemic biased assumptions doesn't mean you supernaturally activated the correct data-processing modalities (eye cones [crossover network/ color separation], optic nerve contrast, midbrain informational labeling of seen images, V1 (Primary Visual Cortex), extrastriate visual areas (V2, V3, V4, MT/V5) that handle more complex, integrated visual information,

Visual Area 4 (V4/hV4): Located in the ventral occipital lobe, specifically the lingual gyrus and fusiform gyrus, this region is considered a specialized "color center" crucial for color vision. Damage to this area can result in a condition called achromatopsia, or cortical color blindness, even if the eyes themselves are functional.

Without activating the correct series of systems or by activating a different system like Wernicke’s language understanding a person doesn't supernaturally get the correct interpretation of the exact information. Brodmann areas are interconnected, but with random guessing people without enough imagination will not imagine anything, and people with enough imagination will imagine something based on physical connectome facts like previous biases.

Many people attack physicalism with stupidity. (There are some cases of few unwise physicalists or lay-atheists who also say antiscientific things.)

Necessarily create the page: Brodmannian personhood-yielding brain (person-making brain + nurture [actual or simulated]) otherwise many fallacies will emerge. ~2026-33898-4 (talk) 10:58, 16 January 2026 (UTC)

Language-based explanations to people who are never exposed to color doesn't result in color recognition (some people have strong imagination; a very very negligible amount of participants will even see mostly wrong colors due to internal interpretation of connectome biases [imagination is probabilistic; very very negligibly rare specific imagination can occur through internal biases = a wrong color-like experience in a negligible amount of color-untrained participants). If the scientist activates color vision via neuronal activation they will see color, but the full system of vision should be activated for a complete experience. Skipping the midbrain for example will reduce the emotional reaction (it will exist attenuated because the occipital lobe is interconnected with the overall brain).  — Preceding unsigned comment added by ~2026-33898-4 (talk) 11:30, 16 January 2026 (UTC)

Imagination is probabilistic. Not all people have the same imaginative abilities. Complicated data-processing of specific data categories requires adequate training. A very very negligibly rare amount of individuals would have imperfect/erroneous color-like experiences without any color training via connectome biasing. — Preceding unsigned comment added by ~2026-33898-4 (talk) 11:35, 16 January 2026 (UTC)

Property dualism is interpretational; not fundamental

• In quantum field theory the void (empty spacetime which isn't inexistence in physics) has different interpretations per observer. The overall Universe (or at least a Hubble causal sphere; but it interacts with others) has the full description. No single observer is the Universe.
• A Brodmann-type multimodal multiprocessor (biological or future digital personhood-yielding brain) has a logical procedural description and an experiencing introspection by the person it generates.

Persons experience their personhood internally because they're built multimodally to yield such an experience. This doesn't violate physical laws (physicalism).

Reality violates omnimonistic physicalism. Omnimonism is the claim that all subjects of study have monistic foundations. In science logical monism and pluralism are open questions. Simplistic omnimonism is obviously wrong (it rejects the fact that all data-processing doesn't become fully conscious by the person). The clearly stupid physical omnimonism started as a mocking of people who only accept logic, and logic is one thing if we reject logical pluralism. Also many old rationalists weren't there wisest. Karl Popper rejected the many-worlds interpretation without providing a logical mechanism for the annihilation of supernaturally by him rejected outcomes. In Newtonian mechanics a ball on top of a symmetric hill and a falling ball on a declivity which at some point has an intricately built curvy protuberance, in both cases infinite outcomes are possible. No infinite energy at the moment of multifurcation is required because "logical systemic and procedural achievability" is more foundational at the ontological continuum of physical existence than energy transfers which is about results/outcomes. Thus many atheists who are simplistic, help the enemies of rationalism because they leave logical gaps filled will human biases.

The definition of the void and of the personhood-yielding brains are perspective issues, not genuinely different ontologies (as separate examples of course).

Property dualism is wrong because it proposes a clear-cut separation which cannot be substantiated ontologically, but only interpretationally.

A mechanism does what is supposed to do if it functions well and if it exists. Physical actuality doesn't imply a single frame of reference and/or mechanisms which don't exist, simply because bad thinkers write wrong theories based on their bad explanations and biases. University physicalism wastes too much time in the haze of bad explanations and on people who want to immediately make great statements about the physical world without painstakingly describing physical systems according to standard science. These people prove that philosophy will always have dominant biased and simplistic approaches with people writing huge texts and being rigorous on explaining views but not rigorous on the exact specifics of the systems they describe. If you describe views, you describe interpretations, and if you overestimate them you describe human biases. And then many layers of biases accumulate: mockery of atheists and atheists who aren't rigorous (being an atheist doesn't guarantee rigor).~2026-68451-4 (talk) 21:55, 31 January 2026 (UTC)

Interpretational perspective generalization and distortion of monism into omni-monism

Monism doesn't guarantee omni-monism (monism on every single view). Also physicalism has different schools: a. mind physicalists: those who examine self-awareness versus the mechanism which yields it (many consider it a mere interpretational perspective; we are what mechanisms yield and others outside the mechanism cannot have full access; physical monism doesn't uncausally and unmechanistically cause a wider monism of a wider common brain which doesn't exist), and b. mechanistic physicalism (see: David Deutsch) in which physical systems are explained without distorting monism into omni-monism via the generalization of interpretational perspective (different physicalists have different perspectives and many totally different approaches and interests; popular and academic physicalism usually only focuses on omni-monistic mind physicalism as an interpretational perspective generalization).

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Different physicalists may have totally different perspectives. And this is important. Popular and academic physicalism almost exclusively focus on only one group of schools (various views on generalizations of interpretational perspectives). Some physicalists abhor the dominant physicalism. The dominant physicalism isn't necessarily this dominant in people who are actually physicalists (it exists as a variation). ~2026-82596-1 (talk) 18:04, 6 February 2026 (UTC)

a. type-identity theory vs. b. multiple realizability/ functionalism vs. c. reality

(The correct thing to do is to create the page: personhood-yielding brain (biological and digital; theoretically it can be also mechanical but it would have to be unmanageably enormous, slow and impossible to maintain).

Thinking, emotions and other experiences (higher Brodmann-like functions in a connectome) are yielded structurally, but structures vary. Unmanageably many alternative brain architectures can yield high personhood with rich thinking characteristics. Donald Davidson was wrong for confusing a. the hard to know (untraceability or difficult traceability of all structures and functions) with b. vague negationism/ vague unknowinagnosticism (I reject something and I don't know my suggestion). Being unknowing/agnostic (here agnostic means unknowing) doesn't lead to explicit understanding. Brain builders (programs + electronics) cannot use unknowingness as the architecture of the brains they build thus Donald Davidson isn't so bright for them (of course even people who aren't bright can offer useful comments to be re-rendered otherwise by the bright [bright here means of useful intelligence]). Free will is impossible/supernatural/exo-systemic without any exo-system which is a fallacy. All logical systems/mechanisms/structures have degrees of freedom. We can increase the degrees of freedom of a system, but too much freedom introduces negative effects (noise, mistakes, mental illness, crime, etc.).

Most philosophers think according to their biases. Science doesn't describe reality with emphatic bold immediate statements. The real world is more complicated than the imagined purist biases.

a. type-identity theory vs. b. multiple realizability/ functionalism vs. c. reality

Type-identity theory is correct in coarse-graining (clones cannot practically have the exact matter arrangements and data; also the quantum jittering of everything produces deviations in supposedly exact clones which grow exponentially). Exact functioning (they have to be functioning) structures and mechanisms yield the specific results they produce (for example thinking states, moods, etc.). Type-identity theorists have multiple views. The correct view in brain building is that exact brain type yields the exact mind, and different brain architectures can yield similar but not exact identities because personhood-yielding computer-brains are too complicated and even subtle differences do produce differences, in some cases significant. Absolute correspondence amongst systems is impossible and in practice in huge systems even supposed type-identity exact clones with the exact data, yield random deviations because clones don't cancel the random shakiness of particles and Everettism (many-worlds interpretation; replaced by a supernatural vaguery which annihilates correct outcomes as suggested by bad philosophers. Infinite energy during the multifurcation isn't required. The systemic logical achievability is more fundamental than energy transfers, because energy is procedurally exchanged according to logical achievability. Logical achievability yields everything achievable, originating from foundational logical achievability. Energy transfers isn't the most fundamental layer of reality, but this statement is problematic due to the axiomatic circularity in the physical foundations. Energy transfers of strictly monistic anti-Everettian systems which sometimes supernaturally decide to become Everettian is a wrong description.

Multiple realizability/ functionalism is coarse-grain correct which means useful but wrong. Here I don't use the daydreamer philosophical vaguery perspective (anything goes with it) but the specific brain building approach (deepest rationalism as it is and not wished). Personhood-yielding computer–brains are highly complicated. These systems have too many components. Not all the networks and timings are the exact same. Multiple realizability amongst equivalent but different systems/ functionalism is very important and correct in coarse-graining matching/ semantic congruence but it does not yield absolute-exact brain clones because there in no full semantic congruence amongst complicated systems and even supposed type-identity clones with exact program[s], electronics and data are impossible due to quantum shakiness, timing errors etc. (pace givers aren't ideal).

The vast majority of nowadays philosophers want to say ideal things including ideal descriptions of the non-ideal, and they don't care about the rigorous details of reality even though most of them pretend they care about it.

In a vague framework of intellectual charlatanism anything goes because without rigorous foundations, any claim is based on explanations not supported by an achievable foundations (plural noun as in physical foundations and mathematical foundations).

As if we introduce a million ifs, anything goes, but these ifs usually don't meet logical achievability criteria as a system. If something is corrupt in our impressive emotional biased arguments, the argument has no substantial value. Even wrong arguments sometimes have value if re-rendered which means changed, and improved to become different arguments and/or justifications.

In science we don't seek immediate grandioze simplifications. We honestly try to substantiate what we can being rigorous and honest about the methods and the evidence. Be a good scientist. Not a philosopher. ~2026-82596-1 (talk) 18:07, 6 February 2026 (UTC)

The arguments amongst omni-monistic and naturo-pluralistic physicalists are maximally important in philosophy

Many miseducated editors didn't read: monism to see that isn't not monothematic (single-subjected).

Many editors do not understand that even aspects of the basic definition which is 100% antisupernaturalistic, are problematic because various physicalists argue about sections of the definition.

We must be honest and describe the truth. There is a range of views within physicalism. ~2026-82596-1 (talk) 19:37, 6 February 2026 (UTC)

The reason your contributions are being removed is because they do not align with Wikipedia's rules for editing (Wikipedia:Ten simple rules for editing Wikipedia). See especially rule #2 (wikipedia is not a publisher of original thought and it is also not a soapbox), rule #4 (the level of technical detail must be balanced against the ability of non-experts to understand those details), and rule #6 (cite, cite, cite). Elfawessi (talk) 14:28, 11 February 2026 (UTC)

Simplifications and distortions

(Please add this section in the article. You can improve the title. It's very important because mistakes destroy the arguments.)

Physicalism is distorted. Most people who speak and teach physicalism aren't physicalists themselves. For example not all brain cells contribute equally to consciousness/personhood; and hormones, the gut, and the external environment affect the brain which isn't a standalone system. Copying a biological architecture into a very similar digital system is doable and will create a similar personality, but the deep structural foundations of electronic and biological systems differ, and this causes inevitable changes in experiencing due to timing, capacity, workflow/throughput, etc. Harming a digital Brodmannian brain to make it closer to a biological brain will only extend the differences, because different systems have different strong elements. Most nowadays (2026) type-physicalist philosophers don't have rigorous structural knowledge and imagine unrigorous wrong explanations. Most books and videos on physicalism are wrong, because people without structural knowledge utter absolute and wrong descriptions unrelated to physical achievability. That's why it's bad to say you're a physicalist, because people ascibe you mistakes. Metaphysical naturalism is a less burdened synonym. — Preceding unsigned comment added by ~2026-28173-60 (talk) 16:11, 10 May 2026 (UTC)

This is badly written, unclear, uncited, self-insisting, soap-box-like commentary that should absolutely not be added anywhere near this article.

If you hope to contribute constructively please put some effort into satisfying the Wikipedia rules for editing.

In its current form, this amounts to sabotage. ~2026-34824-94 (talk) 02:12, 14 June 2026 (UTC)

Physicalism is a hypernym; it includes monistic physicalism and pluralistic physicalism

Mind-brain physical monism means that a. ontology and mechanism (functioning brain) describes and is identical to b. the system and its yielded personal experience (mind) with absolute correspondence/ identity.

Though mind-brain physical monism leaves open questions inside physicalism:

• no guaranteed monistic foundational kernel: At the foundational level, modern physics does not guarantee a single, unified, monistic building block. We may live in a fragmented "system of systems," a cosmos of phenomena which yield phenomena, or an infinite mathematical structure without an ultimate bottom floor.
• causal closure or openness is not settled: Many (but not all) physicalists (and anti-physicalists when present physicalism) treat the causal closure of the physical world as an absolute, unshakeable axiom. In reality, whether the physical universe is causally closed, or whether it exhibits fundamental causal openness (fundamental indeterminism of the physical foundations, emergent causal mechanisms, or open-ended structural dynamics like a high-order foundations), remains a deeply open question in the physical foundations.
• totally separate universes: The existence of totally separate universes with totally separate physical laws (beyond a single multiverse) isn't rejected by modern physics. It's an open question.

Mind-brain physical monism even within physicalism leads to mistakes and simplifications.

Regionality exists in the brain and the information is integrated in many possible ways (immediate integration in the here and now, or storage for later use, or deletion, or weaker and hybrid versions). This neuroscientific description is physicalist but science-based and not philosophy-based.

Many (but not all) physicalist and anti-physicalist philosophers commit a misunderstanding that is not only non-trivial, but fundamental in their urge to describe antisupernaturalism and that a. the ontology and mechanism of the brain is identical to b. the mind which is the yielded systemic personal experience. This identity correspondence doesn't guarantee absolute physical monism in all interpretational domains in pure physicalism. Also not all brain regions and brain cytology contributes equally or at all to cognition (this isn't a point of disagreement amongst various physicalists but it's important in neuroscience). Physicalism is a hypernym and it includes monistic physicalism and pluralistic physicalism; and the domain of pluralism must be clearly stated for each case because it's not self-evident. ~2026-39882-12 (talk) 18:45, 15 July 2026 (UTC)

This is badly written, unclear, uncited, self-insisting, soapbox-like commentary that should absolutely not be added anywhere near this article. If you hope to contribute constructively please put some effort into satisfying the Wikipedia rules for editing. In its current form, this amounts to sabotage. AlsoWukai (talk) 10:30, 27 July 2026 (UTC)

Removing the actual universe from physicalism becomes false philosophicalism

It is an open question if all the natural phenomena are immediately one single system, or multiple compatible systems, some more fundamental than the others, with causal permeability amongst orders of magnitude (see: David Deutsch).

The Universe is most probably a collection of causally connected system and not an immediate ontology.

Study everything about the computers and how they work. Young kids who don't know say simplistic things like many philosophers who don't know physics.

It's maximally important in physicalism to describe the Universe and not a simplification of it. That's why most physicalists and anti-physicalists are bad at describing the ontology of the cosmos, because they start from basic biases and biased debunking of biases, and overfocus on them as to boost their arguments make generalizations and mistakes.

Physicalism failing to describe the ontology of the actual cosmos is a major problem in physicalism. ~2026-41111-19 (talk) 02:58, 24 July 2026 (UTC)

This is badly written, unclear, uncited, self-insisting, soapbox-like commentary that should absolutely not be added anywhere near this article. If you hope to contribute constructively please put some effort into satisfying the Wikipedia rules for editing. In its current form, this amounts to sabotage. AlsoWukai (talk) 10:30, 27 July 2026 (UTC)