Talk:Foundationalism

Isn't this a typo? "...while some contemporary rationalism asserts..." It should read 1) "while some contemporary rationalists assert..." or 2) "while contemporary rationalism asserts...". The first suggestion is preferable.

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—Preceding unsigned comment added by Douglasorme (talk • contribs) 01:19, 17 September 2008 (UTC)

Not knowing much about this subject, it would be very helpful to have some accounting of the history of foundationalism. Who coined the term, who came up with it, who are some of the more notable proponents of it, etc.

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I've given this article, which let's just say didn't reflect the state of the art on the topic (and actually, it still doesn't), a quick going-over. It needs to be augmented with some points made in the regress argument in epistemology and perhaps other articles linked from epistemology. Please, before you start writing articles on a subject for Wikipedia, look around for related articles. You can adapt text from those other articles. --LMS

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I'm embarassed to say I'm not very familar with the Babylon 5 TV series, but I believe a religion called "Foundationalism" appeared there (Dr. Franklin?). We may want to make a note of this.

Is this a jest? Seriously though, disambiguation will sort this out - religion is not philosophy.--Knucmo2 12:22, 1 November 2005 (UTC)

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If anything there should be a link to Babylon 5/Foundationalism since that term is not used with that meaning anywhere ouside of the show. And there is a common philisophical meaning, which unless the language changes, is priamary, and should be treated as such. MRC BTW, Larry, this is getting to be quite a good article.

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I had a discussion with some members of various philosophical communities, and a few of them were convinced that "basic beliefs" didn't require any justification whatsoever.

Questioning this, I went to Mr. Ernest Sosa himself and inquired as to whether this group, as well as those who do justify "basic beliefs" on non-beliefs were both foundationalists, and he said that they were. Similarly, Patrick Rysiew was in agreement. I think it is better to take the word of these two philosophers than less knowledgable philosophers, so I have changed the text back. - 24.80.226.183

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It's probably unhelpful (because inaccurate) to say that infinite regresses, "dogmatic" stopping points, and circular arguments are not "logically valid." Circular arguments, for instance, are actually deductively valid arguments, and it's not obvious that the other two cases admit of some problem of logical validity. Usually we (rightly) find all three things objectionable - but not because they fail to be "logically valid." They are unconvincing, or question-begging, or dialectically inappropriate, or demand further explanation, but in none of the cases is it necessary that we have some violation of logical inference. I would not use the phrase "logically valid," since that has a rather narrow application in philosophy and logic (or at least narrower than is being used here).

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I think there should be some mention of this connection to analytic philosophy, especially that of Wittgenstein's because it his deals with "basic facts" that construct in states-of-affairs and so on.

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Isn't fallibilism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallibilism an alternative to foundationalism?

The "alternatives" are alternative theories of justification, but it should be said that there are also alternatives to justification.

I removed the "Arguments for... F"

Because:
It did not present an argument for F.
It contained the error that circular arguments are invalid, they are not. They are unconvincing.
It had some questionable use of 'dogmatic'.

--Deleet (talk) 01:26, 12 July 2008 (UTC)

'Reformed epistemology'?

Under Alternatives to..., 'reformed epistemology' is listed. Seems to me reformed epistemology is merely a type of foundationalism, with specific foundationalist 'basic beliefs', etc. Can anyone explain how R.E. is not F? Foggg (talk) 20:22, 16 June 2010 (UTC)

I believe it's incompatibility with foundationalism has to do with it's adherence to divine command theory —Preceding unsigned comment added by 134.193.112.62 (talk) 05:46, 15 December 2010 (UTC)

Reformed epistemology is not related to divine command theory. They deal with different things, though one could presumably use RE to account for the propagation of divine commands. Even so, they are distinct. One can hold to RE but not DCT or vice-versa. GreenRedGreen (talk) 07:42, 26 April 2026 (UTC)

Reformed epistemology, which I hold in such low regard that bile rises in my throat as I say the words so I may not be the most unbiased commentator, seems to be incompatible with foundationalism in that it seems to fail to distinguish between basic beliefs and externally justified beliefs, making all beliefs basic. No part of it is questionable, as the Reformed worldview according to the Reformed epistemology, is a precondition for intelligibility. This is of course taking stupid to whole new levels of low, but it's what they say. --BenMcLean (talk) 20:23, 5 April 2012 (UTC)

One could argue that all of Western Christianity is foundationalist, both Protestantism with its "sola scriptura" and post-Tridentine Catholicism with its papal/magisterial authority. They just disagree about what the foundation is. In contrast, Eastern Christianity is more like an complex ecosystem than a house built on a foundation; hence it is more coherentist (with a healthy dose of mysticism thrown in). Authority is viewed as internal and pneumatic rather than external and dogmatic, and so there isn't a need for a "foundation" per se. This could be because Western Christians accepted Aristotle's ideas (via scholasticism) and Easterners didn't. FiredanceThroughTheNight (talk) 16:57, 8 July 2014 (UTC)

RE is in fact a form of foundationalism. I don't care for RE either (though I respect some who do). GreenRedGreen (talk) 07:43, 26 April 2026 (UTC)

Program-like, open system and pluralistic foundationalism in cosmology

Physical logicofoundationalism in cosmology isn't tautological to the philosophical foundationalism but it shares some ideas.

Physical logicofoundationalism separates the physical laws which are the deepest logical layer from the events. The cyclic big bangs are important events but not the physical foundations. In the many-worlds interpretation and in some branching cyclic cosmology theories there is no single first universe, but alternative solutions. Everettism = the many-worlds interpretation produces many alternative past and future universes for each universe-strain/ specific subuniverse (amongst big bangs) we study.

Physical logicofoundationalists oppose nihilogony (creation from pure nothing itself) because pure nothingness isn't a potential state. Pluralistic logic is eternal and it provides infinite program-like universes. The axiomatization of the systems of proof (mathematics, allomathematics [see: axiom of choice and other further mathematics axioms we can accept or reject] and the infinite geometries) doesn't have the program-like entropic self-executable form of the physical foundations. Physical logicofoundationalists have various views. Physical logicofoundationalists don't reject the creation from matter, but the deepest physical foundations for them is the logical achievability of each different universes' physical laws. The field is still evolving.

Knowledge is higher, multilayered and interpreted by a Brodmannian brain (biological or digital) information thus God being a mereological simple (without parts) is impossible to exist and be fundamental as a knowledge-bearer (his knowledge would have been more fundamental, he wouldn't have free will because everything which exists obeys logic [the mentally ill don't fundamentally violate logic; they have a dysfunctional connectome and neuroendocrinology], exocausality/exologic/the supernatural not only is unknowable but it lacks any specific logical mechanisms and foundations = it is atautotic (without identity) = it cannot exist. Data-processing releases heat (Landauer's principle) thus God would necessarily require to have a physical impact = no free will, no immateriality; and reversible computing is impossible to build. All reversible computer simulations would actually release procedural heat, and they cannot exist as absolute foundational standalones because they don't have a mechanism of interaction between informational and thermodynamic entropy = if they had they wouldn't be reversible computers though.

The cosmological foundationalism is maximally important, because it helps us understand the importance of foundationalism but modernly presented. Ideas explain ideas, but the Brodmann [with parts of different data-processing modalities] brain (biological or digital) isn't the most fundamental nor the ideas of the thinkers. Logical pluralism examines multiple experimental logical systems. Different logical contextualities are possible. There is no universal logical system and no universal axiomatic system due to mutual exclusions and different logical foundations. It is impossible to compress in a finite system the infinite logical and axiomatic systems (they don't have trivial patterns). Old foundationalists didn't know some modern logical experiments and experimental systems.

— Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A02:2149:8BDE:1C00:14DA:D03:ED12:E1A6 (talk) 17:40, 31 August 2025 (UTC)

Reformed Epistemology - modest or classic or neither?

There are different versions of RE. I suggest that RE does belong in the article, but it should be its own section or moved to a more general section versus being subsumed under modest foundationalism. RE can be modest, but it doesn't have to be modest. Its real contribution is how it works out (or attempts to work out) ways for belief in God (as well as more complex Christian doctrines, depending on the version) can be properly basic.

Wanted to see if folks have ideas regarding its placement.

TL;DR

Reformed epistemology should definitely be in the article, but the current placement is a bit suspect. GreenRedGreen (talk) 07:47, 26 April 2026 (UTC)