Operation Fourth Term

Operation Fourth Term
Part of Gothic Line Offensive
Major General Edward Almond, Commanding General of the 92nd Infantry Division, inspects his troops during a decoration ceremony, February 1945.
Date 4–11 February 1945 Location Versilia, Garfagnana, Italy 44.09°N 10.43°E / 44.09; 10.43 Result Axis victory Territorial changes Monte Stella and Lama dei Peligni captured by the Axis forces
Belligerents
United States Air Support: Brazil	Italian Social Republic Germany
Commanders and leaders
Edward Almond Mark W. Clark John Shirley Wood Lucian Truscott Gerald R. Johnson Norman Dike W. D. Crittenberger	Mario Carloni Rodolfo Graziani J.V. Borghese Otto Fretter-Pico
Units involved
See Order of Battle
Casualties and losses
695–706 killed 22–27 tanks destroyed 2 aircraft damaged 48 Major officers killed 55 prisoners 22 A.V.Fs damaged 1,000–1,200 wounded	Unknown 75–145 prisoners

Operation Fourth Term, was an offensive launched by the United States in World War II between 4 and 11 February 1945, aimed at the capture of Massa, in the wider Gothic Line front. After several days of costly and unproductive fighting, the commander of the 92nd Infantry Division called off the attack and the operation failed to achieve its objective.

Order of battle

See also: Gothic Line order of battle

Allies:
United States

• 92nd Infantry Division
  • 365th Infantry Regiment
  • 366th Infantry Regiment
    • 3rd Battalion of the 366th Infantry Regiment
  • 370th Infantry Regiment
  • 371st Infantry Regiment
  • 760th Medium Tank Battalion
  • 758th Light Tank Battalion
  • 27th Armored Field Artillery
  • 86th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron

Brazil

• Brazilian Expeditionary Force
  • 1st Brazilian Fighter Squadron

Axis:
Italian Social Republic

• IV Coastal Defense Artillery Group "Coppi"
  • "Pezzini" Coastal Defense Artillery Group
• 1st Bersaglieri Division "Italia"
  • 1st Bersaglieri Regiment
  • 2nd Bersaglieri Regiment

Nazi Germany

• 148th Reserve Division:
  • 281st Infantry Regiment
  • 285th Infantry Regiment

Prelude

Main article: Battle of Garfagnana

The Allied front in northwestern Tuscany, as of December 1944, consisted of a line that extended from Forte dei Marmi to the Barga Valley. During this time, the U.S. 92nd Infantry Division, an all–African American unit with little combat experience, occupied the region. The German Wehrmacht and the National Republican Army (the army of the Italian Social Republic) attempted to exploit the perceived weakness of the 92nd through a coordinated final offensive on the Italian front known as "Operation Wintergewitter" between December 26–28, 1944. Their initial success allowed them to break into the Barga Valley and defeat elements of the 92nd Infantry Division. However, before long, they were halted by the entry of the 8th Indian Infantry Division. Shortly afterwards, Italo-German troops were forced to retreat from territory they had occupied for only a short time, although they captured over 200 prisoners of war and took possession of various weapons and equipment while doing so.

Planning the offensive

After the Axis offensive, Willis D. Crittenberger was appointed commander of the U.S. Fifth Army to plan an attack to capture Garfagnana, a central position in the Upper Serchio Valley, and the naval base at La Spezia. The offensive would be the major offensive of the U.S. Army 's 92nd Infantry Division and was planned in two phases. In the first, two infantry regiments launched diversionary attacks in the Serchio Valley. Their objective was to draw enemy reserves from the coastal areas and clear defenses overlooking a major German supply and communications center, then cross the coast and the town of Seravezza, attempting to capture the hills overlooking the coastal corridor and the approaches to the town of Massa. If the 92nd Infantry Division succeeded in capturing those hills, it would control the coastal roads to Massa, bringing the division's artillery within range of La Spezia.

Battle

General Almond and the staff of the 92nd Division developed a two-pronged operation called FOURTH TERM to accomplish their mission in response to the situation. The first phase of the operation was to allow the division to arrive at the Lama di Sotto Ridge (located four miles northwest of Tiglio) via the Serchio Valley. Strettoia Hill (located three miles northeast of Forte dei Marmi) is the objective for this operation because it overlooks the coastal corridor and the routes into Massa (located five miles north of Forte dei Marmi). Strettoia Hill will allow for the capture of the coastal main supply routes into Massa and allow corps and division artillery to engage Italian navy vessels based in La Spezia.

The primary mission of the 597th at the beginning of the operation was to provide direct support for the 365th Infantry. The next day, the 598th Infantry moved out of the Serchio and returned to the coastal area, where it was now going to be a part of the main attack instead of providing support to the 366th Infantry. Now because the 598th was no longer providing support to the 366th, the 597th was assigned an additional mission to provide support to the 366th Infantry as well. This effectively meant that the 597th would be providing direct support to both regiments at the same time. During the entire operation, both regiments (the 365th and the 366th) had their cannon companies attached to the 597th as well. After the operation was complete, approximately fifty percent of all officers from the 597th were passed on to the supported regiments, either with the forward observers of the attacking units, or as liaison officers in the battalion or regimental headquarters.

On the initial day of operations, the 597th assisted the efforts of the 3d Battalion, 365th Infantry (the main attack) with an accompanying forward observer in each attacking company. Several enemy artillery positions and strongpoints were struck. The day started very promisingly, with all objectives being reached by noon. Lieutenant Gayles, Lieutenant Johnson, and Lieutenant McCant were with the forward Littoral Forces. General Clark was at the Outpost in Sommacolonia with Colonel Derricks and Captain McCants until the completion of the objective. General Colbern had visits to both Sommacolonia and Lama di Sotto during the day.

Colonel Derricks and Captain Hargrove described the preparation for and conduct of the attack:

Left CP at 0500 hours for Sommacolonia (OP) to observe attack... Attack was successful but expensive in men and material. My guns have repelled all counterattacks so far. On 5 February Attack jumped off. C battery at Piana di Lama di Sotto above Sommacolonia. Received word that the battery knocked out one enemy gun about nine o'clock. Lt Burton adjusted the battery effectively on enemy mule train vie Treppignana. For most of the day we've been firing steadily about two thousand rounds by four o'clock. The 365th has started up Lama di Sotto. I hear they have run into many mines and are getting a lot of machine gun and mortar fire. Casualties aren't too heavy, however, I hear, and they are moving up pretty steadily. We are getting calls for missions all over the front. Our battalion and the regiment of British mediums the 10th AGRA-plus the Cannon Companies of the 365th and 368th Infantry Regiments are furnishing the artillery support.

— Colonel Derricks and Captain Hargrove

On February 4, 1945, the 365th Infantry began operations in the Serchio Valley, advancing along a ridge on the east side of the river; the 366th Infantry provided support and moved along the west side. Both units made significant advances at the beginning, with the 366th taking control of the village of Gallicano and the 365th quickly reaching their objective on the ridge, called 'Lama di Sotto', and experiencing very little resistance as they progressed through their respective objectives. However, during the next two days, the 366th captured the village of Calomini, and the 365th secured the ridge and the village of Lama; German reinforcements were located at the same time, replacing the Italians who were failing in their defense. The Germans confirmed their presence on February 7 with a counter-attack by the 148th Division, 286th Infantry Regiment at night.

German forces engaged with United States 365th Infantry forces to west of Serchio River; United States 365th was found unable to withstand German forces assault so pulled back from original operational starting position near ridge to maintain contact with 366th Infantry; and due to lack of German aggressive move towards additional US forces both were in stare down position unable to make any move towards each other. Operation did not accomplish significant objective as a diversionary attack but both inexperienced United States regiments were able to attack and obtain key terrain under moderate resistance despite inability to hold the terrain they captured.

On the morning of February 8th when the limited attack was underway, Genaral Truscott, Crittenberger, and Almond all observed from an observation post in the hills east of Forte dei Marmi. From the outset of the attack, the operation was not going as planned. After only 800 yards of advance, elements of the 371st Infantry hit an enemy minefield stopping their advance as well as exposing the right flank of the 370th Infantry. Despite this, stroke of bad luck, the 370th Infantry's lead Battalion was able, with close support from aircraft of the 86th Fighter Squadron, to continue to advance and capture Battalion objectives by late afternoon. As soon as the men of the Rifle Companies moved into dispersed locations to dig in, a tremendous mortar barrage indicated an impending German Counterattack.

German troops swiftly routed the advance unit of the battalion. The second battalion fell back down the east face of the Strettoia Hills. Troops from a third battalion, which were to have leapfrogged to the next height according to plan, encountered troops that were falling back due to enemy activity. These two battalions had a lot of confusion between them, and as a result, the attack failed. On the third day following the date that the attack failed, the regimental command post sent an urgent note to all battalions to inform them of the status of the regiment: "The only reserve we have is our regimental command post; it is absolutely necessary that we do everything in our power to join all possible soldiers together; we will be faced with much pressure today, so make your preparations accordingly; find, in all homes or places, for stragglers; report every hour the progress you have made and the number of soldiers that you have massed together."

The continued failure of the operation was limited, due to the coastal plain being narrow in the Strettoia Valley where the operation continued to occur. The 366th Infantry tried with additional engineering and armor units for three days to advance over the shallow depth of the Cinquale Canal and did not succeed. The support of the naval artillery from the Italian Coast Defense at Punta Bianca, located 10 miles from the Cinquale Canal, made matters worse for the task force. It was clear, as a result of the high degree of straggling and disorganization throughout the components of the 92D DIV and attached units, that any further efforts to continue with this operation would result in no value. On the third day of the operation (November 11), General Almond cancelled the operation.

Aftermath

During the attack on the Versilia sector, the 371st lost 4 officers and 17 men killed, including the commander of its 3rd Battalion, and 4 officers and 104 men wounded and missing. The 370th, whose lines were generally the same as when the attack began, lost 15 officers, 3 of whom were killed in action, and 197 enlisted men, 13 of whom were killed in action. The 366th Infantry lost 5 officers and 152 men killed, 14 officers and about 300 men wounded, and 153 missing, of these, the 3rd Battalion's losses are reported as follows: 2 officers and 31 enlisted men killed, 10 officers and 177 enlisted men wounded, and 48 enlisted men missing. The losses of the 86th Fighter Squadron and the tank battalions are unknown, although it is known that they lost 22 tanks. Other sources speak of 27 armored vehicles destroyed. Overall, American losses in Operation Fourth Term exceeded 1,000 units. According to other sources, the joint operation Serchio or Versilia exceeded 1,100 victims, including 56 officers. Others still speak of 1,200 victims. More detailed sources speak of 300 dead and 1,000 wounded, referring however to the clashes that took place from 7 to 11 February, consequently the figure remains incomplete.

The failed attack on the Cinquale Canal was the most significant of the unit's many failures, and Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall ordered the division's reorganization. The 365th and 371st Infantry Regiments were detached from the division for retraining, taking with them all substandard soldiers. All the best remaining troops joined the 370th Infantry Regiment. The War Department then assigned two new regiments to the division: the 473rd Infantry Regiment, an all-white unit, and the 442nd Infantry Regiment (Nisei), the Japanese-American unit that would become the most decorated regiment in the U.S. Army.

See also

• Battle of the Atlantic
• Battle of Frankfurt
• Battle of Ponte Perati
• Italian invasion of Albania

References

Sources

• Fisher, Ernest (1947). United States Army in World War II.: The Mediterranean theater of operations. Historical Division, Department of the Army.
• Fisher, Ernest F. (1977). United States Army in World War II.: The Mediterranean theater of operations. Center of Military History, United States Army.
• Clark, Lt Col Major (2023). Derricks' Bridgehead: The History of the 92nd Division, 597th Field Artillery Battalion, and the Leadership Legacy of Col. Wendell T. Derricks. Casemate. ISBN 978-1-63624-272-9.
• Lee, Ulysses (1966). The Employment of Negro Troops. Government Printing Office. ISBN 978-0-16-088264-7.