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Moral perception

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Moral perception is a term used in ethics and moral psychology to denote the discernment of the morally salient qualities in particular situations.[1] Moral perceptions are argued to be necessary to moral reasoning (see practical reason), the deliberation of what is the right thing to do. Moral perception is variously conceptualized by Aristotle, Hannah Arendt, and Martha C. Nussbaum. Lawrence Blum (1994) distinguishes moral perception from moral judgment. Whereas a person's judgment about what the moral course of action would be is the result of a conscious deliberation, the basis for that process is the perception of aspects of one's situation, which is different for each person. Moral perceptions are also particular in nature.[2]

Empirical research in moral psychology suggests that people are capable of rapidly - perhaps even subconsciously - detecting the moral qualities of situations and stimuli,[3][4][5] however the interpretation of some of this research has been contested on methodological grounds.[6]

References

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  1. ↑ Gantman, Ana P.; Van Bavel, Jay J. (November 2015). "Moral Perception". Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 19 (11): 631–633. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.08.004. PMID 26440123. S2CID 205395898.
  2. ↑ Blum, Lawrence. 1994. Moral Perception and Particularity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  3. ↑ Van Berkum, Jos J.A.; Holleman, Bregje; Nieuwland, Mante; Otten, Marte; Murre, Jaap (September 2009). "Right or wrong? The brain's fast response to morally objectionable statements". Psychological Science. 20 (9): 1092–1099. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02411.x. hdl:1874/379385. PMID 19656340. S2CID 43650830.
  4. ↑ Gantman, Ana P.; Van Bavel, Jay J. (July 2014). "The moral pop-out effect: Enhanced perceptual awareness of morally relevant stimuli". Cognition. 132 (1): 22–29. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2014.02.007. PMID 24747444. S2CID 1745166.
  5. ↑ Decety, Jean; Cacioppo, Stephanie (December 2012). "The speed of morality: a high-density electrical neuroimaging study". Journal of Neurophysiology. 108 (11): 3068–3072. doi:10.1152/jn.00473.2012. PMID 22956794.
  6. ↑ Firestone, Chaz; Scholl, Brian J. (February 2016). "'Moral Perception' Reflects Neither Morality Nor Perception". Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 20 (2): 75–76. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.10.006. PMID 26612519. S2CID 3701490.
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