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Draft:Robert Van Gulick

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
  • Comment: Publications from the subject or his alma mater do not count towards notability. Lynch44 01:20, 28 February 2026 (UTC)



Robert Van Gulick
Education
EducationPrinceton University (AB)
University of California, Berkeley (MA, PhD)
ThesisFunctionalism as a Theory of Mind (1976)
Philosophical work
EraContemporary philosophy
InstitutionsSyracuse University
Rutgers University
Main interests
Philosophy of mind, consciousness, self-awareness, functionalism, philosophy of cognitive science
Notable ideas
Higher-Order Global States (HOGS)

Robert Van Gulick is a philosopher and professor of philosophy at Syracuse University.[1] His work is primarily in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science, particularly consciousness, self-awareness and functionalism.[2]

Van Gulick is associated with the Higher-Order Global States (HOGS) model of consciousness, which combines elements of higher-order and global-state approaches to conscious awareness.[3][4] The model has subsequently been discussed in academic literature on higher-order and self-representational theories of consciousness.[5][6][7]

Education and career

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Van Gulick received an A.B. in philosophy from Princeton University in 1970. He earned an M.A. in 1973 and a Ph.D. in philosophy in 1976 from the University of California, Berkeley. His dissertation was titled Functionalism as a Theory of Mind.[2]

He taught at Rutgers University from 1976 to 1984 and joined Syracuse University in 1984. He became a professor of philosophy at Syracuse in 1995.[2] From 2008 to 2010, he held Syracuse's William P. Tolley Distinguished Teaching Professorship in the Humanities.[8]

Van Gulick served as president of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology in 2002.[9]

Philosophical work

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Van Gulick has written on consciousness, self-awareness, functionalism, intentionality, emergence and the relationship between phenomenal experience and cognitive organization.[2]

Higher-Order Global States

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Van Gulick developed the Higher-Order Global States model as an account of the relationship between consciousness and higher-order awareness. In contrast to standard higher-order accounts that posit a distinct higher-order representation of a lower-order mental state, HOGS treats the relevant higher-order content as arising within the organization of a larger global state.[3][4]

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy interprets Van Gulick's account as one in which globally available first-order states acquire a higher-order dimension through their incorporation into representations of the self and its relationship to the environment. It also notes some ambiguity in the theory concerning the precise relationship between the original first-order state and the resulting higher-order global state.[3]

The HOGS model has been discussed in subsequent work on higher-order and self-representational theories of consciousness. Josh Weisberg examined the model in Synthese as a form of same-order representation theory and considered its combination of global availability and self-awareness.[5] Chad Kidd considered HOGS alongside other self-representational models in Philosophical Studies, including whether its account of integrated conscious states addresses problems involving self-misrepresentation.[6]

Tom McClelland discusses HOGS in The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness, situating it within self-representational theories and describing the role that integration into a subject's broader mental economy plays in the account.[7] Later authors have continued to compare aspects of HOGS with alternative accounts of higher-order representation and self-consciousness.[10][11]

Van Gulick later connected HOGS with Global Neuronal Workspace theory. In an editorial introducing a 2022 special issue on self-consciousness, Stefan Lang and Klaus Viertbauer describe his contribution as combining HOGS with the Global Neuronal Workspace framework and developing a virtual-self integration account of the conscious subject.[12]

Selected publications

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  • Van Gulick, Robert (1988). "A Functionalist Plea for Self-Consciousness". The Philosophical Review. 97 (2): 149–181. doi:10.2307/2185260.
  • Van Gulick, Robert (1989). "What Difference Does Consciousness Make?". Philosophical Topics. 17 (1): 211–230. doi:10.5840/philtopics198917119.
  • Van Gulick, Robert (1995). "How Should We Understand the Relation Between Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness?". Philosophical Perspectives. 9: 271–289. doi:10.2307/2214222.
  • Van Gulick, Robert (2000). "Inward and Upward: Reflection, Introspection, and Self-Awareness". Philosophical Topics. 28 (2): 275–305. doi:10.5840/philtopics200028222.
  • Van Gulick, Robert (2001). "Reduction, Emergence and Other Recent Options on the Mind/Body Problem: A Philosophical Overview". Journal of Consciousness Studies. 8 (9–10): 1–34.
  • Van Gulick, Robert (2004). "Higher-Order Global States (HOGS): An Alternative Higher-Order Model of Consciousness". In Gennaro, Rocco J. (ed.). Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins Publishing Company. pp. 67–92. doi:10.1075/aicr.56.06gul.
  • Van Gulick, Robert (2009). "Functionalism". In McLaughlin, Brian P.; Beckermann, Ansgar; Walter, Sven (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 128–151. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0008.
  • Van Gulick, Robert (2012). "Subjective consciousness and self-representation". Philosophical Studies. 159 (3): 457–465. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9765-7.
  • Van Gulick, Robert (2014). "Getting it All Together – Phenomenal Unity and the Self". Analysis. 74 (3): 491–498. doi:10.1093/analys/anu065.
  • Van Gulick, Robert (2022). "Consciousness and Self-awareness—an Alternative Perspective". Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 13 (2): 329–340. doi:10.1007/s13164-022-00622-4.

References

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  1. ↑ "Robert Van Gulick". Syracuse University College of Arts and Sciences. Retrieved September 25, 2026.
  2. 1 2 3 4 "Robert N. Van Gulick Curriculum Vitae" (DOCX). Syracuse University College of Arts and Sciences. Retrieved September 25, 2026.
  3. 1 2 3 Carruthers, Peter. "Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved September 25, 2026.
  4. 1 2 Gennaro, Rocco J. "Consciousness". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved September 25, 2026.
  5. 1 2 Weisberg, Josh (2008). "Same old, same old: the same-order representation theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor". Synthese. 160 (2): 161–181. doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9106-0.
  6. 1 2 Kidd, Chad (2011). "Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation". Philosophical Studies. 152: 361–383. doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9444-0.
  7. 1 2 McClelland, Tom (2020). "Self-Representationalist Theories of Consciousness". In Kriegel, Uriah (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 458–481. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.21.
  8. ↑ "William P. Tolley Distinguished Teaching Professor in the Humanities". Syracuse University College of Arts and Sciences. Retrieved September 25, 2026.
  9. ↑ "Past Officers". Society for Philosophy and Psychology. Retrieved September 25, 2026.
  10. ↑ Coleman, Sam (2015). "Quotational higher-order thought theory". Philosophical Studies. 172: 2705–2733. doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0441-1.
  11. ↑ Barnden, John A. (2022). "Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness: A Meta-Causal Approach". Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 13: 397–425. doi:10.1007/s13164-021-00603-z.
  12. ↑ Lang, Stefan; Viertbauer, Klaus (2022). "Editorial: Self-Consciousness Explained—Mapping the Field". Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 13 (2): 257–276. doi:10.1007/s13164-022-00641-1.
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Category:Living people Category:Year of birth missing (living people) Category:Philosophers of mind Category:Princeton University alumni Category:Rutgers University faculty Category:Syracuse University faculty Category:University of California, Berkeley alumni