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|
 Repsense team | |
| Type | Private (UAB) |
|---|---|
| Industry | Narrative intelligence, data analytics, artificial intelligence |
| Founded | 2022 in Vilnius, Lithuania |
| Founders | Mykolas Katkus Alfredas Chmieliauskas Liudvikas Andriulis |
| Headquarters | Vilnius , Lithuania |
Key people | Mykolas Katkus (CEO) |
| Website | repsense |
Repsense is a narrative intelligence company developing technology for tracking, analysing and predicting the spread of narratives across traditional and social media. Its tools are used by governments, institutions and businesses for applications ranging from media monitoring, reputation analysis and crisis management to the detection of disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference.[1][2]
History
[edit]Repsense was founded in 2022 in Vilnius, Lithuania.[2][3] In August 2025, the company launched its narrative intelligence platform, Havel, which ingests text, broadcast, social media, video, advertising and search content from over 60,000 sources in more than 75 languages, and analyses narrative structure, coordination patterns and trajectory.[4]
In December 2025, the company announced a €2 million seed round led by Tensor Ventures, with participation from Seed Starter (the corporate venture capital arm of Česká spořitelna), BSV Ventures and Coinvest Capital. The funding was allocated to expanding the Havel platform and to growing the company's presence in both the security and commercial sectors.[1]
The company's software uses artificial intelligence to trace the spread of false information from its origin across social media platforms, and has been used by international experts and organizations working on election integrity.[2] Its work has been described in the context of cognitive warfare – coordinated efforts to change public behaviour through manipulated information.[2]
Research
[edit]Kapčiamiestis military training area (2026)
[edit]In January 2026, Repsense published an analysis of public discourse surrounding Lithuania's planned brigade-scale military training area near Kapčiamiestis, identifying signs of a coordinated disinformation campaign against the project. Using its Havel disinformation monitoring platform, the company analysed 3,500 mentions across Facebook accounts and comments, Telegram groups, TikTok videos and traditional media between 15 December 2025 and 7 January 2026, and found significant overlaps between narratives promoted on Russian information channels and messages appearing in Lithuanian social media. Russia-linked Telegram and TikTok accounts began publishing critical content about the training area on 17 December, several days before active discussion began in Lithuanian media following residents' meetings with defence ministry representatives – a pattern the company described as typical of pre-planned information operations. The analysis also noted that a normal democratic debate about the project was taking place in parallel.[5]
Russian propaganda on TikTok in Germany (2026)
[edit]In February 2026, Repsense presented a study at the Munich Security Conference examining pro-Kremlin propaganda on TikTok in Germany, based on an analysis of 262,000 German-language TikTok videos from more than 3,000 channels and a total of 3.1 million pieces of content.[6] The study found that pro-Russian narratives were amplified many times more strongly on TikTok than in German online media, and documented a recurring pattern in which narratives originating on Russian Telegram channels were repackaged by German far-right accounts before reaching TikTok audiences. It also identified content using coded Nazi symbolism and Soviet propaganda that evaded the platform's moderation, as well as deepfake videos of fabricated conversations between heads of state. The coded material – including blurred imagery, hidden hashtags and propaganda songs used as background music – was identified through content-level analysis of the videos themselves, which, according to the study, is not detectable through conventional monitoring methods.[6][7]
Armenian parliamentary election (2026)
[edit]Ahead of the 2026 Armenian parliamentary election, Repsense monitored the Armenian information environment continuously from November 2025 to June 2026, in partnership with the International Practitioners' Partnership Network (PRACTNET) and the Estonian foundation Sihtasutus Liberaalne Kodanik (SALK), tracking 1.8 million media items across twelve platform categories in Armenian, Russian and English.[8] The monitoring documented an environment of foreign information manipulation and interference around the election, with its findings used by disinformation monitoring efforts in Yerevan. An interim analysis reported by Le Figaro concluded that 58% of anti-government messages spread on TikTok were the result of coordinated action, and identified a coordinated network of thirteen Armenian-language TikTok accounts producing the bulk of the platform's anti-government messaging.[2] A commentary published by commonspace.eu, an analysis website managed by the LINKS Europe Foundation, cited the company's analysis of media mentions across websites, Telegram, Facebook, TikTok, Instagram, X and broadcast television during the campaign, which found that around 17.5% of analysed TikTok videos were labelled high risk for disinformation.[9]
References
[edit]- ^ a b Laoun, Joy (16 December 2025). "Repsense raises €2M seed round to expand disinformation analysis platform used by NATO". Vestbee. Retrieved 10 July 2026.
- ^ a b c d e Vitureau, Marielle (7 June 2026). "«Un environnement actif de manipulation et d'ingérence» : la désinformation russe à l'œuvre en Arménie". Le Figaro (in French). Retrieved 10 July 2026.
- ^ "Repsense, UAB". rekvizitai.vz.lt. Retrieved 10 July 2026.
- ^ "The Havel Platform". Repsense. Retrieved 10 July 2026.
- ^ "Analizė: viešajame diskurse dėl Kapčiamiesčio poligono pastebima rusiškų manipuliacijų". LRT (in Lithuanian). 11 January 2026. Retrieved 10 July 2026.
- ^ a b Hoffmann, Luca-Marie; Röpcke, Julian (13 February 2026). "Exklusive Studie belegt: Kreml-Propaganda flutet TikTok". Bild (in German). Retrieved 10 July 2026.
- ^ "Deep Video Analysis". Repsense. Retrieved 10 July 2026.
- ^ "Armenia Election 2026 Narrative Intelligence Report". Repsense. Retrieved 10 July 2026.
- ^ Ferbel-Azcarate, Santiago (12 June 2026). "Social media usage and Armenia's 2026 election". commonspace.eu. LINKS Europe Foundation. Retrieved 10 July 2026.