Deliberative indispensability argument
The deliberative indispensability argument is an argument for normative realism defended by David Enoch, most prominently in his 2011 book Taking Morality Seriously.
Background
[edit source]The deliberative indispensability argument is an argument for robust realism about normative and moral truths. This is the view that normative and moral truths exist and they are objective and irreducibly normative. In other words, they are true as a matter of fact—not a matter of personal preference or opinion—and they cannot be reduced to descriptive natural facts.[1]
One argument against robust realism from Gilbert Harman is that moral truths cannot explain any empirical observations. Harman contrasted moral claims with scientific claims like claims about electrons. According to Harman, the existence of electrons is required to explain various observations such as trails left in cloud chambers. In contrast, people's moral viewpoints can be explained by their upbringing and culture, so moral facts are not necessary to explain moral psychology or behavior.[2]
David Enoch formulated the deliberative indispensability argument in part to respond to this point by Harman.[3] It was inspired by other indispensability arguments from the philosophy of mathematics. These arguments often support mathematical realism based on mathematics' explanatory indispensability to science, but Enoch aimed to expand indispensability considerations beyond scientific explanation. He argued that normative truths are indispensable to deliberation and that deliberative indispensability is as good an argument for their existence as explanatory indispensability would be.[4]
The argument
[edit source]The argument is one example of an indispensability argument. In general, indispensability arguments work by defending their conclusion on the basis that it is indispensable for some purpose or project.[5] In formulating his own version of the argument, Enoch considered why indispensability to explanation can support a conclusion but indispensability to other projects, like sorcery, cannot. He argued that this is because explanation is intrinsically indispensable in the sense that it is rationally non-optional to engage in the project of explanation to understand and act in the world. By contrast, attempts at sorcery are an optional project.[6]
Enoch's argument, therefore, introduces a distinction between an entity being instrumentally indispensable to carry out a project, and the intrinsic indispensability of the project itself. The entity is instrumentally indispensable because it is required to carry out the project successfully. The project is intrinsically indispensable because it is rationally non-optional. According to Enoch, both of these forms of indispensability are required for an indispensability argument to be successful.[7]
With this distinction in place, Enoch states the deliberative indispensability argument in Taking Morality Seriously as follows:[8]
- If something is instrumentally indispensable to an intrinsically indispensable project, then we are justified in believing that that thing exists.
- The deliberative project is intrinsically indispensable.
- Irreducibly normative truths are instrumentally indispensable to the deliberative project.
- Therefore, we are justified in believing that there are irreducibly normative truths.
References
[edit source]Citations
[edit source]- ↑ Lenman 2013, pp. 835–836; Behrends 2012, pp. 146–147; Faraci 2012, pp. 259–260.
- ↑ Lutz 2022, p. 119; Vesper 2025, p. 28; Chrisman 2023, pp. 5, 22.
- ↑ Lutz 2022, p. 119.
- ↑ Sinclair & Leibowitz 2016, pp. 15–16.
- ↑ Cline 2016, p. 3240.
- ↑ Sinclair & Leibowitz 2016, p. 15; Cline 2016, p. 3240.
- ↑ Sinclair & Leibowitz 2016, p. 15; McPherson & Plunkett 2015, pp. 107–108.
- ↑ Enoch 2011, p. 83; Sinclair & Leibowitz 2016, p. 16.
Sources
[edit source]- Behrends, Jeff (2012). "Review of Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism". The Review of Metaphysics. 66 (1): 146–148. ISSN 0034-6632. JSTOR 41635563.
- Chrisman, Matthew (2023). What Is This Thing Called Metaethics?. Routledge. pp. 21–23. ISBN 978-1-003-20589-0.
- Cline, Brendan (2016). "Against Deliberative Indispensability as an Independent Guide to What There Is". Philosophical Studies. 173 (12): 3235–3254. doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0661-z. ISSN 0031-8116.
- Enoch, David (2011). Taking Morality Seriously. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-957996-9.
- Faraci, David (2012). "Review of Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism". The Journal of Value Inquiry. 46 (2): 259–267. doi:10.1007/s10790-012-9329-x. ISSN 0022-5363.
- Lenman, James (2013). "Deliberation, Schmeliberation: Enoch's Indispensability Argument". Philosophical Studies. 168 (3): 835–842. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0214-7. ISSN 0031-8116.
- Lutz, Matt (2022). "In Defense of Deliberative Indispensability". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 103 (1): 118–135. doi:10.1111/papq.12341. ISSN 0279-0750.
- McPherson, Tristram; Plunkett, David (2015). "Deliberative Indispensability and Epistemic Justication". In Shafer-Landau, Russ (ed.). Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Vol. 10. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-873869-5.
- Sinclair, Neil; Leibowitz, Uri D. (2016). "Introduction: Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics". In Sinclair, Neil; Leibowitz, Uri D. (eds.). Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. Oxford University Press. pp. 1–20. ISBN 978-0-19-877859-2.
- Vesper, Achim (2025). "No Normative Output Without Normative Input? An Examination of the Argument from Deliberative Indispensability". International Journal for the Semiotics of Law. 38 (1): 25–38. doi:10.1007/s11196-024-10214-3. ISSN 1572-8722.