David M. Kreps

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David M. Kreps
Born	1950 (age 75–76) New York City, U.S.
Alma mater	Dartmouth College (BA) Stanford University (PhD)
Children	3
Awards	John Bates Clark Medal, Erwin Plein Nemmers Prize in Economics, John J. Carty Award for the Advancement of Science
Scientific career
Fields	Game theory, Decision Theory, Finance
Institutions	Stanford University
Doctoral advisor	Evan Lyle Porteus
Doctoral students	Chi-fu Huang Robert Gibbons

David Marc "Dave" Kreps (born 1950) is an American game theorist, economist and professor at the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University (since 1980).

Education and career

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He earned his A.B. from Dartmouth College in 1972 and his Ph.D. from Stanford in 1975. Kreps won the John Bates Clark Medal in 1989.^[1] He was awarded an honorary Ph.D. by the Université Paris-Dauphine in 2001.

The Stanford University Department of Economics appointed Kreps the Adams Distinguished Professor of Management. He is known for his analysis of dynamic choice models and non-cooperative game theory, particularly the idea of sequential equilibrium, which he developed with Stanford Business School colleague Robert B. Wilson.

With colleagues Paul Milgrom and Robert B. Wilson, he was awarded the 2018 John J. Carty Award for the Advancement of Science. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences. In 2018, Kreps was awarded the Erwin Plein Nemmers Prize in Economics by Northwestern University.

He has also written many books, including Microeconomics for Managers,^[2] A Course in Microeconomic Theory, and Game Theory and Economic Modeling.^[3]

Selected publications

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Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982). Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2), 245-252.
Kreps, D. M. (1990). Corporate culture and economic theory. Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, 90(109-110), 8.
Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982). Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2), 253-279.
Cho, I. K., & Kreps, D. M. (1987). Signaling games and stable equilibria. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(2), 179-221.
Harrison, J. M., & Kreps, D. M. (1979). Martingales and arbitrage in multiperiod securities markets. Journal of Economic Theory, 20(3), 381-408.
Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982). Sequential equilibria. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 863-894.
David M. Kreps (1990). Game Theory and Economic Modelling. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-828381-2.^[4]^[5]

External links

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David M. Kreps' home page at Stanford University
David M. Kreps; John Roberts; Robert B. Wilson (July 1986), Contributions to the New Palgrave (PDF), Research paper, vol. 892, Palo Alto, CA: Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, pp. 30–35, (Draft of articles for the first edition of New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics), retrieved 7 February 2011

References

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↑ Tirole, Jean (1990). "In Honor of David Kreps, Winner of the John Bates Clark Medal". Journal of Economic Perspectives. 4 (3): 149–170. doi:10.1257/jep.4.3.149. ISSN 0895-3309.
↑ David M. Kreps (2004). Microeconomics for Managers. Norton. ISBN 978-0-393-97678-6.
↑ David M. Kreps (1990). Game Theory and Economic Modelling. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-828381-2.
↑ Heiner, R. (1992). Game Theory and Economic Modeling. Const. Pol. Econ., 3, 113.
↑ Sen, A (1992) Review: Demystifying Game Theory - Reviewed Work: Game Theory and Economic Modelling by David M. Kreps, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 27, No. 14, Apr. 4, pp. 698-699

John Bates Clark Medal recipients

Game theory

Traditional game theory

Definitions	Asynchrony Bayesian regret Best response Bounded rationality Cheap talk Coalition Complete contract Complete information Complete mixing Conjectural variation Contingent cooperator Coopetition Cooperative game theory Dynamic inconsistency Escalation of commitment Farsightedness Game semantics Hierarchy of beliefs Imperfect information Incomplete information Information set Move by nature Mutual knowledge Non-cooperative game theory Non-credible threat Outcome Perfect information Perfect recall Ply Preference Rationality Sequential game Simultaneous action selection Spite Strategic complements Strategic dominance Strategic form Strategic interaction Strategic move Strategy Subgame Succinct game Topological game Tragedy of the commons Uncorrelated asymmetry Win–win game Zero-sum game
Equilibrium concepts	Backward induction Bayes correlated equilibrium Bayesian efficiency Bayesian game Bayesian Nash equilibrium Berge equilibrium Bertrand–Edgeworth model Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium Core Correlated equilibrium Cursed equilibrium Edgeworth price cycle Epsilon-equilibrium Gibbs equilibrium Incomplete contracts Inequity aversion Individual rationality Iterated elimination of dominated strategies Markov perfect equilibrium Mertens-stable equilibrium Nash equilibrium Open-loop model Pareto efficiency Payoff dominance Perfect Bayesian equilibrium Price of anarchy Program equilibrium Proper equilibrium Quantal response equilibrium Quasi-perfect equilibrium Rational agent Rationalizable strategy Satisfaction equilibrium Self-confirming equilibrium Sequential equilibrium Shapley value Strong Nash equilibrium Subgame perfect equilibrium Trembling hand equilibrium
Strategies	Appeasement Bid shading Cheap talk Collusion Commitment device De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Fictitious play Focal point Grim trigger Hobbesian trap Markov strategy Max-dominated strategy Mixed strategy Pure strategy Tit for tat Win–stay, lose–switch
Games	All-pay auction Battle of the sexes Nash bargaining game Bertrand competition Blotto game Centipede game Coordination game Cournot competition Deadlock Dictator game Trust game Diner's dilemma Dollar auction El Farol Bar problem Electronic mail game Gift-exchange game Guess 2/3 of the average Keynesian beauty contest Kuhn poker Lewis signaling game Matching pennies Obligationes Optional prisoner's dilemma Pirate game Prisoner's dilemma Public goods game Rendezvous problem Rock paper scissors Stackelberg competition Stag hunt Traveler's dilemma Ultimatum game Volunteer's dilemma War of attrition
Theorems	Arrow's impossibility theorem Aumann's agreement theorem Brouwer fixed-point theorem Competitive altruism Folk theorem Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem Gibbs lemma Glicksberg's theorem Kakutani fixed-point theorem Kuhn's theorem One-shot deviation principle Prim–Read theory Rational ignorance Rational irrationality Sperner's lemma Zermelo's theorem
Subfields	Algorithmic game theory Behavioral game theory Behavioral strategy Compositional game theory Confrontation analysis Contract theory Drama theory Graphical game theory Heresthetic Mean-field game theory Negotiation theory Quantum game theory Social software
Key people	Albert W. Tucker Alvin E. Roth Amos Tversky Antoine Augustin Cournot Ariel Rubinstein David Gale David K. Levine David M. Kreps Donald B. Gillies Drew Fudenberg Eric Maskin Harold W. Kuhn Herbert Simon Herbert Scarf Hervé Moulin Jean Tirole Jean-François Mertens Jennifer Tour Chayes Ken Binmore Kenneth Arrow Leonid Hurwicz Lloyd Shapley Martin Shubik Melvin Dresher Merrill M. Flood Olga Bondareva Oskar Morgenstern Paul Milgrom Peyton Young Reinhard Selten Robert Aumann Robert Axelrod Robert B. Wilson Roger Myerson Samuel Bowles Suzanne Scotchmer Thomas Schelling William Vickrey

Combinatorial game theory

Core concepts	Combinatorial explosion Determinacy Disjunctive sum First-player and second-player win Game complexity Game tree Impartial game Misère Partisan game Solved game Sprague–Grundy theorem Strategy-stealing argument Zugzwang
Games	Chess Chomp Clobber Cram Domineering Hackenbush Nim Notakto Subtract a square Sylver coinage Toads and Frogs
Mathematical tools	Mex Nimber On Numbers and Games Star Surreal number Winning Ways for Your Mathematical Plays
Search algorithms	Alpha–beta pruning Expectiminimax Minimax Monte Carlo tree search Negamax Paranoid algorithm Principal variation search
Key people	Claude Shannon John Conway John von Neumann

Evolutionary game theory

Core concepts	Bishop–Cannings theorem Evolution and the Theory of Games Evolutionarily stable set Evolutionarily stable state Evolutionarily stable strategy Replicator equation Risk dominance Stochastically stable equilibrium Weak evolutionarily stable strategy
Games	Chicken Stag hunt
Applications	Cultural group selection Fisher's principle Mobbing Terminal investment hypothesis
Key people	John Maynard Smith George R. Price William Donald Hamilton Robert Axelrod

Mechanism design

Core concepts	Algorithmic mechanism design Bayesian-optimal mechanism Incentive compatibility Market design Myerson ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation
Theorems	Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem Revenue equivalence Border's theorem
Applications	Digital goods auction Knapsack auction Truthful cake-cutting

Other topics
Bertrand paradox Chainstore paradox Computational complexity of games Helly metric Multi-agent system PPAD-complete

Authority control databases
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National	United States France BnF data Japan Czech Republic Netherlands Norway Latvia Korea Sweden Poland Israel Belgium
Academics	CiNii Mathematics Genealogy Project zbMATH MathSciNet
People	DDB
Other	IdRef Open Library Yale LUX

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Education and career

Selected publications

See also

External links

References