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Chinese government sanctions

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The government of the People's Republic of China has imposed financial and trade restrictions against individuals, entities, and jurisdictions whose actions it has determined to be contrary to certain national interests. China maintains three unilateral sanctions programs in addition to implementing the multilateral sanction decisions adopted by the United Nations Security Council.

China's three unilateral sanctions programs are separately administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, and the Taiwan Affairs Office. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains a sanctions list that imposes travel, trade, and financial restrictions against targeted individuals and entities accused of interfering with China's domestic affairs or endangering China's interests.[1] The Ministry of Commerce maintains the Unreliable Entity List, which heavily restricts allowable business and investment activity in China by listed entities.[2] The Taiwan Affairs Office implements sanctions against Taiwan and targets entities and individuals accused of promoting Taiwanese independence.[3]

Economic sanctions have become an increasingly common instrument in China's foreign policy, particularly as the country's economic power has grown in recent years. Compared to Western sanctions—typically led by the United States and the European Union—China's use of economic sanctions exhibits several notable differences. Influenced by international norms, domestic political and economic structures, and concerns over its international reputation, China tends to employ sanctions in a more restrained and low-profile manner.[4] Although the frequency of Chinese sanctions has risen significantly in recent years, it remains relatively rare for China to impose sanctions as proactively or publicly as Western powers. Several key characteristics distinguish Chinese economic sanctions:[5][6]

Ambiguous and informal announcements

[edit]

Unlike in Western countries, Chinese sanctions are not typically imposed through clear legal or administrative orders. Instead, they are often announced via statements by relevant government agencies, serving to create a sense of threat or coercion. For this reason, scholars frequently describe Chinese sanctions as "informal sanctions". A notable example is the dispute between China and South Korea over the deployment of the THAAD missile defense system in 2016. In response, Chinese authorities ordered the suspension of 74 Lotte supermarkets for fire safety violations and informally blacklisted several South Korean companies, effectively halting commercial interactions.[7] These measures lacked formal legal basis but had tangible punitive effects.

This ambiguity allows the Chinese government greater policy flexibility. However, the pattern began to shift following the U.S.–China trade war, as China introduced a series of legal instruments—such as the Unreliable Entity List and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law—to formalize and legitimize its use of sanctions.[8] Despite these developments, many sanctions continue to be issued through diplomatic statements without formal legal codification.

In September 2020, the Ministry of Commerce issued new rules allowing for the creation of the Unreliable Entity List, and the National People's Congress followed up soon after in June 2021 by promulgating the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, which established a legal framework for maintaining previous sanctions. The law also allowed Chinese ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Taiwan Affairs Office, to implement new blocking sanctions against foreign individuals and entities.[9] The Taiwan Affairs Office announced a sanction under the new law in November 2021,[10] and the Ministry of Commerce announced its first Unreliable Entity List designation in February 2023.[11]

Focus on specific issues

[edit]

Chinese sanctions are often closely tied to issues of diplomacy and national sovereignty; for example, the rare earth export ban on Japan amid the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute[6] and agriculture import ban on Taiwan during Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan.[12] In practice, Chinese economic sanctions tend to be more symbolic than substantive—frequently described as "more bark than bite." They are often short in duration but intense in impact, aiming to compel the target to yield quickly under pressure.

Focus on individuals, corporations, and public mobilization

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Chinese sanctions are primarily directed at foreign individuals and companies, rather than foreign governments—a notable contrast to the approaches of the United States or the European Union, which sometimes target entire governments. In addition, China often encourages its domestic population to reduce consumption of goods from the targeted country, thereby enhancing the impact of sanctions through patriotic appeals.[7] This strategy blends state action with public participation to amplify pressure on the target.

As of August 2024, over 100 individuals and entities have been sanctioned by China.[13]

Scholars have created Chinese Economic Sanctions database from 1949 to 2020, including 135 cases in which China is the sender and 88 cases in which China is the target,[14] and the dataset can be downloaded on GitHub.

Sanctions announced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

[edit]
DateCountry/RegionIndividual/entityPosition when sanctionedRestrictionsRef.
Travel restriction[note 1]Prohibit contact[note 2]Asset freeze[note 3]
2 December 2019 United StatesNational Endowment for Democracy Not announcedNot announcedNot announced[15]
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs Not announcedNot announcedNot announced
International Republican Institute Not announcedNot announcedNot announced
Human Rights Watch Not announcedNot announcedNot announced
Freedom House Not announcedNot announcedNot announced
13 July 2020Congressional-Executive Commission on China Not announcedNot announcedNot announced[16][17]
Sam BrownbackUnited States Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious FreedomNot announcedNot announcedNot announced
13 July 2020
10 August 2020		Marco Rubio[note 4]United States SenatorNot announcedNot announcedNot announced[16][17][18]
13 July 2020
10 August 2020		Ted CruzNot announcedNot announcedNot announced
13 July 2020
10 August 2020		Chris SmithMember of the U.S. House of RepresentativesNot announcedNot announcedNot announced
14 July 2020 / 26 October 2020 / 21 February 2022 / 16 February 2023 Lockheed Martin Corporation U.S. defense company Yes Yes Not announced [19][20][21]
10 August 2020Josh HawleyUnited States SenatorNot announcedNot announcedNot announced[18][22]
Tom CottonNot announcedNot announcedNot announced
Pat ToomeyNot announcedNot announcedNot announced
Carl GershmanPresident of the National Endowment for DemocracyNot announcedNot announcedNot announced
Derek J. MitchellPresident of the Institute for Democracy in International AffairsNot announcedNot announcedNot announced
Daniel TwiningPresident of the International Republican InstituteNot announcedNot announcedNot announced
Kenneth RothExecutive director of the Human Rights WatchNot announcedNot announcedNot announced
Michael AbramowitzPresident of Freedom HouseNot announcedNot announcedNot announced
26 October 2020 Boeing Defense, Space & Security U.S. defense company Not announced Not announced Not announced [20]
26 October 2020 / 21 February 2022 / 16 February 2023 Raytheon Corporation[note 5]
 Yes Yes Not announced [20][21]
26 October 2020 Other individuals and entities that played a role in selling weapons to Taiwan Not announced Not announced Not announced Not announced [20]
30 November 2020John KnausSenior Director of the Asia Affairs of the National Endowment for DemocracyNot announcedNot announcedNot announced[23]
Manpreet Singh AnandAsia Project Leader of the Institute for Democracy in International AffairNot announcedNot announcedNot announced
Crystal RosarioHong Kong Branch Director of the Institute for Democracy in International AffairsNot announcedNot announcedNot announced
Kelvin Sit Tak-OHong Kong Project Director of the Institute for Democracy in International AffairsNot announcedNot announcedNot announced
21 January 2021Mike PompeoFormer U.S. Secretary of StateYesYes[24][25]
Peter NavarroFormer Director of Office of Trade and Manufacturing PolicyYesYes
Robert C. O'BrienFormer U.S. National Security AdvisorYesYes
David R. StilwellFormer Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific AffairsYesYes
Matt PottingerFormer Deputy National Security AdvisorYesYes
Alex AzarFormer U.S. Secretary of Health and Human ServicesYesYes
Keith J. KrachFormer Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the EnvironmentYesYes
Kelly CraftFormer U.S. Ambassador to the United NationsYesYes
John BoltonFormer U.S. National Security AdvisorYesYes
Steve BannonFormer Senior Counselor to the PresidentYesYes
The remaining 18 personnel have not been announcedNot announcedYesYes
22 March 2021 European Union
 Germany		Reinhard BütikoferMember of the European ParliamentYesYes[26]
Michael Gahler[note 6]YesYes
 European Union
 France		Raphaël Glucksmann[note 6]YesYes
 European Union
 Bulgaria		Ilhan Kyuchyuk[note 6]YesYes
 European Union
 Slovakia		Miriam Lexmann[note 6]YesYes
 NetherlandsSjoerd SjoerdsmaMember of the House of RepresentativesYesYes
 BelgiumSamuel CogolatiMember of the Chamber of RepresentativesYesYes[26][27]
 LithuaniaDovilė ŠakalienėMember of the SeimasYesYes[26]
 GermanyAdrian ZenzResearcherYesYes
 SwedenBjörn Fredrik JerdénYesYes
 European UnionPolitical and Security Committee Yes
European Parliament Subcommittee on Human Rights[note 6] Yes
 GermanyMercator Institute for China Studies Yes
 DenmarkAlliance of Democracies Foundation Yes
26 March 2021 United KingdomTom Tugendhat[note 7]Member of Parliament
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee		YesYesYes[28]
Ian Duncan Smith[note 7]Member of ParliamentYesYesYes
Neil O'Brien[note 7]Member of ParliamentYesYesYes
David Alton[note 7]Member of the House of LordsYesYesYes
Tim LoughtonMember of ParliamentYesYesYes
Nus Ghani[note 7]Member of ParliamentYesYesYes
Helena Kennedy[note 7]Member of the House of LordsYesYesYes
Geoffrey NiceLawyerYesYesYes
Joanne Smith-FinleyActivist on Uyghur issuesYesYesYes
China Research Group YesYes
Conservative Party Human Rights Commission YesYes
Uyghur Tribunal YesYes
Essex Court Chambers YesYes
27 March 2021 United StatesGayle Conelly ManchinChair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious FreedomYesYes[29]
Tony PerkinsVice Chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious FreedomYesYes
 CanadaMichael ChongMember of ParliamentYesYesYes
Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development Yes
17 April 2021 IcelandJónas HaraldssonLawyer[30][31]
26 May 2021 United StatesJohnnie Moore Jr.Member of the U.S. Commission on International Religious FreedomYes[32]
23 July 2021 / 30 December 2021Wilbur RossFormer U.S. Secretary of CommerceYesYesYes[33][34]
23 July 2021 / 30 December 2021Carolyn BartholomewChairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review CommissionYesYesYes
23 July 2021 / 30 December 2021Jonathan N. StiversFormer Director of the Congressional-Executive Commission on ChinaYesYesYes
23 July 2021 / 30 December 2021Doyun KimNational Democratic InstituteYesYesYes
23 July 2021 / 30 December 2021Adam J. KingInternational Republican Institute Authorized Representative in Hong KongYesYesYes
23 July 2021Sophie RichardsonHuman Rights Watch China DirectorNot announcedNot announcedNot announced[33]
Hong Kong Democracy Council Not announcedNot announcedNot announced
21 December 2021Nadine MaenzaChair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious FreedomYesYesYes[35]
Nury TurkelVice Chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious FreedomYesYesYes
Anurima BhargavaMember of the U.S. Commission on International Religious FreedomYesYesYes
James W. CarrYesYesYes
5 August 2022Nancy PelosiSpeaker of the U.S. House of RepresentativesNot announcedNot announcedNot announced[36]
12 August 2022 LithuaniaAgnė VaiciukevičiūtėDeputy Minister of Transport and CommunicationsNot announcedNot announcedNot announced[37]
16 September 2022 United StatesGregory J. HayesChairman of Raytheon TechnologiesNot announcedNot announcedNot announced
Ted ColbertPresident and CEO of Boeing Defense, Space & SecurityNot announcedNot announcedNot announced
23 December 2022Miles YuSenior Fellow at the Hudson Institute

Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution

 YesYesYes[38]
Todd SteinDeputy Director of the Congressional-Executive Commission on ChinaYesYesYes
7 April 2023Sarah May SternChair of the Board of the Hudson InstituteYesYesYes[39]
John P. WaltersDirector of the Hudson InstituteYesYesYes
John HeubuschFormer executive director of the Ronald Reagan Presidential LibraryYesYesYes
Joanne M. DrakeChief Executive Officer of the Ronald Reagan Presidential LibraryYesYesYes
Hudson InstituteCivil societyN/aYesYes
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Center for Public AffairsCivil societyN/aYesYes
13 April 2023Michael McCaulChair of the House Foreign Affairs CommitteeYesYesYes[40]
15 September 2023Lockheed Martin, St. Louis, Missouri BranchMilitary industryYesYesYes[41]
Northrop GrummanYesYesYes
26 December 2023KharonData enterpriseYesYesYes[42]
Edmund XuDirector of Investigations of Kharon CorporationYesYesYes
Nicole MorgretResearcher at the Center for Advanced Defense StudiesYesYesYes
7 January 2024BAE Systems Land and ArmamentMilitary industryYesYesYes[43]
Alliant Techsystems OperationYesYesYes
AeroVironmentYesYesYes
ViaSat[note 8]YesYesYes
Data Link SolutionsYesYesYes
11 April 2024General Dynamics Land Systems[note 9]YesYesYes [44]
General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI)[note 9]YesYesYes
21 May 2024Mike GallagherFormer Member of the House of RepresentativesYesYesYes[45]
22 May 2024Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire ControlMilitary industryN/aYesYes[46]
Lockheed Martin AeronauticsN/aYesYes
Raytheon/Lockheed Martin Javelin Joint VentureN/aYesYes
Raytheon Missile SystemsN/aYesYes
General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical SystemsN/aYesYes
General Dynamics Information TechnologyN/aYesYes
General Dynamics Mission SystemsN/aYesYes
Inter-Coastal ElectronicsN/aYesYes
System Studies & SimulationN/aYesYes
IronMountain SolutionsN/aYesYes
Applied Technologies GroupN/aYesYes
AxientN/aYesYes
Kathy WardenChairman, CEO and President of Northrop Grumman CorporationYesYesYes
Matthew BrombergVice President of Global Operations of Northrop Grumman CorporationYesYesYes
Benjamin R. DaviesVice President and General Manager of Northrop Grumman Strategic Deterrence SystemYesYesYes
Thomas H. JonesVice President and Aviation Systems President of Northrop Grumman CorporationYesYesYes
Stephen O'BryanVice President and Global Business Development Officer of Northrop Grumman CorporationYesYesYes
Roshan RoederVice President and Defense Systems President of Northrop Grumman CorporationYesYesYes
Firat H. GezenVice President of General Dynamics

President of General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems

 YesYesYes
Jason W. AikenExecutive Vice President for Technology, General DynamicsYesYesYes
Amy GillilandSenior Vice President, General Dynamics

President, General Dynamics Information Technologies

 YesYesYes
Christopher J. BradyVice President, General Dynamics

President, General Dynamics Mission Systems

 YesYesYes
21 June 2024Lockheed Martin Missile Systems Integration LaboratoryMilitary industryYesYesYes [47]
Lockheed Martin Advanced Technology LaboratoriesYesYesYes
Lockheed Martin VenturesYesYesYes
James D. TaicletChairman, President and CEO of Lockheed MartinYesYesYes
Frank Andrew St. JohnChief Operating Officer of Lockheed MartinYesYesYes
Jesus MalaveCFO of Lockheed MartinYesYesYes
12 July 2024Anduril IndustriesMilitary industryYesYesYes [48]
Maritime Tactical SystemsYesYesYes
Pacific Rim DefenseYesYesYes
Aevex AerospaceYesYesYes
LKD AerospaceYesYesYes
Summit Technologies Inc.YesYesYes
Wahid NawabiChairman, President and chief executive officer of AeroVironmentYesYesYes
Kevin McDonnellSenior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Anduril IndustriesYesYesYes
Brian William SchimpfCEO of Anduril IndustriesYesYesYes
Matthew Marley GrimmChief Operating Officer of Anduril IndustriesYesYesYes
Gregory Michael KausnerSenior Vice President of Global Defense, Anduril IndustriesYesYesYes
1 August 2024Jim McGovernMember of the House of RepresentativesYesYesYes [49]
18 September 2024Sierra Nevada CorporationMilitary industryN/aYesYes [50]
Stick Rudder Enterprises LLCN/aYesYes
Cubic CorporationN/aYesYes
S3 AeroDefenseN/aYesYes
TCOM, Limited PartnershipN/aYesYes
TextOreN/aYesYes
Planate Management GroupN/aYesYes
ACT1 FederalN/aYesYes
ExoveraN/aYesYes
10 October 2024Edge Autonomy Operations LLCMilitary industryN/aYesYes[51]
Huntingdon Ingalls Industries Inc.N/aYesYes
Skydio Inc.N/aYesYes
Steven R. RudderFounder of Stick Rudder Enterprises LLCYesYesYes
James William Ickes IIVice President of Sierra Nevada CorporationYesYesYes
David Keith SuttonLockheed Martin Asia DirectorYesYesYes
Yeong-Tae PakVice President of Aerospace Environment CorporationYesYesYes
Patrick Edward JankowskiDirector of Indo-Pacific Programs, Northrop Grumman CorporationYesYesYes
John PurvisFormer CEO of Edge Autonomous OperationsYesYesYes
Josh BrungardtChief Operating Officer of Edge Autonomous OperationsYesYesYes
Christopher Douglas KastnerPresident and CEO of Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc.YesYesYes
Adam BryCo-founder and CEO of SkydioYesYesYes
Tom MossGeneral Manager of Asia Pacific Region, SkydioYesYesYes
5 December 2024Teledyne Brown Engineering Inc.Military industryN/aYesYes[52]
BRINC Drones Inc.N/aYesYes
Rapid Flight LLCN/aYesYes
Red Six SolutionsN/aYesYes
Shield AI Inc.N/aYesYes
SYNEXXUS Inc.N/aYesYes
Firestorm Labs Inc.N/aYesYes
Kratos Unmanned Aerial Systems Inc.N/aYesYes
HavocAIN/aYesYes
Neros TechnologiesN/aYesYes
Cyberlux CorporationN/aYesYes
Domo Tactical CommunicationsN/aYesYes
Group WN/aYesYes
Barbara BorgonoviPresident of Naval Power Strategic Business Unit, RaytheonYesYesYes
Gerard HueberVice President of Naval Power Strategic Business Unit, RaytheonYesYesYes
Richard D. CrawfordFounder and CEO of United Technologies Systems Operating CompanyYesYesYes
Beth EdlerPresident of the Data Link SolutionsYesYesYes
Blake ResnickFounder and CEO of BRINC Drone Inc.YesYesYes
 United Kingdom Charles WoodburnCEO of BAE SystemsYesYesYes
21 December 2024 CanadaUyghur Rights Advocacy ProjectCivil societyYesYesYes[53]
Canada-Tibet CommitteeYesYesYes
Mehmet TohtiExecutive Director of the Uyghur Rights Advocacy ProjectYesYesYes
Jasmine KainthPolicy and Advocacy Director of the Uyghur Rights Advocacy ProjectYesYesYes
David MatasLegal Advisor of the Uyghur Rights Advocacy ProjectYesYesYes
Sarah TeichYesYesYes
John PackerYesYesYes
Clive AnsleyYesYesYes
Yonah DiamondYesYesYes
Justine BernatchezYesYesYes
Linden DalesYesYesYes
Charles BurtonPolicy Advisor of the Uyghur Rights Advocacy ProjectYesYesYes
Margarett Mccuaig JohnstonYesYesYes
Marcus KolgaYesYesYes
Scott SimonYesYesYes
Conor HealyResearch Consultant of the Uyghur Rights Advocacy ProjectYesYesYes
Geoffrey AharonYesYesYes
Samphe LhalungpaChair of the Canada-Tibet CommitteeYesYesYes
Luisa DuranteVice Chair of the Canada-Tibet CommitteeYesYesYes
Sherap TherchinExecutive Director of the Canada-Tibet CommitteeYesYesYes
Eliza von BaeyerDirector of the Canada-Tibet CommitteeYesYesYes
Youngdoung TenzinCommunity Events Manager of the Tibet Council of CanadaYesYesYes
27 December 2024 United StatesInsitu, Inc.Military enterprisesN/aYesYes[54]
Hudson Technologies Co.N/aYesYes
Saronic Technologies, Inc.N/aYesYes
Raytheon CanadaN/aYesYes
Raytheon AustraliaN/aYesYes
Aerkomm Inc.N/aYesYes
Oceaneering International, Inc.N/aYesYes
9 January 2025 South AfricaIvan Meyer and his familyFederal Chairperson of the Democratic AllianceYesYesYes[55]
1 July 2025 PhilippinesFrancis TolentinoFormer Senate Majority LeaderYesN/aN/a[56]
8 September 2025 JapanHei SekiMember of the House of CouncillorsYesYesYes[57]
15 December 2025 Shigeru Iwasaki Political Advisor to the Executive Yuan Yes Yes Yes [58]
26 December 2025 United StatesNorthrop Grumman Systems CorporationMilitary industryN/aYesYes[59]
L3Harris Maritime ServicesN/aYesYes
Boeing in St. LouisN/aYesYes
Gibbs & Cox, Inc.N/aYesYes
Advanced Acoustic ConceptsN/aYesYes
VSE CorporationN/aYesYes
Sierra Technical Services, Inc.N/aYesYes
Red Cat Holdings, Inc.N/aYesYes
Teal Drones, Inc.N/aYesYes
ReconCraftN/aYesYes
High Point AerotechnologiesN/aYesYes
Epirus, Inc.N/aYesYes
Dedrone Holdings Inc.N/aYesYes
Area-IN/aYesYes
Blue Force TechnologiesN/aYesYes
Dive TechnologiesN/aYesYes
VantorN/aYesYes
Intelligent Epitaxy Technology, Inc.N/aYesYes
Rhombus Power Inc.N/aYesYes
Lazarus Enterprises Inc.N/aYesYes
Palmer LuckeyFounder of Anduril IndustriesYesYesYes
John CantillonVice President of L3Harris Technologies, Inc., Vice President and Principal Accounting Officer of L3Harris Maritime ServicesYesYesYes
Michael J. CarnovalePresident and chief executive officer of Advanced Acoustic ConceptsYesYesYes
John A. CuomoPresident and chief executive officer of VSE CorporationYesYesYes
Mitch McDonaldPresident of Teal Drones, Inc.YesYesYes
Anshuman RoyFounder and chief executive officer of Rhombus Power Inc.YesYesYes
Dan SmootPresident and chief executive officer of VantorYesYesYes
Aaditya DevarakondaChief Executive Officer of Dedrone Holdings Inc.YesYesYes
Ann WoodPresident of High Point AerotechnologiesYesYesYes
Jay HoflichCo-founder and chief executive officer of ReconCraftYesYesYes
30 March 2026 JapanKeiji FuruyaMember of the House of RepresentativesYesYesYes[60]
11 June 2026 PhilippinesGilberto Teodoro Jr.Philippine Defense SecretaryYesYesNo[61]

Sanctions announced by the Ministry of Commerce

[edit]

Unreliable Entity List

[edit]
This section is an excerpt from Unreliable Entity List § List.[edit]

As of 9 October 2025, a total of 72 entities (all of which are from the United States) were included in the Unreliable Entities List, of which 55 were under sanctions. Except for two entities that were retaliated against by the second Trump administration for imposing tariffs on China, the rest were sanctioned for United States arms sales to Taiwan.

DateCountry/RegionEntityRestrictionsRef.
Travel restrictions[note 10]Trade restrictions[note 11]Investment restrictions[note 12]
16 February 2023 United StatesLockheed Martin CorporationYesYesYes[62]
Raytheon Missiles & DefenseYesYesYes
20 May 2024General Atomics Aeronautical SystemsYesYesYes
General Dynamics Land SystemsYesYesYes
Boeing Defense, Space & SecurityYesYesYes
2 January 2025General Dynamics Information TechnologyYesYesYes[63]
General Dynamics Mission SystemsYesYesYes
General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical SystemsYesYesYes
Lockheed Martin Advanced Technology LaboratoryYesYesYes
Lockheed Martin AeronauticsYesYesYes
Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire ControlYesYesYes
Lockheed Martin Missile System Integration LaboratoryYesYesYes
Lockheed Martin VenturesYesYesYes
Raytheon/Lockheed Martin Javelin Joint VentureYesYesYes
Raytheon Missile SystemsYesYesYes
14 January 2025Anduril IndustriesYesYesYes[64]
Applied Technologies GroupYesYesYes
AxientYesYesYes
Inter-Coastal ElectronicsYesYesYes
IronMountain SolutionsYesYesYes
Maritime Tactical SystemsYesYesYes
System Studies & SimulationYesYesYes
15 January 2025Aevex AerospaceYesYesYes[65]
LKD AerospaceYesYesYes
Pacific Rim DefenseYesYesYes
Summit Technologies, Inc.YesYesYes
4 February 2025 Illumina, Inc.YesYesYes [66]
PVH Corp.YesYesYes
4 March 2025[note 13]ACT1 FederalYesYesYes[68]
Cubic CorporationYesYesYes
ExoveraYesYesYes
Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc.YesYesYes
Planate Management GroupYesYesYes
S3 AeroDefenseYesYesYes
Stick Rudder Enterprises LLCYesYesYes
TCOM, Limited PartnershipYesYesYes
Teledyne Brown Engineering, Inc.YesYesYes
TextOreYesYesYes
4 April 2025[note 14]BRINC Drones, Inc.YesYesYes[71]
Domo Tactical CommunicationsYesYesYes
Firestorm Labs, Inc.YesYesYes
HavocAIYesYesYes
Insitu, Inc.YesYesYes
Kratos Unmanned Aerial Systems, Inc.YesYesYes
Neros TechnologiesYesYesYes
Rapid Flight LLCYesYesYes
Red Six SolutionsYesYesYes
Skydio Inc.YesYesYes
SYNEXXUS, Inc.YesYesYes
9 April 2025[note 15]Cyberlux CorporationYesYesYes[72]
Edge Autonomy Operations LLCYesYesYes
Group WYesYesYes
Hudson Technologies Co.YesYesYes
Shield AI, Inc.YesYesYes
Sierra Nevada CorporationYesYesYes
25 September 2025Aerkomm Inc.NoYesYes[73]
Oceaneering International, Inc.NoYesYes
Saronic Technologies, Inc.NoYesYes
9 October 2025AeroVironment, Inc.NoYesYes[74]
Alliant Techsystems Operations LLCNoYesYes
BAE Systems, Inc.NoYesYes
Cubic Global DefenseNoYesYes
Dedrone by AxonNoYesYes
DZYNE TechnologiesNoYesYes
Elbit Systems of America, LLCNoYesYes
Epirus, Inc.NoYesYes
Exelis Inc.NoYesYes
Halifax International Security ForumNoYesYes
Recorded Future, Inc.NoYesYes
TechInsights Inc.[note 16]NoYesYes
Teledyne FLIR, LLCNoYesYes
VSE CorporationNoYesYes
14 October 2025 Hanwha Shipping LLCNoYesYes[75]
Hanwha Philly Shipyard Inc.NoYesYes
Hanwha Ocean USA International LLCNoYesYes
Hanwha Shipping Holdings LLCNoYesYes
HS USA Holdings Corp.NoYesYes

Countermeasures

[edit]
Date Country/Region Entity Restrictions Ref.
Travel restrictions[note 17] Trade restrictions[note 18] Investment restrictions[note 19]
13 August 2025  European Union

 Lithuania

 Urbo BankasNoYesNo [76]
AB Mano BankasNoYesNo

Sanctions announced by the Taiwan Affairs Office

[edit]
This section is an excerpt from Diehard "Taiwan independence" separatists § List of diehard "Taiwan independence" separatists.[edit]
DateIndividual/entityPosition when sanctionedRestrictionsList typeRef.
Travel restrictions[note 20]Prohibition on communication[note 21]Freezing of property[note 22]
5 November 2021Su Tseng-changPremier of the Republic of ChinaYesYes[A][77][78][note 23]
You Si-kunPresident of the Legislative YuanYesYes
Joseph WuMinister of Foreign AffairsYesYes
3 August 2022Taiwan Foundation for DemocracyYesYes[B][79]
International Cooperation and Development FundYesYes
Xuande EnergyYesYes[C]
Lingwang TechnologyYesYes
Dawn MedicalYesYes
SkyEye Satellite TechnologyYesYes
16 August 2022Hsiao Bi-khimTaiwanese Representative in the U.S.YesYes[A][78][note 23]
Wellington KooSecretary-General of the National Security CouncilYesYes
Tsai Chi-changVice President of the Legislative YuanYesYes
Ker Chien-mingMajority Leader of the Legislative YuanYesYes
Lin Fei-fanDeputy Secretary-General of the Democratic Progressive PartyYesYes
Chen Jiau-huaChairperson of the New Power PartyYesYes
Wang Ting-yuMember of the Legislative YuanYesYes
Huang Yu-linExecutive Director of the Taiwan Foundation for DemocracyYesYes[78]
Xiang TianyiSecretary General of the International Cooperation and Development FoundationYesYes
7 April 2023Prospect FoundationYesYes[B][80]
Council of Asian Liberals and DemocratsYesYes
15 May 2024Edward HuangCurrent affairs commentatorYesYes [81]
Liu Bao-jieTelevision hostYesYes
Yu BeichenTaoyuan City CouncillorYesYes
Wang Yi-chuanExecutive Director of the Policy Committee of the Democratic Progressive PartyYesYes
Lee Cheng-haoCurrent affairs commentatorYesYes [82]
14 October 2024Robert TsaoFounder of the United Microelectronics CorporationYesYes[A]
Puma ShenMember of the Legislative YuanYesYes
Kuma AcademyYesYes[B]
5 June 2025 Sicuens International Yes [C] [83]
7 January 2026 Liu Shyh-fang Minister of the Interior Yes Yes [A] [84]
Cheng Ying-yao Minister of Education Yes Yes
Notes
  1. 1 2 3 4 The persons listed on the left are those who have been included in the list of "Taiwan independence diehards" by the Taiwan Affairs Office.
  2. 1 2 3 The institutions listed on the left are included in the list of institutions affiliated with "Taiwan independence diehards" by the Taiwan Affairs Office.
  3. 1 2 The institutions listed on the left are included in the enterprises that donated to institutions affiliated with "Taiwan independence diehards" list by the Taiwan Affairs Office.

Enforcement of UN Security Council sanctions resolutions

[edit]
Country/EntityMinistry of Foreign Affairs Notice NumberUN Security Council ResolutionsRef.
LibyaNo. 3/10, 2020, No. 3, 20212509/2571[85][86][87]
Islamic State
al-Qaeda		No. 1 of 2019, No. 5 of 20201267/1989/2253[88][89]
MaliNo. 4, 2019, No. 8/10, 20202484/2541[86][90][91]
SomaliaNo. 6, 2019, No. 10/11, 20202498/2551[86][92][93]
IraqNo. 10, 20201518[86]
Democratic Republic of the CongoNo. 3, 2019, No. 7/10, 20202478/2528[86][94][95]
SudanNo. 10 of 2020, No. 1 of 20212562[86][96]
TalibanNo. 10, 20201988 [86]
Guinea-BissauNo. 10, 20202048 [86]
Central African RepublicNo. 1/9/10, 20202507/2536[86][97][98]
YemenNo. 4/10, 2020, No. 2, 20212511/2564[86][99][100]
South SudanNo. 2, 2019, No. 6/10, 20202471/2521[86][101][102]
North KoreaInternational Group Letter [2013] No. 39[note 24]2094[103]

Other

[edit]

Chinese transliteration of Rubio

[edit]

Originally, some news agencies reported the Chinese transliteration of Marco Rubio was 卢比奥 (盧比奧), while the Foreign Affairs Ministry used the another transliteration 鲁比欧 (魯比歐). When he assumed the secretary of State in January 2025, some news agencies reported that Chinese transliteration of Rubio was changed to 鲁比奥 (魯比奧), which under the transliteration guideline adpoted by Xinhua News Agency. Under the guideline, Ru referred to 鲁 (魯), and Lu referred to 卢 (盧). Therefore, the standardized Chinese transliteration is "鲁比奥 (魯比奧)". The spokesperson of the Foreign Affairs Ministry Mao Ning stated that "instead of how his name is translated in Chinese, it's his actual name in English that is more important".[104][105][106] On 12 May 2026, Rubio headed to Beijing with U.S. President Donald Trump for the first time. According to reports, this arrangement might have been made possible after China changed his name's transliteration.[107] However, The New York Times reported that this was false, noting that Xinhua News Agency had used both transliterations for about a decade.[108]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ↑ Sanctioned individuals and their immediate family members are prohibited from entering mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau
  2. ↑ Prohibition of Chinese citizens and institutions from dealing with sanctioned individuals or entities
  3. ↑ Freezing of assets in China
  4. ↑ When he is sanctioned by the Chinese government, the Chinese translation of Rubio was 卢比奥 (盧比奧). In January 2025, the Chinese translation is changed to 鲁比奥 (魯比奧).
  5. ↑ Renamed to Raytheon Technologies Corporation in 2020
  6. 1 2 3 4 5 Cancelled on 30 April 2025
  7. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Cancelled on 30 January 2026
  8. ↑ Cancelled on 22 July 2024
  9. 1 2 On 20 May 2024, the Ministry of Commerce listed the above-mentioned enterprises on the list of unreliable entities.
  10. ↑ Listed companies' executives are prohibited from entering mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau, and existing work or residency permits are cancelled
  11. ↑ Listed companies are prohibited from engaging in import and export trade with mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau
  12. ↑ Prohibits new investments by listed companies in mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau
  13. ↑ The sanctions are ceased since 10 November 2025.[67]
  14. ↑ The sanctions are suspended since 14 May 2025 for 90 days,[69] and extended since 12 August 2025 for another 90 days,[70] and extended since 10 November 2025 for one year.[67]
  15. ↑ The sanctions are suspended since 14 May 2025,[69] and ceased since 12 August 2025.[70]
  16. ↑ Including the following subsidiaries: TechInsights Europe Limited, TechInsights Europe Sp zo.o, TechInsights Japan KK, TechInsights USA Inc, TechInsights Korea Co. Ltd., TechInsights Market Analysis Limited, SARL Strategy Analytics, Strategy Analytics GmbH Market Research and Management Consulting, SARI Strategy Analytics Private Limited
  17. ↑ Listed companies' executives are prohibited from entering mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau, and existing work or residency permits are cancelled
  18. ↑ Listed companies are prohibited from engaging in import and export trade with mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau
  19. ↑ Prohibits new investments by listed companies in mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau
  20. ↑ Sanctioned individuals and their immediate family members are prohibited from entering mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau
  21. ↑ Mainland Chinese residents and institutions are prohibited from trading with sanctions individuals or from dealing with punished entities.
  22. ↑ Freezing property in mainland China
  23. 1 2 In addition to the above, other measures include: restricting institutions affiliated with them from cooperating with relevant organizations and individuals in the mainland, never allowing companies affiliated with them and their financiers to make profits in the mainland, and taking other necessary disciplinary measures. Criminal liability will be pursued for life.
  24. ↑ Issued by the International Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Transport, not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

References

[edit]
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  98. ↑ "中华人民共和国外交部通告（2020年第9号）" [Notice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (No. 9 of 2020)]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4 September 2020. Archived from the original on 2021-08-29. Retrieved 2021-04-03.
  99. ↑ "中华人民共和国外交部通告（2020年第4号）" [Notice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (No. 4 of 2020)]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 26 February 2020. Archived from the original on 2021-08-29. Retrieved 2021-04-03.
  100. ↑ "中华人民共和国外交部通告（2021年第2号）" [Notice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (No. 2 of 2021)]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 26 February 2021. Archived from the original on 2021-08-29. Retrieved 2021-04-03.
  101. ↑ "中华人民共和国外交部通告（2019年第2号）" [Notice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (No. 2 of 2019)]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 31 May 2019. Archived from the original on 2021-08-29. Retrieved 2021-04-03.
  102. ↑ "中华人民共和国外交部通告（2020年第6号）" [Notice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (No. 6 of 2020)]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 30 May 2020. Archived from the original on 2021-08-29. Retrieved 2021-04-03.
  103. ↑ "关于执行联合国安理会第2094号决议的通知" [Notice on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2094]. International Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Transport. 25 April 2013. Archived from the original on 2023-05-08. Retrieved 2023-05-07.
  104. ↑ "Beijing changes Rubio's Chinese name, perhaps to get around travel ban". Radio Free Asia. 2025-01-21. Archived from the original on 2025-02-01. Retrieved 2025-01-24. However, some records show that going back to 2016 in official Chinese media, both versions have been used.
  105. ↑ "中國觀察：「盧比奧」改名「魯比奧」 無關解套制裁". std.stheadline.com (in Chinese). 2025-01-23. Archived from the original on 2025-02-18. Retrieved 2025-02-06.
  106. ↑ "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning's Regular Press Conference on January 22, 2025". Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 22 January 2025. Retrieved 30 March 2026.
  107. ↑ "Linguistic workaround allows Marco Rubio, sanctioned by Beijing, to travel to China for the first time". The Guardian. 13 May 2026. Retrieved 13 May 2026.
  108. ↑ Wong, Edward (2026-05-15). "Sanctioned by China, Rubio Enjoys a Trip to Beijing". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2026-05-16.
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