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VLS-1 V03

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VLS-1 V03
Wreck of the structure of the VLS launch pad
Map
Date22 August 2003; 23 years ago (2003-08-22)
Time13:26:06 BRT (UTC-3)
Duration0:08:45[1]
Location
OutcomeSetback to the Brazilian space program with the death of 21 technicians and destruction of launch vehicle and structure (launch pad and launch tower)
Deaths21
VLS-1 V03
The VLS-1 involved
Start of mission
Launch dateAugust 25, 2003 (2003-08-25) (Planned)
RocketVLS-1
End of mission
DestroyedAugust 22, 2003 (destroyed before launch)

The 2003 Alcântara VLS accident was an accident during the Brazilian Space Agency's third attempt to launch the VLS-1 rocket, which was intended to launch two satellites into orbit. The rocket ignited on its launch pad at the Alcântara Launch Center, killing 21 people. It is officially the fourth deadliest space exploration related disaster in history.

Background

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The rocket, proposed in 1979[2] had two launch attempts until the accident: one in 1997, which ended up in the Atlantic Ocean due to the failure of one of the first stage engines to start[3][4] and another in 1999, destroyed remotely due to a flame penetrating the top of the second stage block 3 minutes after takeoff.[5][6]

In 2000, according to Manchete magazine, the ECHELON surveillance system allegedly engaged in industrial espionage against VLS systems.[7] The following year, when the launch was still scheduled for 2002, the Ministry of Science tripled the program's funding and the CTA conducted successful tests of the VLS engines.[8][9] In November 2002, the third launch had been postponed from December 2002 to March 2003.[10]

Operation São Luís

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Besides being the third flight of the VLS-1, the operation had as objectives the launch of the satellites UNOSAT and SATEC in to orbit; verify the CLA's ability to perform type launches and the use of the CLBI as a tracking station.[11] The Satec, valued at R$ 500,000, used spare parts from other programs, had a service life of six months, weighed 65 kg, was 66 cm wide and deep, and 61 cm tall; developed by INPE, its objective was to test the technological equipment on board the rocket; Unosat, developed by the University of Northern Paraná with support from AEB, among others, was intended to be Brazil's first nanosatellite. V03 aimed to place them in a circular orbit at 15° and 750 km.[12] The VLS-1 was valued at U$ 7 million.[13]

The transportation of materials for V03 started on August 23, 2002[14] and stopped on April 16, 2003. The operation was restarted on July 1, an inspection the next day found no problems, and the satellites were transported on the 30th.[15] Tribuna da Imprensa reports that the launch was delayed three times, including in April and May, due to, among other problems, flaws in the protection of the rocket "cluster."[16] After several assembly operations, the accident occurred on August 22, 2003.[17]

On August 17, two launch simulations took place, which led to the launch being scheduled for the 25th. Colonel Serre reports that there was no pressure to rush the launch and disregard safety regulations, a view expressed by the then-Minister of Defense, José Viegas, after the accident.[18][19] However, a report by Agência Brasil on August 20 states that the date of the 25th was not yet 100% confirmed.[20] A few days before the accident, an Air Force intelligence team was sent to the Alcântara Space Base to investigate possible disruptions to the launch plan.[21] One of the tests conducted involved measuring radio waves in the days leading up to the launch, and nothing suspicious was detected in the region.[22][23]

Accident

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The accident occurred three days before the scheduled launch date, at 1:26:06 pm (Brasília time) on August 22, 2003,[24][1] between frames 26 and 27 recorded by the Closed Circuit TV of the Mobile Integration Tower,[25][26] with professionals spread across the five floors of the tower.[27] At the time of the accident, the rocket weighed 50 metric tons, 90% of which was solid fuel, ammonium perchlorate.[13]

An unplanned ignition destroyed the launch vehicle while on the CLA platform.[25] 21 people died due to the ignition of a first stage engine.[28] It took about eight seconds before the tower was enveloped by smoke and gases heated up to 3,000 °C.[29] The mobile tower stood upright for five minutes, collapsing at 1:31.[1][30]

Survivors reported the noise of at least one booster running and several loud bangs.[1] Amauri dos Santos Conceição, a safety technician at the base, reports in his diary that he waited for the authorities to remove two visible bodies, and then stayed behind to try to extinguish the remaining fires and search for other survivors. He finished his duties at the control tower at 7:55 p.m. (BRT).[31]

Due to the scale of the event, the dead were identified through a roll call[32] and the remains were identified and sent to the IML on August 23, 2003.[33] On the same day, the base was reopened to the press.[34] An Estadão podcast reports that there was no checklist indicating who had entered the base and who was working on the rocket at the time of the accident. It took two days to locate the 21 victims: on the first day, 2 were recovered; on the second, 7; and on the third, 12 victims. In the first few days after the accident, the victims were listed as "missing." The remains were identified using personal belongings, dental records, and DNA testing.[35]

At the same time that the accident occurred, the president of AEB Luiz Bevilacqua, was giving a press conference about the agreement signed between Brazil and Ukraine for the use of the Alcântara base. Being informed of the accident by journalists, he ironically replied "only if it's a party skyrocket". A few minutes later, an aide confirmed the incident with a note.[36][37][38] It was identified that the ignition process occurred prematurely, and thus the launch tower was not removed in time, which was the main cause of the fire.[39]

None of the activities, involving final adjustments to the equipment and the installation of video cameras, carried out that day posed any risk. However, the number of people at the base was well above safety standards, which allowed for only six people to be present. The accident significantly delayed the Brazilian space program.[40][41][42]

Aftermath

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As an immediate response, President Lula called an emergency meeting at the Palácio do Planalto with Defense Minister José Viegas and decided that Viegas and Roberto Amaral, Minister of Science, would travel to Alcântara the following day.[43] André Singer, spokesman of the Presidency, was the first to speak on behalf of the executive branch.[44] Also on the 23rd, Russian President Vladimir Putin sent a telegram to the Brazilian president expressing his condolences.[45] Lula did not travel with his ministers because he was scheduled to attend the funeral of diplomat Sérgio Vieira de Mello.[46] Three days later, during an international trip to Peru, President Lula spoke about the accident involving the journalists, after Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo opened the press conference by asking for a minute of silence for the victims.[47]

President Lula and Minister Viegas rejected the idea that the accident had occurred due to a lack of funding, while Brigadier General Hugo de Oliveira Piva, the architect of the VLS program, pointed to the program's financial constraints dating back to the Sarney administration, which has since seen the program's budget drop from $521 million to $285 million during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration, as the main cause of the accident, while also acknowledging the possibility of human error.[48][49][50]

Investigation

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Funeral service, with military honors, for 19 victims, held on August 27, 2003

The funeral service for the 19 victims, held with full military honors on August 27, 2003, at the DCTA—with the last two being identified that same afternoon—was attended by the Governor of São Paulo, Geraldo Alckmin, President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva.[51][52] Ministers José Viegas (Defense) and Roberto Amaral (Science and Technology), Senate President José Sarney, and the government leader in the Senate, Aloizio Mercadante.[53] In total, about 1,500 people attended the funeral.[54] The next day, the funeral for the last two victims took place.[55]

The Military Police Inquiry was opened on August 26, 2003, and the Technical Investigation Commission was appointed on August 28, 2003.[56] The investigation involved Russia[57] at the request of the Ministry of Defense, in particular Brigadier Luiz Carlos Bueno, during his visit to Moscow as part of the Brazilian Air Force F X Program, when he requested three technicians and was responded to with the dispatch of six six technicians from the Russian Aerospace Agency.[58][59]

The families of the victims have even called for an independent investigation,[60] something that the then president Lula has not commented on, but he has announced that he would send a bill of R$ 100 thousand to compensate the victims' families, approved by the Chamber of Deputies in October of that same year, in addition to paying for scholarships for their children. In the end, the investigation was not independent, as it was led by Brigadier Marco Antônio Couto do Nascimento, deputy director of the CTA,[61][62][63] including representatives from the Brazilian Society for the Advancement of Science.[64] A Special Commission of the House of Representatives visited the base on October 20.[65] The compensation was approved by the House on October 28, 2003.[66] Despite evidence of French espionage in Maranhão, no evidence of sabotage was found.[67] Allegations of sabotage made within the Air Force and by members of Congress went so far as to concern the Air Force Command, which believed this would bring the project into disrepute, despite acknowledging the presence of foreigners and spies in the area at the time of the accident.[68]

In testimony before the Chamber of Deputies in September 2003, Ministers José Viegas Filho and Roberto Amaral announced that discussions regarding U.S. use of the Alcântara base had resumed, and they ruled out the possibility of electrical problems at the VLS.[69] 32 days after the accident, Air Force Brigadier General Thiago Ribeiro, technical director of the CTA, announced that the ignition of Booster A was in fact caused by an electrical current inside the rocket, which was either sudden—measuring 1.2 amps—or weak and lasting five minutes.[70] In October, a Brazil-Russia partnership was announced to develop a liquid-fueled VLS using Russian technology; under agreements with Ukraine, the project would also receive a transfer of Ukrainian technology.[71][72]

The report was presented by the ministers of Defense and Science on 16 March 2004.[73] The conclusion of both the Brazilian and Russian investigators was that the cause of the accident was due to the unplanned start of the A-booster.[74] Among the possible causes of the ignition, they raised the possibility of static electricity, with the Russian experts noting the absence of a bridge between the propellant and the propellant housing, but it was considered a low probability event due to the non-occurrence of lightning on the day.[75] The electrostatic discharge hypothesis was found to be superior,[76] due to the absence of a barrier between the first stage boosters.[77] Overall, the report did not identify any "active failure" (error or violation) that caused the accident. However, it cited limited funding and a shortage of staff as contributing factors to the incident.[78][79] In April 2004, the Space Agency even suggested that it would be better to cancel the program than to continue without funding.[80]

Following the report's publication, a new public tender was launched at the CTA, and in June, the Brazilian government requested an additional R$ 37 million for the space program's budget.[81][82] That year, the government had promised R$ 100 million for the VLS program, even though the AEB estimated that three times that amount would be needed.[83] In August 2004, Minister Eduardo Campos revealed that 46% of the fourth VLS was already complete.[84]

An Estadão podcast indicates that the "mechanical safety device"—a lock that prevents ignition—was removed after an ignition failure in one of the engines of the VLS-1 V01, and will not be included in the next two versions; instead, it will be replaced by a relay box, or an "electronic device," which has been successfully tested on sounding rockets. The Investigation Commission did not consider the absence of the DMS to be the cause of the accident, but noted that the component would have prevented the fire, recommending that it be added back to future projects. The installation of detonators hours before the accident—two days earlier than scheduled (the installation schedule, in turn, indicates that they should have been installed on August 23)—by decision of the technical team was also considered a relevant factor in the incident. The investigations found no evidence of culpability or a military crime, and concluded that the most likely cause was an "electrostatic discharge" in the detonator.[85][86]

The report on the accident by the Chamber of Deputies' External Commission recommended that the Brazilian Space Agency once again be placed under the authority of the Office of the President.[87] In September 2004, the Military Prosecutor's Office even requested a new forensic investigation into the accident, and a call for bids was issued for the reconstruction of the base.[88][89] Finally, the bidding process had been under legal review since late 2005; it was subsequently suspended by the Federal Court of Accounts in 2007, and the budget for a new attempt was slow to be approved. Issues such as the safety of solid propellant had not yet been resolved in 2006, according to Petrônio Noronha de Souza, president of the Brazilian Aerospace Association.[90][91] In October 2006, it was announced that the family of one of the victims had filed a claim for damages and interest of up to R$ 5 million, which was upheld by the 1st Federal Court of São José dos Campos.[92] In 2008, the VLS project had been resumed, with the expectation of testing various aspects of the VLS-1B by 2012.[93] In tests conducted in October 2008 at the Coronel Abner power plant in São José dos Campos, the engine's flames reached 2,800ºC.[94]

Results

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The integration tower, which cost R$6.5 million in 1995, cost about R$10 million to rebuild.[95] The launch tower was completed and delivered in 2012, but in 2013 the base had not yet finished its reconstruction.[96] A mock-up of the VLS-1 was tested on the tower in 2012;[97] In 2015, there were expectations that a partial test of the VLS would take place in 2016, with the AEB acknowledging the possibility that the program might be scrapped due to a lack of funding—a claim disputed by the Brazilian Air Force.[98] But in 2016 it was decided to end the VLS program in favor of the VLM.[99] The VLS-1 V04 even had 70% of its structure completed, with its launch first expected to happen in 2006; it was then expected to happen in 2012, but it was canceled with the end of the program.[100][101]

Victims

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The accident killed 21 civilians who were working at the time of the fire.[37][39][102]

  • Amintas Rocha Brito, 47, engineer
  • Antonio Sergio Cezarini, 47, engineer
  • Carlos Alberto Pedrini, 45, engineer
  • Cesar Augusto Costalonga Varejão, 49, engineer
  • Daniel Faria Gonçalves, 20, mechanic
  • Eliseu Reinaldo Vieira, 46, engineer
  • Gil Cesar Baptista Marques, 44, cameraman
  • Gines Ananias Garcia, 46, engineer
  • Jonas Barbosa Filho, 37, technician
  • José Aparecido Pinheiro, 39, technician
  • José Eduardo de Almeida, 38, cameraman
  • José Eduardo Pereira II, 43, technician
  • José Pedro Claro da Silva, 51, engineer
  • Luis Primon de Araújo, 45, engineer
  • Mario Cesar de Freitas Levy, 43, engineer
  • Massanobu Shimabukuro, 43, technician
  • Mauricio Biella Valle, 42, engineer
  • Roberto Tadashi Seguchi, 46, engineer
  • Rodolfo Donizetti de Oliveira, 35, technician
  • Sidney Aparecido de Moraes, 38, technician
  • Walter Pereira Junior, 45, technician

See also

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References

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  1. 1 2 3 4 Berquó et al. 2004, p. 32.
  2. ↑ Berquó et al. 2004, p. 7.
  3. ↑ Berquó et al. 2004, p. 11.
  4. ↑ Folha de São Paulo, 3 de novembro de 1997.
  5. ↑ Cabrera 2003, p. 27.
  6. ↑ Berquó et al. 2004, p. 12.
  7. ↑ Manchete, 15 July 2000.
  8. ↑ Jornal do Commercio, 10 November 2001.
  9. ↑ Jornal do Brasil, 9 May 2001.
  10. ↑ Jornal do Brasil, 11 November 2002.
  11. ↑ Berquó et al. 2004, p. 14.
  12. ↑ Monitor Campista, 27-28 April 2003.
  13. 1 2 Jornal do Brasil, 23 August 2003.
  14. ↑ Berquó et al. 2004, p. 16.
  15. ↑ Berquó et al. 2004, p. 17.
  16. ↑ Tribuna da Imprensa, 26 August 2003.
  17. ↑ Berquó et al. 2004, pp. 18–21.
  18. ↑ As peças do acidente, 22 August 2023, 7:52-9:05.
  19. ↑ Jornal do Commercio, 24-25 August 2003.
  20. ↑ Agência Brasil, 20 August 2003.
  21. ↑ A Tribuna, 24 August 2003.
  22. ↑ Jornal do Brasil, 24 August 2003.
  23. ↑ Jornal do Brasil, 25 August 2003.
  24. ↑ Zurita 2021.
  25. 1 2 Leite 2013.
  26. ↑ Berquó et al. 2004, p. 30.
  27. ↑ Fogo em Alcântara, 17 August 2023, 6m14s-6m25s.
  28. ↑ Today 2003.
  29. ↑ Berquó et al. 2004, p. 31.
  30. ↑ Fogo em Alcântara, 17 August 2023, 7m30s.
  31. ↑ Fogo em Alcântara, 17 August 2023, 8:20-8:22,14:04-14:43.
  32. ↑ Folha de São Paulo, 22 August 2003.
  33. ↑ Valente & Lessa 2003.
  34. ↑ Meneghini 2003.
  35. ↑ Fogo em Alcântara, 17 August 2023, 17:14-17:28,18:44-18:47,19:51-19:59,21:05-21:13,22:50-23:02.
  36. ↑ Estado 2003.
  37. 1 2 Mendonça & Cosso 2003.
  38. ↑ Jornal do Commercio, 23 August 2003.
  39. 1 2 D'Alama 2013.
  40. ↑ Global 2003; Konner 2013.
  41. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 31 August 2003.
  42. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 17 March 2004.
  43. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 23 August 2003.
  44. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 14 January 2011.
  45. ↑ Kremlin, 23 August 2003.
  46. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 24 August 2003.
  47. ↑ BBC, 25 August 2003.
  48. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 26 August 2003.
  49. ↑ Folha de São Paulo, 23 August 2003.
  50. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 28 August 2003b.
  51. ↑ Fogo em Alcântara, 17 August 2023, 24:39-25:50.
  52. ↑ Monitor Campista, 28 August 2003.
  53. ↑ Jornal do Commercio, 28 August 2003, Governo quer reunir-se com familiares das vítimas.
  54. ↑ A Tribuna, 28 August 2003.
  55. ↑ O Fluminense, 29 August 2003.
  56. ↑ Berquó et al. 2004, p. 22.
  57. ↑ Berquó et al. 2004, p. 23.
  58. ↑ Agência Brasil, 3 de setembro de 2003.
  59. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 5 September 2003.
  60. ↑ Nogueira 2003.
  61. ↑ Cosso 2003; D'Alama 2013.
  62. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 30 August 2003.
  63. ↑ O Fluminense, 29 October 2003.
  64. ↑ Jornal do Commercio, 30 August 2003.
  65. ↑ Agência Brasil, 20 de outubro de 2003.
  66. ↑ Agência Brasil, 29 de outubro de 2003.
  67. ↑ Ferraz 2013.
  68. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 7 September 2003.
  69. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 10 September 2003.
  70. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 24 September 2003.
  71. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 11 October 2003.
  72. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 22 October 2003.
  73. ↑ Revista Marítima Brazileira, April and June 2004, p. 303.
  74. ↑ Berquó et al. 2004, p. 37.
  75. ↑ Berquó et al. 2004, p. 39, 3.2.1.2 Eletricidade estática no propelente.
  76. ↑ Berquó et al. 2004, p. 62.
  77. ↑ Berquó et al. 2004, pp. 61–62.
  78. ↑ Monitor Campista, 17 March 2004a.
  79. ↑ Monitor Campista, 17 March 2004b.
  80. ↑ Tribuna da Imprensa, 2 April 2004.
  81. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 25 March 2004, Programa espacial.
  82. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 17 June 2004.
  83. ↑ Jornal do Commercio, 3 April 2004.
  84. ↑ Jornal do Commercio, 6 August 2004.
  85. ↑ As peças do acidente, 22 August 2023, 14:42-24:10.
  86. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 31 January 2004.
  87. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 31 August 2004.
  88. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 9 September 2004.
  89. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 16 September 2004.
  90. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 4 April 2006.
  91. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 9 September 2007.
  92. ↑ Jornal do Commercio, 27, 28 and 29 October 2006.
  93. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 19 July 2008.
  94. ↑ Jornal do Commercio, 21 October 2008.
  95. ↑ Nogueira 2003a.
  96. ↑ Agência Brasil, 12 de fevereiro de 2013.
  97. ↑ DefesaNet, 12 de julho de 2012.
  98. ↑ Uol, 27 May 2015.
  99. ↑ DefesaNet, 29 de dezembro de 2016.
  100. ↑ Silva 2021, p. 388; Rollemberg, Veloso & Queiroz Filho 2009, p. 67.
  101. ↑ Correio Braziliense, 28 August 2003a.
  102. ↑ Época, 29 August 2003.

Bibliography

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