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Elections in Afghanistan

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected from Afghan elections)

An Afghan voter displaying his registration card, 2009 presidential election. (Photo: ISAF / Wikimedia Commons)

Afghanistan has held elections at various points throughout its modern history, though the continuity of electoral institutions has repeatedly been disrupted by changes of regime, civil war, and foreign occupation. Representative assemblies existed under the constitutional monarchy from the 1920s onward, and competitive elections were conducted under the Kingdom of Afghanistan from 1949 to 1969. The communist government that ruled between 1978 and 1992 introduced a managed electoral system with limited competition under its National Reconciliation policy. Following the collapse of that government and years of civil conflict, the Bonn Agreement of December 2001 established a framework for democratic transition, under which Afghanistan held seven national elections between 2004 and 2019—comprising three presidential elections and four parliamentary or provincial council cycles. These elections were administered initially by the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB), and from 2006 by the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC).

Elections under the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan were governed by the 2004 Constitution, which established a presidential republic with a bicameral legislature. Presidential elections used a two-round system, and parliamentary elections for the lower house (Wolesi Jirga) used the single non-transferable vote (SNTV). The constitution reserved at least 25 percent of Wolesi Jirga seats for women candidates. Despite substantial voter participation in the first election cycle—approximately 70 percent of registered voters cast ballots in 2004—turnout declined across successive elections, falling to under 20 percent by 2019. All seven elections were marked to varying degrees by fraud, security threats from Taliban insurgents, and administrative weaknesses in electoral institutions.

The Taliban's return to power in August 2021 ended Afghanistan's electoral period. On 25 December 2021, the Taliban government dissolved both the IEC and the ECC, with its spokesman Bilal Karimi describing them as "unnecessary institutes for the current situation."[1][2] The Taliban simultaneously dissolved the Ministry for Peace and the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs. In August 2023, all political parties were formally banned.[3] As of 2026, Afghanistan has no functioning electoral institutions and no scheduled elections.

Election results summary

[edit]

Presidential elections

[edit]
YearWinnerVote % (first round)Turnout (est.)Notes
2004Hamid Karzai55.4%~70% of registered votersFirst direct presidential election; ~8.1 million votes cast
2009Hamid Karzai (declared)49.67% (after audit)~30–33% of registered votersRunoff cancelled after Abdullah withdrew; widespread fraud documented
2014Ashraf Ghani— (runoff only)~57% (round 1); runoff disputedFull 100% audit of runoff ballots; National Unity Government formed by negotiation
2019Ashraf Ghani50.64%<20% of registered voters1.8 million valid votes from 9.7 million registered; lowest turnout on record

Parliamentary elections (Wolesi Jirga)

[edit]
YearSeatsTurnout (est.)Notes
2005249~57%Women won 68 seats (28%); results delayed by fraud investigation
2010249Not officially published21 candidates disqualified post-election; Taliban intimidation in south and east
2018249Not officially publishedResults took six months to certify; IEC and ECC commissioners subsequently dismissed

Kingdom of Afghanistan

[edit]

Afghanistan's first National Assembly was convened under the Constitution of 1923, though elections during this early period were heavily managed and not genuinely competitive. A series of parliaments were elected between 1931 and 1946 under restricted conditions, with the monarchy retaining close control over candidate selection and outcomes. The basis for more competitive elections was only established with the Constitution of 1931, which gave the Shura-ye Milli (National Council) a partly elected membership, though suffrage was limited and indirect in many areas.[4]

1949

[edit]

The seventh National Assembly, elected in 1949 under Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan, was conducted with less official interference than earlier parliaments and produced a legislature that came to be known as the "Liberal Parliament" (1949–1951). According to Barnett Rubin, this parliament gave open voice to criticism of the government, permitted opposition political groups to organise, and enacted laws providing for a free press—the most open political environment Afghanistan had experienced to that point.[5]

1952

[edit]

The 1952 parliamentary elections were held in the aftermath of a government crackdown the previous year that suppressed press freedom and restricted the political groups the Liberal Parliament had tolerated. The resulting assembly was more closely managed by the government than its predecessor.

1964

[edit]

In 1964, King Mohammed Zahir Shah convened a Loya jirga to draft and ratify a new constitution. The body comprised 167 elected provincial representatives and 34 members appointed directly by the king, totalling 452 delegates including six women. The 1964 Constitution of Afghanistan was a significant reforming document: it introduced women's suffrage in Afghanistan for the first time and established the framework for competitive parliamentary elections.[6][7] While the government screened out a number of potential dissidents among the delegates, observers noted that the assembly broadly represented Afghanistan's range of social, political, and religious opinion.[8]

1965

[edit]

The 1965 elections for the 12th National Assembly were described by contemporary observers as the most competitive Afghanistan had held to that point. The 216-member Wolesi Jirga produced by the election included anti-royalists, Pashtun nationalists, politicians across the political spectrum, urban liberals, a small leftist bloc, and conservative Islamist leaders. Women participated as both voters and candidates for the first time under the 1964 constitution, though female turnout was low. Difficulties included widespread illiteracy, an absence of organised political parties, low overall voter turnout, and some attempts by government officials to influence outcomes.[9]

1969

[edit]

The 1969 elections produced a parliament that more closely reflected the rural social structure of Afghanistan: conservative landowners and businessmen predominated, and more non-Pashtun representatives were elected than in the previous assembly. Most urban liberals lost their seats, as did all female delegates. The 13th parliament contained few leftists, though Babrak Karmal and Hafizullah Amin were both elected from constituencies in and near Kabul.[10]

Republic of Afghanistan (1973–1978)

[edit]

The Kingdom of Afghanistan was overthrown in a bloodless coup on 17 July 1973, when Mohammed Daoud Khan seized power and abolished the monarchy. Daoud suspended the 1964 constitution and governed by decree. A new constitution promulgated in 1977 provided for a single-party presidential system, but it created no genuine space for electoral competition. Daoud's government was overthrown in the Saur Revolution of April 1978 before any parliamentary elections could be scheduled under the republic.[11]

Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (1978–1992)

[edit]

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which seized power in the Saur Revolution of April 1978, governed Afghanistan as a Marxist-Leninist single-party state.[12] The party was divided between the Khalq and Parcham factions, and the early years of communist rule were marked by severe political repression and mass executions.[13] The Soviet military intervention of December 1979 installed Babrak Karmal as leader; he was replaced by Mohammad Najibullah in 1986.[14]

1987

[edit]

In 1987, Najibullah's government announced a National Reconciliation policy that included a new constitution permitting the formation of other political parties, and provided for a bicameral National Assembly (the Meli Shura) consisting of a Senate (Sena) and a House of Representatives (Wolesi Jirga). The constitution also provided for a president to be elected indirectly by the National Assembly to a seven-year term.[15]

Local elections were held in August 1987; a proportion of those elected were reported as non-PDPA members. On 30 September 1987, Najibullah was unanimously elected President of the Revolutionary Council. A Loya jirga in November 1987 subsequently elected him as President of the State.[15]

1988

[edit]

Elections for both houses of the National Assembly were held in April 1988. The PDPA won 46 seats in the House of Representatives and retained control of government with support from the National Front (45 seats) and other leftist parties. The Mujahideen boycotted the elections. The government left 50 of the 234 lower-house seats vacant in an attempt to draw the armed opposition into a power-sharing arrangement.[15] The elections were not credibly competitive; they took place against the backdrop of ongoing civil war and Soviet military involvement, and drew no meaningful international monitoring.

Islamic State of Afghanistan (1992–2001)

[edit]

Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the fall of the communist government in April 1992, formal electoral institutions largely ceased to function. An indirect presidential election took place in December 1992, and an interim government headed by a prime minister was formed in June 1993.[15] The subsequent period was defined by civil war among rival Mujahideen factions that destroyed much of Kabul and caused massive civilian displacement. The Taliban seized Kabul in September 1996 and ruled until the United States-led intervention of late 2001. No elections took place during either the Mujahideen civil war or the first Taliban period; the Taliban governed by religious decree and rejected electoral mechanisms as incompatible with Islamic governance.

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2001–2021)

[edit]

Electoral framework

[edit]
An Afghan ballot paper from the 2004 election, showing candidate photographs and symbols for voters with limited literacy. (Wikimedia Commons)

The Bonn Agreement of 5 December 2001, negotiated under UN auspices among Afghan factions in Germany, established a transitional roadmap including an Emergency Loya Jirga, a Constitutional Loya Jirga, and national elections. The Emergency Loya Jirga, convened in June 2002, elected Hamid Karzai as chairman of the Transitional Administration. The Constitutional Loya Jirga, convened on 14 December 2003 and concluding on 4 January 2004, produced the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, which established a presidential republic with a bicameral legislature.

Under the constitution, presidential elections used a two-round system requiring a candidate to obtain more than 50 percent of the valid vote to avoid a runoff. This format was adopted partly for its simplicity given high illiteracy rates and limited prior exposure to competitive elections.[16] Presidential candidates were required to demonstrate the support of at least 10,000 eligible voters to appear on the ballot, and to nominate two vice-presidential running mates.

Parliamentary elections for the Wolesi Jirga used the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system, in which each voter cast one vote for an individual candidate in multi-member provincial constituencies. Andrew Reynolds, writing in the Journal of Democracy, described SNTV's adoption as having come about "by a path of muddled missteps" and a "disservice to the millions of Afghans who deserved a clear and transparent tool to craft their first democratic parliament."[17] Under SNTV, candidates from the same political party competed against each other for votes rather than cooperating, structurally disadvantaging organised parties and favouring individually prominent candidates including former commanders and local power-holders.

The constitution required that at least 25 percent of Wolesi Jirga seats be held by women, with a minimum of two seats per province. Because of widespread illiteracy, ballot papers displayed candidate photographs and individually chosen symbols alongside names, allowing voters to identify candidates they could not read about.[18]

The upper house (Meshrano Jirga) was not directly elected: two-thirds of its 102 seats were filled by provincial councils, and the remaining one-third were appointed by the president, with half of the presidential appointees required to be women.[19]

Electoral administration

[edit]

The initial elections in 2004 were managed by the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB), a hybrid Afghan-international entity formed in 2003 under presidential decree. The JEMB was chaired by an Afghan official and vice-chaired by a UN representative, with logistical support from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). In the period 2002–2004 there were several transitions of institutional form—from a purely UN construct to an interim hybrid body to a more Afghan-led secretariat—before the JEMB administered the 2004 presidential and 2005 parliamentary elections.[20]

The Independent Election Commission (IEC) was formally established in 2006 as a permanent Afghan-led institution, mandated by Article 156 of the constitution to administer voter registration, candidate vetting, polling, counting, and result certification.[21] The Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) was established as a separate body to receive and adjudicate electoral complaints.[22] Together these two commissions formed the core of Afghanistan's electoral administration from 2006 until their dissolution by the Taliban in December 2021.[23]

The IEC's operations were chronically affected by underfunding, staff capacity limitations, and allegations of political interference. Almost all election costs were borne by the international community; the Afghan government contributed little to electoral financing throughout the democratic period.[24]

2004 presidential election

[edit]
Women voting in Afghanistan during the 2004 presidential election. (USAID / Wikimedia Commons)

On 9 October 2004, Afghanistan held its first direct presidential election.[25] Eighteen candidates stood, including interim leader Hamid Karzai, Yunus Qanuni of the Northern Alliance, Hazara leader Mohammed Mohaqiq, Uzbek commander Abdul Rashid Dostum, and Masooda Jalal, the only woman in the field.[26] The election was overseen by the JEMB, observed by approximately 400 international monitors from the OSCE and other organisations, and supported by UNAMA, which also organised out-of-country voting for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran.[27]

Voter registration had reached approximately 10.5 million by polling day, of whom around 41 percent were women.[28] Approximately 8.1 million votes were cast, representing around 70 percent of registered voters; the figure included over two million refugee votes from Pakistan and Iran.[29] On election day, fifteen opposing candidates announced a boycott of results, alleging that the indelible ink used to prevent multiple voting could be washed off. The United Nations agreed to convene an independent three-member panel to investigate the allegations; most candidates ultimately accepted the investigation process. The panel found that the irregularities had not materially affected the outcome.

Karzai was declared the winner on 3 November 2004 with approximately 4.4 million votes (55.4%), well above the 50 percent threshold required to avoid a runoff. Qanuni placed second with 16.3 percent, followed by Mohaqiq (11.7 percent) and Dostum (10 percent). Karzai was sworn in for a five-year term on 7 December 2004.[30]

2005 parliamentary election

[edit]

Parliamentary and provincial council elections were held on 18 September 2005. There were 2,707 candidates for the Wolesi Jirga, of whom 328 were women, and 3,185 for the provincial councils. Approximately 12 million voters were registered for the 249-seat Wolesi Jirga. Turnout was approximately 57 percent (about 6.8 million voters), lower than at the 2004 presidential election, widely attributed to voter confusion arising from the large number of candidates on each ballot and high illiteracy rates.[31] Almost all candidates ran as independents; political parties had no formal standing in the electoral law.

Final results, delayed by fraud investigations, were announced on 12 November 2005. Former commanders and their associates secured a significant share of Wolesi Jirga seats. Women won 68 of 249 seats (27.3 percent), exceeding the 25 percent constitutional minimum. Ten seats were reserved for the Kuchi (nomadic) community. Observer missions from the OSCE and EU noted concerns about proxy voting in some provinces and other irregularities. The election cost approximately $159 million, almost entirely funded by international donors.[32]

The structural effects of SNTV became apparent in this election. As Reynolds noted, the system discouraged party-based organisation: candidates of the same party competed against each other for individual votes rather than cooperating, making electoral coordination nearly impossible and tending to benefit individually prominent figures over party representatives.[33]

2009 presidential election

[edit]

Presidential and provincial council elections were held on 20 August 2009. This was the first election run by Afghan institutions rather than the UN-supported JEMB, though the United Nations Development Programme's ELECT project provided substantial technical assistance. The European Union Election Observation Mission, which deployed 120 observers and was present from July to November 2009, conducted a comprehensive assessment of the process and noted significant security limitations that restricted observer access to polling stations.[34]

The United Nations and other monitors placed first-round turnout at approximately 30–33 percent of registered voters.[35] The Electoral Complaints Commission received over 2,800 formal complaints, with the largest proportion concerning irregularities at polling stations, including ballot box stuffing and voter intimidation. Fraud investigations led to the invalidation of votes from more than 200 polling stations and ultimately the exclusion of approximately one million ballots. A Democracy International election observation mission concluded that "fraud was widespread" and that "a controversial method for determining the final results further undermined the integrity of the election."[36]

The main candidates were incumbent President Karzai and former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah. Preliminary results gave Karzai approximately 54 percent, but after the invalidation of fraudulent ballots his total fell below the 50 percent threshold, making a runoff legally required. The IFES election guide noted that 3,093,256 first-count votes had been attributed to Karzai before the audit-driven reductions.[37] Under sustained international pressure, Karzai agreed on 20 October 2009 to contest a second round against Abdullah. On 1 November, Abdullah withdrew, citing the Karzai government's refusal to reform the IEC leadership and stating that a fair contest was not possible. The IEC cancelled the runoff on 2 November 2009 and declared Karzai the winner of a second term.[38] Abdullah said the appointment had "no legal basis."

The 2009 election severely damaged the credibility of Afghan electoral institutions. The scale of documented fraud led to sustained international pressure for reform, though few structural changes were implemented before the 2010 parliamentary elections.[39]

2010 parliamentary election

[edit]

Parliamentary elections were held on 18 September 2010. In the preceding weeks, the Taliban distributed night letters in several areas threatening to amputate the ink-marked fingers of anyone who voted, deterring participation in parts of the south and east.[40] More than 2,600 candidates stood, including more than 400 women.

In late November 2010, the IEC disqualified 21 candidates for alleged fraud, 19 of whom had been winning or leading their races based on partial results. The Wolesi Jirga was eventually inaugurated in January 2011 after a protracted certification process. Women's participation in this election cycle, as in 2004 and 2009, was estimated at approximately 40 percent of votes cast, according to pre-election assessments by election monitoring organisations.[41]

2014 presidential election

[edit]

A presidential election was held on 5 April 2014, the first in which Hamid Karzai was constitutionally ineligible to stand due to term limits. Eleven candidates contested the first round. According to the IFES Election Guide, Abdullah received 45.00 percent (2,972,141 votes) and Ghani 31.56 percent (2,084,547 votes) in the first round, with approximately 6.6 million votes cast overall and turnout of approximately 57 percent of registered voters.[42]

The runoff on 14 June 2014 produced initial tallies showing Ghani with approximately 56 percent, but the result was immediately contested by Abdullah, who cited a suspicious increase of approximately 1.3 million votes compared to the first round in Ghani's base areas. Following mediation by US Secretary of State John Kerry in July 2014, the two candidates agreed to an unprecedented full audit of all ballots cast in the runoff—approximately 8 million votes across some 23,000 polling stations—facilitated by UNAMA and other international experts.[43] A Democracy International observer mission concluded that the audit was "imperfect, but the process revealed that it was much harder to find evidence of fraud in this election compared to previous elections."[44]

On 19 September 2014, the IEC announced Ghani as the winner. The political crisis was resolved through a power-sharing agreement establishing a National Unity Government, with Ghani as president and Abdullah as Chief Executive—a position that had no basis in the constitution. A United Nations Secretary-General report to the Security Council characterised the prolonged electoral process as having "exacerbated economic uncertainty, emboldened spoilers and increased popular disenchantment."[45]

2018 parliamentary election

[edit]

Parliamentary elections were held on 20 October 2018, having been postponed from their original date of 15 October 2016 due to security concerns and disputes over electoral reform. Results took approximately six months to certify. Following allegations of fraud and mismanagement, President Ghani dismissed all IEC and ECC commissioners by executive order in February 2019 and appointed replacements, with the eighteen registered presidential candidates submitting a pool of nominees from which new commissioners were drawn. The new Parliament was inaugurated on 26 April 2019.[46]

2019 presidential election

[edit]
Afghan air force helicopters delivering election materials during the 2009 election cycle, a logistical challenge common to all Afghan election periods. (DVIDS / Wikimedia Commons)

Presidential elections were held on 28 September 2019 against the backdrop of ongoing Taliban violence, a stalled US-Taliban peace process, and accumulated public disillusionment with electoral institutions. The Taliban carried out multiple attacks during the campaign period, including a suicide bombing at a Ghani campaign rally on 17 September 2019 that killed 26 people. On election day, approximately 1.6 million people voted from a registered electorate of 9.7 million—a turnout of under 20 percent, the lowest in Afghan electoral history.[47] A USIP analysis described the combination of worsening security, polling centre closures, tighter voter registration requirements, and low campaign mobilisation as having produced Afghan participation "at the lowest levels observed in the past fifteen years."[48]

The 2019 election was the first to deploy biometric voter verification devices intended to reduce multiple voting. Approximately one million of the initial 2.7 million votes were subsequently purged for lacking corresponding biometric data, leaving 1.8 million valid ballots.[49] Preliminary results announced on 22 December 2019 gave Ghani 50.64 percent. Final results confirmed on 18 February 2020 declared Ghani the winner with 923,592 votes (50.64 percent) against Abdullah's 39.52 percent.[50]

Abdullah rejected the results and held a parallel inauguration ceremony on 9 March 2020, the same day Ghani was officially sworn in for a second term.[citation needed] The resulting constitutional crisis was resolved on 16 May 2020 through a power-sharing agreement in which Ghani remained president and Abdullah was assigned to lead peace negotiations with the Taliban.[51] On 15 August 2021, Ghani fled Afghanistan as Taliban forces entered Kabul, ending the Islamic Republic's existence.[52]

Taliban rule (2021–present)

[edit]

Following the fall of Kabul on 15 August 2021, the Taliban re-established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. On 25 December 2021, Taliban spokesman Bilal Karimi announced the dissolution of both the IEC and the ECC, stating that they were "unnecessary institutes for the current situation in Afghanistan" and adding that the Taliban "will revive these commissions, if we feel a need." The Taliban simultaneously dissolved the Ministry for Peace and the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs. The IEC had employed 582 full-time staff across its central and provincial offices; more than 1,000 people across all four dissolved institutions lost their posts.[53][54]

Halim Fidai, who had served as governor of four provinces under the Islamic Republic, said the dissolution showed the Taliban "does not believe in democracy," adding that they "get power through bullets and not ballots."[55]

In May 2022, when asked whether elections would be held, First Deputy Leader Sirajuddin Haqqani characterised the question as "premature."[56] In August 2023, the Taliban formally banned all political parties, citing violations of sharia law.[57] As of 2026, no elections have been scheduled and no electoral institutions exist within Afghanistan.

Electoral system under the Islamic Republic

[edit]

Presidential elections

[edit]

Presidential elections used a two-round system. A candidate required more than 50 percent of valid votes to win in the first round; if no candidate achieved that threshold, the top two candidates competed in a runoff, constitutionally required to be held within two weeks. Presidential terms were fixed at five years with a two-term limit; the president held the executive authority with no prime ministerial check. The constitution's highly centralised presidential structure, as the USIP noted, "significantly heightened the stakes for a presidential electoral win or loss" and produced only one constitutional transfer of power—from Karzai to Ghani in 2014 through term limits rather than electoral defeat.[58]

Parliamentary elections

[edit]

Members of the Wolesi Jirga were elected using SNTV in 34 multi-member provincial constituencies. Each voter cast a single non-transferable vote for one candidate; the candidates with the most individual votes in each province won seats in proportion to the province's population. The number of seats per province ranged from two (in less populous provinces) to thirty-three (for Kabul). Under SNTV, political parties could not pool candidate votes, making it structurally rational for candidates to run as independents regardless of party affiliation, as the 2005 results confirmed. Both President Karzai (2004–2014) and President Ghani (2014–2021) declined to reform the SNTV system despite sustained elite pressure for change, passing successive electoral laws by presidential decree in ways that, according to constitution scholars, weakened the parliament relative to the executive.[59]

Women's reserved seats

[edit]

The 2004 Constitution required that at least 25 percent of Wolesi Jirga seats be held by women, with a minimum of two seats per province. Women exceeded this constitutional minimum in the 2005 elections, winning 68 of 249 seats (27.3 percent). Reserved seats were also mandated for provincial councils and the Meshrano Jirga.[60]

Voter participation

[edit]

Turnout in Afghan elections under the Islamic Republic declined significantly across successive cycles. The 2004 presidential election attracted approximately 70 percent of registered voters. By 2019, turnout had fallen to below 20 percent. The USIP's analysis of 2019 results attributed the decline to worsening security, tighter voter registration requirements, polling centre closures, and "modest campaign mobilisation efforts," together generating the lowest participation levels in fifteen years of Afghan elections.[61]

Women's participation in elections was substantially lower than men's in most cycles, suppressed by security concerns, conservative cultural norms, and an insufficient number of female polling staff. Women's participation expanded in the 2004, 2009, and 2010 elections, reaching approximately 40 percent of votes cast in those cycles, according to pre-election analysis by the USIP and monitoring organisations.[62] In the 2019 election, the IEC reported that 31 percent of valid votes were cast by women.[63]

Regional disparities in participation were pronounced throughout the democratic period. Southern and eastern provinces, where Taliban influence was strongest, consistently recorded lower turnout, fewer open polling centres, and higher rates of election-day violence. Out-of-country voting for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran was conducted only in the 2004 presidential election; subsequent efforts to organise refugee voting were abandoned due to estimated costs of $50 million for Iran and Pakistan alone and logistical concerns about host-country cooperation.[64]

Fraud and electoral integrity

[edit]

Electoral fraud was documented in all seven elections held between 2004 and 2019. Common forms included ballot stuffing, proxy voting (in which a male relative cast ballots on behalf of female family members), the use of multiple voter registration cards, and the supply of fraudulent ballots by local strongmen. Conservative Pashtun districts used a proxy registration system for women voters that was, according to Steve Coll, "particularly susceptible to fraud."[65]

Indelible ink used to prevent multiple voting proved removable with soap or detergents in 2004 and again in 2009. Biometric verification devices, introduced in 2019 to address this problem, generated new complications: mismatched voter lists and device malfunctions resulted in approximately one million ballots lacking biometric records and therefore being invalidated.[66]

In the 2009 and 2014 presidential elections, the margin of documented fraud exceeded the margin of apparent victory, requiring extensive internationally supervised audits in both cases. In 2014, the IEC's chief electoral officer was detained while leaving IEC headquarters with tens of thousands of unmarked ballots, and recorded phone conversations purportedly showed discussions of ballot box stuffing involving IEC officials and a member of one campaign team.[67] A full audit of the runoff ballots was completed but did not resolve the dispute electorally; the final outcome was determined by political negotiation rather than the audit result.[68]

International observation

[edit]

All elections under the Islamic Republic were observed by international monitors, though observer access was limited in later cycles by security conditions. The OSCE provided electoral support teams for elections in 2004, 2005, 2009, 2010, and 2014. The European Union deployed an Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) to the 2009 elections, deploying 120 observers and issuing a comprehensive final report documenting security limitations, fraud patterns, and procedural weaknesses. The EU EOM's 2009 report noted that the IEC's institutional capacity had been hampered by the international community's delay in addressing logistical needs for the election until late 2008.[69]

UNAMA played a central administrative role in the 2004 election and monitoring roles in subsequent cycles. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), Democracy International, and the Carter Center also provided observation and technical support. For the 2014 election, the UN Secretary-General rapidly deployed over 123 electoral experts from across the UN system to assist in supervising the ballot audit, which involved in excess of 8 million votes.[70]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ↑ "Taliban Dissolves Afghanistan's Election Commission, Saying 'There Is No Need'". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 25 December 2021. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  2. ↑ "Taliban-run government dissolves Afghan election commissions". PBS NewsHour. 26 December 2021. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  3. ↑ Gul, Ayaz (16 August 2023). "Taliban Ban Afghan Political Parties, Citing Sharia Violations". Voice of America. Retrieved 13 December 2023.
  4. ↑ Rubin, Barnett R. (2002). The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (2nd ed.). Yale University Press. pp. 50–52. ISBN 9780300095197.
  5. ↑ Rubin, Barnett R. (2002). The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (2nd ed.). Yale University Press. pp. 58–60. ISBN 9780300095197.
  6. ↑ Wayne, Tiffany K., ed. (2020). Women's Suffrage: The Complete Guide to the Nineteenth Amendment. ABC-CLIO. p. 77. ISBN 9781440871993.
  7. ↑ Sankey, Margaret D. (2018). Women and War in the 21st Century: A Country-by-Country Guide. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-1440857669.
  8. ↑ Rubin, Barnett R. (2002). The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (2nd ed.). Yale University Press. p. 74. ISBN 9780300095197.
  9. ↑ Rubin, Barnett R. (2002). The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (2nd ed.). Yale University Press. pp. 74–76. ISBN 9780300095197.
  10. ↑ Rubin, Barnett R. (2002). The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (2nd ed.). Yale University Press. pp. 76–77. ISBN 9780300095197.
  11. ↑ Rubin, Barnett R. (2002). The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (2nd ed.). Yale University Press. pp. 85–90. ISBN 9780300095197.
  12. ↑ Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan and its Aftermath (PDF) (Report). International Journal of Advanced Research in Humanities and Social Sciences. February 2025. p. 3.
  13. ↑ A Guide to Intra-state Wars: An Examination of Civil, Regional, and Intercommunal Wars, 1816–2014 (Report). CQ Press / SAGE Publications. 2016. p. 256.
  14. ↑ Why Did Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan After 1979 Fail so Miserably? (PDF) (Report). David Publishing Company. March 2022. pp. 244–245.
  15. 1 2 3 4 The Europa World Year Book 2003. Europa Publications. 2003. p. 400. ISBN 9781857432275.
  16. ↑ Reynolds, Andrew (April 2006). "Electoral Systems Today: The Curious Case of Afghanistan". Journal of Democracy. 17 (2): 104–117. doi:10.1353/jod.2006.0036.
  17. ↑ Reynolds, Andrew (April 2006). "Electoral Systems Today: The Curious Case of Afghanistan". Journal of Democracy. 17 (2): 104–105. doi:10.1353/jod.2006.0036.
  18. ↑ Coll, Steve (2018). Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Penguin Press. pp. 652–653. ISBN 9781594204586.
  19. ↑ Afghanistan Parliamentary Elections 18 September 2005: OSCE/ODIHR Election Support Team Report (Report). Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 3 March 2006. p. 5.
  20. ↑ "Afghanistan: An Electoral Management Body Evolves". ACE Electoral Knowledge Network. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  21. ↑ Post-Election Strategy Group (PESG) Progress Report (PDF) (Report). ACE Electoral Knowledge Network. September 2005. p. 6.
  22. ↑ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Final Report: Presidential and Provincial Council Elections (Report). European Union Election Observation Mission. December 2009. pp. 18–20.
  23. ↑ Afghanistan: Assessment of the Legislative Framework for Elections (Report). United Nations Human Rights Council. April 2024. p. 11.
  24. ↑ "The Absent Voters of Afghanistan: Challenges and Prospects for the Enfranchisement of Migrants". International IDEA. 2021. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  25. ↑ Afghanistan Presidential Election 9 October 2004: OSCE/ODIHR Election Support Team Report (PDF) (Report). Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 17 December 2004. p. 1.
  26. ↑ Afghanistan: From Presidential to Parliamentary Elections (PDF) (Report). International Crisis Group. 23 November 2004. p. 31.
  27. ↑ The 2004 Presidential Election in Afghanistan (Report). European Union Election Observation Mission. October 2004. pp. 5–7.
  28. ↑ "Fact Sheet: Elections in Afghanistan". White House Archives. 8 October 2004. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  29. ↑ "Afghanistan: The Culmination of the Bonn Process" (PDF). House of Commons Library Research Paper RP05-72. 2005. pp. 14–15. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  30. ↑ "Afghanistan: Elections, Constitution, and Government" (PDF). Congressional Research Service. 2006. pp. 3–4. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  31. ↑ "Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance" (PDF). Congressional Research Service (Defense Technical Information Center). 2006. pp. 4–5. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  32. ↑ "Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance" (PDF). Congressional Research Service (Defense Technical Information Center). 2006. pp. 4–5. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  33. ↑ Reynolds, Andrew (April 2006). "Electoral Systems Today: The Curious Case of Afghanistan". Journal of Democracy. 17 (2): 110–112. doi:10.1353/jod.2006.0036.
  34. ↑ "EU EOM Afghanistan 2009: Final Report". European Union Election Observation Mission. December 2009. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  35. ↑ "Afghanistan: AIHRC-UNAMA Joint Monitoring of Political Rights, Presidential and Provincial Council Elections, Third Report, 1 Aug–21 Oct 2009". UNAMA. 21 October 2009. Retrieved 26 June 2023.
  36. ↑ "U.S. Election Observation Mission to the Afghanistan Presidential and Provincial Council Elections 2009" (PDF). Democracy International. 2010. pp. 1–2. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  37. ↑ "IFES Election Guide: Afghan Presidency 2014 Round 2". International Foundation for Electoral Systems. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  38. ↑ Cooper, Helene; Zeleny, Jeff (2 November 2009). "Obama Warns Karzai to Focus on Tackling Corruption". The New York Times. Retrieved 26 June 2023.
  39. ↑ "Timeline: Afghanistan's 2009 presidential election". France 24. 16 October 2009. Retrieved 25 June 2026.
  40. ↑ "Taliban Plans Attacks to Disrupt Afghan Vote". Bloomberg. 16 September 2010. Retrieved 26 June 2023.
  41. ↑ "Afghanistan's Parliamentary Vote: A Canary in the Presidential Poll Mine". ReliefWeb / U.S. Institute of Peace. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  42. ↑ "IFES Election Guide: Afghan Presidency 2014 Round 2". International Foundation for Electoral Systems. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  43. ↑ "Understanding Afghanistan's 2014 Presidential Election" (PDF). United States Institute of Peace Special Report 370. 2014. pp. 3–5. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  44. ↑ "Afghanistan Election Observation Mission 2014: Final Report" (PDF). Democracy International. January 2015. p. 41. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  45. ↑ "The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General" (PDF). United Nations Security Council. 9 September 2014. p. 10. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  46. ↑ "Assessing Afghanistan's 2019 Presidential Election" (PDF). United States Institute of Peace Peaceworks No. 166. 2020. pp. 8–9. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  47. ↑ "Ashraf Ghani Declared Winner of Afghanistan's Presidential Election". Al Jazeera. 18 February 2020. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  48. ↑ "Assessing Afghanistan's 2019 Presidential Election" (PDF). United States Institute of Peace Peaceworks No. 166. 2020. pp. 1–2. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  49. ↑ "Afghan Presidential Election Outcome Remains in Limbo as Results Are Delayed". The Washington Post. 19 October 2019. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  50. ↑ "Ashraf Ghani Declared Winner of Afghanistan's Presidential Election". Al Jazeera. 18 February 2020. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  51. ↑ "Rival leaders Ghani and Abdullah in power-sharing deal". BBC News. 17 May 2020.
  52. ↑ "Afghan president Ghani flees country as Taliban enter Kabul". The Edition. Associated Press / Agence France-Presse. 15 August 2021.
  53. ↑ "Taliban Dissolves Afghanistan's Election Commission, Saying 'There Is No Need'". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 25 December 2021. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  54. ↑ "'No need': Taliban Dissolves Afghanistan Election Commission". Al Jazeera. 25 December 2021. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  55. ↑ "'No need': Taliban Dissolves Afghanistan Election Commission". Al Jazeera. 25 December 2021. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  56. ↑ Amanpour, Christiane [@amanpour] (17 May 2022). "The Taliban govt in Afghanistan is far from inclusive in its leadership" (Tweet). Retrieved 19 June 2022 – via Twitter.
  57. ↑ Gul, Ayaz (16 August 2023). "Taliban Ban Afghan Political Parties, Citing Sharia Violations". Voice of America. Retrieved 13 December 2023.
  58. ↑ "Assessing Afghanistan's 2019 Presidential Election" (PDF). United States Institute of Peace Peaceworks No. 166. 2020. pp. 3–4. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  59. ↑ "Representation: Views from the Ground Up" (PDF). International IDEA / ConstitutionNet. 2023. pp. 4–5. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  60. ↑ Barriers to Greater Participation by Women in Afghan Elections (PDF) (Report). United States Government Publishing Office. March 2011. p. 3.
  61. ↑ "Assessing Afghanistan's 2019 Presidential Election" (PDF). United States Institute of Peace Peaceworks No. 166. 2020. p. 1. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  62. ↑ "Afghanistan's Parliamentary Vote: A Canary in the Presidential Poll Mine". ReliefWeb. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  63. ↑ "Preliminary Tally Shows Afghanistan's Ghani Winning Election". France 24. 22 December 2019. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  64. ↑ "The Absent Voters of Afghanistan". International IDEA. 2021. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  65. ↑ Coll, Steve (2018). Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Penguin Press. p. 381. ISBN 9781594204586.
  66. ↑ Panahi, Kobra; Simko, Lucy; Kohno, Tadayoshi (August 2024). "But they have overlooked a few things in Afghanistan:" An Analysis of the Biometric Voter Verification System in the 2019 Afghanistan Presidential Election (PDF). 33rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 24). USENIX Association. pp. 4337–4354.
  67. ↑ "Can Afghanistan Survive Its Presidential Election?". Foreign Policy Research Institute. August 2014. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  68. ↑ "Understanding Afghanistan's 2014 Presidential Election" (PDF). USIP Special Report 370. 2014. pp. 4–5. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  69. ↑ "EU EOM Afghanistan 2009: Final Report". European Union Election Observation Mission. December 2009. Retrieved 1 June 2025.
  70. ↑ "Report of the Secretary-General: The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security" (PDF). United Nations Security Council Document S/2014/656. 9 September 2014. pp. 9–10. Retrieved 1 June 2025.

Further reading

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