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Convoy QP 13

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(Redirected from QP 13)

Convoy PQ 13
Part of Arctic Convoys of the Second World War

German occupied Norway (in green) lay along the flank of the sea route to northern Russia
Date26 June – 7 July 1942
Location
The Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea
Belligerents
Commanders and leaders
Units involved
Convoy and escorts
  • Reconnaissance aircraft
  • 2 U-boats
Strength
36 Merchant ships
  • Reconnaissance aircraft
  • 2 U-boats
Casualties and losses
  • 173 merchant sailors killed
  • 4 merchant ships sunk
  • 2 merchant ships damaged
  • 1 escort sunk

Convoy QP 13 was an Arctic convoy of the PQ–QP series that ran during the Second World War. It was the thirteenth of the numbered series of convoys of merchant ships westbound from the Arctic ports of Arkhangelsk and Murmansk to Britain, Iceland and North America.

Background

[edit]

Lend-lease

[edit]

The Soviet leaders needed to replace the colossal losses of military equipment lost after the German invasion, especially when Soviet war industries were being moved out of the war zone and emphasised tank and aircraft deliveries. Machine tools, steel and aluminium was needed to replace indigenous resources lost in the invasion. The pressure on the civilian sector of the economy needed to be limited by food deliveries. The Soviets wanted to concentrate the resources that remained on items that the Soviet war economy had the greatest comparative advantage over the German economy. Aluminium imports allowed aircraft production to a far greater extent than would have been possible using local sources and tank production was emphasised at the expense of lorries and food supplies were squeezed by reliance on what could be obtained from lend–lease. At the Moscow Conference, it was acknowledged that 1.5 million tons of shipping was needed to transport the supplies of the First Protocol and that Soviet sources could provide less than 10 per cent of the carrying capacity.[1]

The British and Americans accepted that the onus was on them to find most of the shipping, despite their commitments in other theatres. The Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, made a promise to send a convoy to the Arctic ports of the USSR every ten days and to deliver 1,200 tanks a month from July 1942 to January 1943, followed by 2,000 tanks and another 3,600 aircraft more than already promised.[2] In November, the US president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, ordered Admiral Emory Land of the US Maritime Commission and then the head of the War Shipping Administration that deliveries to Russia should only be limited by 'insurmountable difficulties'.[1] The first convoy was due at Murmansk around 12 October and the next convoy was to depart Iceland on 22 October. A motley of British, Allied and neutral shipping loaded with military stores and raw materials for the Soviet war effort would be assembled at Hvalfjörður in Iceland, convenient for ships from both sides of the Atlantic.[3]

From Operation Dervish to Convoy PQ 11, the supplies to the USSR were mostly British, in British ships defended by the Royal Navy. A fighter force that could defend Murmansk was delivered that protected the Arctic ports and railways into the hinterland.[4] Before September 1941 the British had dispatched 450 aircraft, 22,000 long tons (22,000 t) of rubber, 3,000,000 pairs of boots and stocks of tin, aluminium, jute, lead and wool. In September representatives from Britain and the United States travelled to Moscow to study Soviet requirements and their ability to meet them. The representatives of the three countries drew up a protocol in October 1941 to last until June 1942.[5] British supplied aircraft and tanks reinforced the Russian defences of Leningrad and Moscow from December 1941. The tanks and aircraft did not save Moscow but were important in the Soviet counter-offensive. The Luftwaffe was by then reduced to 600 operational aircraft on the Eastern Front, to an extent a consequence of Luftflotte 2 being sent to the Mediterranean against the British. Tanks and aircraft supplied by the British helped the Soviet counter-offensive force push the Germans further back than might have been possible. In January and February 1941, deliveries of tanks and aircraft allowed the Russians to have a margin of safety should the Germans attempt to counter-attack.[4]

Signals intelligence

[edit]

Ultra

[edit]
Russian map showing Arctic convoy routes from Britain and Iceland, past Norway to the Barents Sea and northern Russian ports

The British Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) based at Bletchley Park housed a small industry of code-breakers and traffic analysts. By June 1941, the German Enigma machine Home Waters (Heimish) settings used by surface ships and U-boats could quickly be read. On 1 February 1942, the Enigma machines used in U-boats in the Atlantic and Mediterranean were changed but German ships and the U-boats in Arctic waters continued with the older Heimish Home Hydra from 1942, Dolphin to the British). By mid-1941, British Y-stations were able to receive and read Luftwaffe W/T transmissions and give advance warning of Luftwaffe operations. In 1941, naval Headache personnel with receivers to eavesdrop on Luftwaffe wireless transmissions were embarked on warships.[6]

B-Dienst

[edit]

The rival German Beobachtungsdienst (B-Dienst, Observation Service) of the Kriegsmarine Marinenachrichtendienst (MND, Naval Intelligence Service) had broken several Admiralty codes and cyphers by 1939, which were used to help Kriegsmarine ships elude British forces and provide opportunities for surprise attacks. From June to August 1940, six British submarines were sunk in the Skaggerak using information gleaned from British wireless signals. In 1941, B-Dienst read signals from the Commander in Chief Western Approaches informing convoys of areas patrolled by U-boats, enabling the submarines to move into "safe" zones.[7]

Arctic Ocean

[edit]
Diagram of the Arctic Ocean

Between Greenland and Norway are some of the most stormy waters of the world's oceans, 890 mi (1,440 km) of water under gales of snow, sleet and hail.[8] The cold Arctic water was met by the Gulf Stream, warm water from the Gulf of Mexico, which became the North Atlantic Drift. Arriving at the south-west of England the drift moves between Scotland and Iceland; north of Norway the drift splits. One stream bears north of Bear Island to Svalbard and a southern stream follows the coast of Murmansk into the Barents Sea. The mingling of cold Arctic water and warmer water of higher salinity generates thick banks of fog for convoys to hide in but the waters drastically reduced the effectiveness of ASDIC as U-boats moved in waters of differing temperatures and density.[8]

In winter, polar ice can form as far south as 50 mi (80 km) off the North Cape and in summer it can recede to Svalbard. The area is in perpetual darkness in winter and permanent daylight in the summer and can make air reconnaissance almost impossible.[8] Around the North Cape and in the Barents Sea the sea temperature rarely rises about 4 °C (39 °F) and a man in the water will die unless rescued immediately.[8] The cold water and air makes spray freeze on the superstructure of ships, which has to be removed quickly to avoid the ship becoming top-heavy. Conditions in U-boats were, if anything, worse the boats having to submerge in warmer water to rid the superstructure of ice. Crewmen on watch were exposed to the elements, oil lost its viscosity and nuts froze and sheared off bolts. Heaters in the hull were too demanding of current and could not be run continuously.[9]

Prelude

[edit]

Kriegsmarine

[edit]

German naval forces in Norway were commanded by Hermann Böhm, the Kommandierender Admiral Norwegen. Two U-boats were based in Norway in July 1941, four in September, five in December and four in January 1942.[10] Hitler contemplated establishing a unified command but decided against it. The German battleship Tirpitz arrived at Trondheim on 16 January, the first ship of a general move of surface ships to Norway. British convoys to Russia had received little attention in 1941, since they averaged only eight ships each and the long Arctic winter nights negated even the limited Luftwaffe reconnaissance effort that was available.[11] On 20 February, the cruisers Prinz Eugen and Admiral Scheer arrived at Trondheim, followed in March by the cruisers Admiral Hipper and Lutzow. The transfer of more U-boats to Norway in 1942 along with the ships allowed the Kriegsmarine to contemplate more ambitious operations against Arctic convoys.[12]

In May, despite the increased number of aircraft available to Luftflotte V, Marine Group Command Nord was sceptical of the ability to find the British distant escorts, despite the better weather at this time of year, because of the area of sea to be covered. Knowledge of the British dispositions was necessary if the big German ships were to be risked against a convoy. Generaladmiral Otto Schniewind, the Flottenchef (Fleet Commander) stressed to Raeder that June was the best month for an operation with its longer hours of daylight and the expectation that the Allies would make a special effort to get supplies to the USSR. SKL and Hubert Schmundt, the Admiral Eismeer agreed that the Allied effort should be met with equal determination. When the next convoy operaaation, the reciprocal Convoy PQ 17–Convoy QP 13 was found, Marine Group Command Nord wanted the ships at Trondheim to transfer to Narvik for a joint attack on Convoy PQ 17, as U-boats followed the convoy.[12]

In Unternehmen Rösselsprung (Operation Knight's Move) the ships would race to the convoy, attack and withdraw before the distant escort and the Home Fleet could intervene. Tirpitz and Admiral Hipper would deal with the close escorts and the other ships would attack the convoy, disabled ships being left for the U-boats to sink later. Success would justify the fuel consumed and the danger of Allied submarines was judged to be no more than that of torpedo attack by destroyers. Hitler was told of the plan on 5 June and ordered that planning was to continue. On 8 June, SKL and Marine Group Command Nord accepted the plan but the command arrangements were as convoluted as ever and Luftflotte V disagreed with its aircraft being diverted to reconnaissance.[13]

Luftflotte 5

[edit]
A Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Kondor of KG 40

In mid-1941, Luftflotte 5 (Air Fleet 5) had been re-organised for Operation Barbarossa with Luftgau Norwegen (Air Region Norway) headquartered in Oslo. Fliegerführer Stavanger (Air Commander Stavanger) the centre and north of Norway, Jagdfliegerführer Norwegen (Fighter Leader Norway) commanded the fighter force and Fliegerführer Kerkenes (Oberst [colonel] Andreas Nielsen) in the far north had airfields at Kirkenes and Banak. The Air Fleet had 180 aircraft, sixty of which were reserved for operations on the Karelian Front against the Red Army.[14]

The distance from Banak to Arkhangelsk was 560 mi (900 km) and Fliegerführer Kerkenes had only ten Junkers Ju 88 bombers of Kampfgeschwader 30, thirty Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers ten Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters of Jagdgeschwader 77, five Messerschmitt Bf 110 heavy fighters of Zerstörergeschwader 76, ten reconnaissance aircraft and an anti-aircraft battalion. Sixty aircraft were far from adequate in such a climate and terrain where

...there is no favourable season for operations. (Earl Ziemke [1959] in Claasen [2001])[15]

The emphasis of air operations changed from army support to anti-shipping operations only after March 1942, when Allied Arctic convoys becoming larger and more frequent coincided with the reinforcement of Norway with ships and aircraft and the less extreme climatic conditions of the Arctic summer.[14]

Arctic convoys

[edit]

A convoy was defined as at least one merchant ship sailing under the protection of at least one warship.[16] At first the British had intended to run convoys to Russia on a forty-day cycle (the number of days between convoy departures) during the winter of 1941–1942, but this was shortened to a ten-day cycle. The round trip to Murmansk for warships was three weeks and each convoy needed a cruiser and two destroyers, which severely depleted the Home Fleet. Convoys left port and rendezvoused with the escorts at sea. A cruiser provided distant cover from a position to the west of Bear Island. Air support was limited to 330 Squadron and 269 Squadron of RAF Coastal Command from Iceland, with some help from anti-submarine patrols along the coast of Norway from RAF Sullom Voe in Shetland. Anti-submarine trawlers escorted the convoys on the first part of the outward voyage. Built for Arctic conditions, the trawlers were coal-burning ships and had sufficient endurance. The trawlers were commanded by their peacetime crews and captains with the rank of Skipper, Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) who were used to Arctic conditions, supplied by anti-submarine specialists of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR).[17] British minesweepers based at Arkhangelsk met the convoys to join the escort for the remainder of the voyage.[18]

Convoy QP 13

[edit]

The convoy consisted of 35 merchant ships, part of which departed from Arkhangelsk on 26 June, joining with a second contingent from Murmansk on 28 June, most of the ships being those that had arrived in Convoy PQ 16. The convoy commodore was Captain. Newell Gale Royal Navy Reserve (RNR) was the convoy commodore, in Empire Selwyn. Most of the ships were returning empty after delivering war material to the Soviet Union but some Soviet ships carried cargoes of export timber. The eastern local escort from 26 to 28 June consisted of Grozny, Gremyaschi and Kuibyshev with the Halcyon-class minesweepers HMS Bramble, HMS Hazard, HMS Leda and HMS Seagull.[19]

The ocean escort for the convoy was, from 26 to 28 June, the submarine HMS Trident, from 26 June to 3 July, the destroyers, HMS Inglefield and Intrepid, to 5 July the minesweeper Niger, to 7 July the destroyers Achates Garland, and Volunteer, minesweeper Hussar and the corvettes Honeysuckle, Hyderabad, Roselys and Starwort with the anti-aircraft cruiser HMS Alynbank and the trawlers HMT Lady Madeleine and St Elstan.[19]

The convoy sailed simultaneously with eastbound Convoy PQ 17 for both convoys to benefit from the heavy covering force of the British aircraft carrier HMS Victorious, the battleship HMS Duke of York, the cruisers HMS Cumberland and Nigeria and the destroyers HMS Ashanti, Douglas, Faulknor, Marne, Martin, Onslaught and Onslow with the United States Navy battleship USS Washington and destroyers USS Mayrant and Rhind. The covering force was commanded by Admiral John Tovey aboard the flagship Duke of York.[20] Force Q, the tanker RFA Gray Ranger and its escort the destroyer HMS Douglas cruised near Jan Mayen to fuel the home Fleet destroyers and then join Convoy QP 13 for the voyage home.

Voyage

[edit]

26 June − 3 July

[edit]
Intrepid, one of five destroyers escorting Convoy QP 13

The twelve ships of the Arkhangelsk section of the convoy departed on 26 June 1942, with the Eastern local escort. The local escort was replaced in relays by the Ocean escort (Senior Officer Escort, Commander Percy Todd) and the Murmansk section of the convoy joined on 28 June. Inglefield and Intrepid carried survivors from HMS Edinburgh, sunk on 2 May during Convoy QP 11, other survivors had joined the Polish destroyer Garland. Overcast and fog in the Barents Sea left the convoy dependent on dead reckoning navigation On 30 June German air reconnaissance found the convoy 180 mi (290 km) north of the North Cape (Nordkapp).[21]

Reconnaissance aircraft and the U-boat, U-88, were shadowing the convoy by 2 July, the day that the convoy crossed with Convoy PQ 17. Force Q, the tanker RFA Gray Ranger and its destroyer, HMS Douglas, transferred to Convoy QP 13. Later in the day, the Admiralty passed instructions that the convoy was to divide, 19 ships for Loch Ewe and 16 mainly US ships to Hvalfjörður. The Admiral Nordmeer, Hubert Schmundt, ordered German forces of Unternehmen Rösselsprung to ignore the empty westbound ships and concentrate on Convoy PQ 17.[20] On 3 July, Garland, Inglefield and Intrepid were ordered by the Admiralty to reconnoitre to the south for Tirpitz, whose position was unknown to the British but nothing was found.[22]

4 July

[edit]
Map showing Svalbard, Bear Island and Jan Mayen

On 4 July the convoy came close to the north Icelandic coast and divided according to the Admiralty instructions of 2 July. Gale and 19 ships altered course for Loch Ewe and arrived after an uneventful journey. Most of the ships due to dock at Hvalfjörður were of the US merchant ships and Captain J. Hiss of American Robin took over as Convoy Commodore, escorted by Inglefield and Intrepid with Niger, Roselys, St Elstan and Lady Madeleine, the Senior Officer escort being the captain of Niger Commander A. J. Cubison.[23]

5−7 July

[edit]

Early on 5 July, Inglefield and Intrepid detached from the convoy to fuel at Seyðisfjörður on the east coast of Iceland. The convoy ran into fog on 5 and as the convoy closed on Straumnes on the Westfjords peninsula, at the north-west of Iceland on the Denmark Strait, Hiss organised the ships into five columns that headed south-west, rolling and pitching, the waves driven by a gale blowing from the north-east. The sky was overcast and the last fix of position was 72 hours old.[23] At 7:10 p.m. Cubison suggested to Hiss that the ships form two columns, to pass between Straumnes and minefield SN72, at the entrance to the Denmark Strait to the north-west that had been laid one month earlier.[19]

Map of Iceland, the Westfiords Peninsula to the north-west (enlargeable)

Hiss had not been briefed about the minefield, the diversion having not been planned before the convoy sailed. An hour later, Cubison estimated by taking soundings that he was at 66°45′N, 22°22′W, north-west of Straumnes.[24] The ships turned south-west to a course of 222° to head for Straumnes Point, Hussar keeping behind Niger with the convoy in sight, as Niger advanced to reach the coast. At 10:00 p.m. the bridge crew saw what they thought was the North Cape at 150° land 1 nmi (1.9 km; 1.2 mi) ahead and ordered a turn to 270° (west) but they had seen an iceberg, that had been difficult to make out in the mist. After forty minutes, Niger ran into the minefield and exploded, 119 men of the 127 crew being killed.[25]

Cubison had managed to signal to Hiss to turn back to a south-west course and other ships set off mines before he was killed. The merchant crews thought that they were being attacked by U-boats or bombarded by a surface raider. Hybert, Massmar, Heffron and Rodina were sunk, Exterminator and John Randolph was damaged. As the convoy was plunged into confusion the surviving escorts possessed Admiralty charts showing the minefield and entered it to begin rescuing the survivors. The Free French Roselys (Lieutenant de vaissaeau A. Bergeret) stayed behind and searched the minefield for more than six hours, rescuing 179 men. The captain of Hussar had got a fix and with St Elstan and Lady Madeleine, guided the surviving ships southwards and arrived at Reykjavík on 7 July.[19]

Aftermath

[edit]

Analysis

[edit]

The Flag Officer Commanding, Iceland (C), Rear-Admiral Frederick Dalrymple-Hamilton, concluded that the catastrophe was caused by the late change of plan, putting Hiss into an impossible position about the conditions off north-west Iceland and no plan made by the Senior Officer escort and the convoy commodore (acting) about what to do if land was not sighted when expected to. Lacking a reliable fix for 72 hours and the error of mistaking an iceberg for land had caused the mistaken change in course. The radar carried by Niger and Hussar lacked reliability and there was no Direction finding (DF) beacon to guide ships between land and the minefield.[26]

Casualties

[edit]

Eight men in Niger survived and 119 men were killed, all of the complements of Exterminator, Hybert and Rodina survived, one man died abandoning Heffron, five men drowned when John Randolph broke in two and when Massmar sank, 17 sailors, 5 Naval Armed Guards and the 26 survivors on board from the sinking of Alamar in Convoy PQ 16 were killed, a loss of 173 men. The lost ships amounted to 38,306 GRT; John Randolf and Exterminator were later written off.[27]

Allied order of battle

[edit]

Convoyed ships

[edit]
Merchant ships[28][a]
ShipYearFlagGRTP'nNotes
Alma Ata1920 Soviet Union3,61154Timber, cargo
American Press1920 United States5,13162
American Robin1919 United States5,17261
Archangelsk1929 Soviet Union2,48064Timber, cargo
Atlantic1939 Merchant Navy5,41481
Budenni1923 Soviet Union2,48243Timber, cargo
Capira1920 Panama5,62593
SS Chulmleigh1938 Merchant Navy5,44594
City of Omaha1920 United States6,12472
SS Empire Baffin1941 Merchant Navy6,97831
Empire Mavis1919 Merchant Navy5,70484
Empire Meteor1940 Merchant Navy7,45724
Empire Selwyn1941 Merchant Navy7,16751Convoy Commodore
Empire Stevenson1941 Merchant Navy6,20914Lumber, cargo
Exterminator1924 Panama6,115235 July, damaged minefield SN72, 66°34N, 23°14′W, scrapped Philadelphia[30]
Heffron1919 United States7,611425 July, sunk on minefield SN72 66°34N, 23°14′W 1† 61 surv.
Hegira1919 United States7,58822
Hybert1920 United States6,120925 July, sunk on minefield SN72 66°34′N, 23°14′W 0†, 50 (+26 ex-Syros) surv
John Randolph1942 United States7,191135 July, sunk on minefield SN72 66°34N, 23°14′W
Komiles1932 Soviet Union3,96253Timber
Kuzbass1914 Soviet Union3,10934
Lancaster1918 United States7,51671
Massmar1920 United States5,828825 July, sunk on minefield SN72, 66°34′N, 23°14′W, 48† (inc.26† exAlamar) 42 surv.
Mauna Kea1919 United States6,06491
Michigan1919 Panama5,59441
Mormacrey1919 United States5,94611
Mount Evans1919 Panama6,26774
Nemaha1920 United States6,50121
Petrovski1921 Soviet Union3,77144Timber, cargo
Pieter de Hoogh1941 Netherlands7,16812
Richard Henry Lee1941 United States7,19132.
Rodina1922 Soviet Union4,441735 July, sunk on minefield SN72, 66°34′N, 23°14′W 0†, 25
St. Clears1936 Merchant Navy4,31233
Stary Bolshevik1933 Soviet Union3,97452
Yaka1920 United States5,43283

Escorts

[edit]
Escort forces [19]
ShipFlagClassNotes
Eastern local escort
Grozny Soviet NavyGnevny-class destroyer26–28 June
Gremyaschi Soviet NavyGnevny-class destroyer26–28 June
Kuibyshev Soviet NavyGnevny-class destroyer26–28 June
HMS Bramble Royal NavyHalcyon-class minesweeper26–28 June
HMS Hazard Royal NavyHalcyon-class minesweeper26–28 June
HMS Leda Royal NavyHalcyon-class minesweeper26–28 June
HMS Seagull Royal NavyHalcyon-class minesweeper26–28 June
Ocean escort
HMS Alynbank Royal NavyAuxiliary AA cruiser26 June – 7 July
HMS Achates Royal NavyA-class destroyer26 June – 7 July
ORP Garland Polish NavyG-class destroyer26 June – 7 July
HMS Volunteer Royal NavyModified W-class29 June – 7 July
HMS Intrepid Royal NavyI-class destroyer26 June – 3 July
HMS Intrepid Royal NavyI-class destroyer26 June – 3 July
HMS Niger Royal NavyHalcyon-class minesweeper26 June – 5 July
HMS Hussar Royal NavyHalcyon-class minesweeper26 June – 7 July
HMS Honeysuckle Royal NavyFlower-class corvette26 June – 7 July
HMS Hyderabad Royal NavyFlower-class corvette26 June – 7 July
HMS Roselys Free French Naval ForcesFlower-class corvette26 June – 7 July
HMS Starwort Royal NavyFlower-class corvette26 June – 7 July
HMS Lady Madeline Royal NavyASW trawler26 June – 7 July
HMS St Elstan Royal NavyASW trawler26 June – 7 July
HMS Seawolf Royal NavyS-class submarine26 June – 1 July, det. to Convoy PQ 17
HMS Trident Royal NavyT-class submarine26 June – 1 July, det. to Convoy PQ 17
Force Q (Fleet oiler and escort)[31]
RFA Gray Ranger Royal Fleet AuxiliaryRanger-class tanker@ Jan Mayen for Convoy PQ 17, 2 July, att. Convoy QP 13
HMS Douglas Royal NavyScott-class destroyer@ Jan Mayen for Convoy PQ 17, 2 July, att. Convoy QP 13

Notes

[edit]
  1. ↑ A convoy had a standard formation of short columns, number 1 to port in the direction of travel. Each position in the column was numbered; 11 was the first ship in column 1 and 12 was the next ship in the column; 21 was the first ship in column 2.[29]

Footnotes

[edit]
  1. 1 2 Boyd 2024, pp. 143–144.
  2. ↑ Woodman 2004, p. 22.
  3. ↑ Woodman 2004, p. 14.
  4. 1 2 Boyd 2024, pp. 182–183.
  5. ↑ Hancock & Gowing 1949, pp. 359–362.
  6. ↑ Macksey 2004, pp. 141–142; Hinsley 1994, pp. 141, 145–146.
  7. ↑ Kahn 1973, pp. 238–241.
  8. 1 2 3 4 Claasen 2001, pp. 195–197.
  9. ↑ Paterson 2016, pp. 100–101.
  10. ↑ Rahn 2001, p. 348.
  11. ↑ Claasen 2001, pp. 190–192, 194.
  12. 1 2 Boyd 2024, p. 266.
  13. ↑ Boyd 2024, pp. 266–267.
  14. 1 2 Claasen 2001, pp. 188–189.
  15. ↑ Claasen 2001, pp. 188–189; Ziemke 1959, p. 317.
  16. ↑ Roskill 1957, p. 92.
  17. ↑ Woodman 2004, p. 44.
  18. ↑ Roskill 1957, pp. 92, 492.
  19. 1 2 3 4 5 Ruegg & Hague 1993, p. 41.
  20. 1 2 Rohwer & Hümmelchen 2005, p. 175.
  21. ↑ Woodman 1994, p. 195; Rohwer & Hümmelchen 2005, pp. 175–176.
  22. ↑ Woodman 1994, p. 195.
  23. 1 2 Woodman 1994, p. 196.
  24. ↑ Pitcairn-Jones 2007, pp. 70−71.
  25. ↑ Pitcairn-Jones 2007, pp. 70−71; Woodman 1994, pp. 196−197.
  26. ↑ Pitcairn-Jones 2007, p. 71; Woodman 1994, p. 197.
  27. ↑ Hague 2000, p. 190; Cressman 2000, p. 108; Rohwer & Hümmelchen 2005, p. 176.
  28. ↑ Jordan 2006, pp. 90, 118, 189, 376, 281, 378, 379, 397, 399, 400, 404, 406, 408, 432, 434, 378, 379, 391, 575, 576, 577, 583; Mitchell & Sawyer 1990, pp. 4, 52, 86, 98−99, 118, 286, 396, 407; Ruegg & Hague 1993, p. 41.
  29. ↑ Ruegg & Hague 1993, p. 31, inside front cover.
  30. ↑ Lettens 2019.
  31. ↑ Woodman 1994, p. 195; Boyd 2024, p. 272.

References

[edit]
  • Boog, H.; Rahn, W.; Stumpf, R.; Wegner, B. (2001). The Global War: Widening of the Conflict into a World War and the Shift of the Initiative 1941–1943. Germany in the Second World War. Vol. VI. Translated by Osers, E.; Brownjohn, J.; Crampton, P.; Willmot, L. (Eng trans. Oxford University Press, London ed.). Potsdam: Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Research Institute for Military History). ISBN 0-19-822888-0.
    • Rahn, W. "Part III. The War at Sea in the Atlantic and in the Arctic Ocean. III. The Conduct of the War in the Atlantic and the Coastal Area (b) The Third Phase, April–December 1941: The Extension of the Areas of Operations". In Boog et al. (2001).
  • Boyd, Andrew (2024). Arms for Russia & the Naval War in the Arctic 1941–1945. Barnsley: Seaforth (Pen & Sword). ISBN 978-1-3990-3886-7.
  • Claasen, A. R. A. (2001). Hitler's Northern War: The Luftwaffe's Ill-fated Campaign, 1940–1945. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0-7006-1050-2.
  • Cressman, Robert J. (2000). The Official Chronology of the U.S. Navy in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-149-1.
  • Hague, Arnold (2000). The Allied Convoy System, 1939–1945: Its Organization, Defence and Operation. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-55750-019-9.
  • Hancock, W. K.; Gowing, M. M. (1949). Hancock, W. K. (ed.). British War Economy. History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series. London: HMSO. OCLC 630191560.
  • Hinsley, F. H. (1994) [1993]. British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations. History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series (2nd rev. abr. ed.). London: HMSO. ISBN 978-0-11-630961-7.
  • Jordan, Roger W. (2006) [1999]. The World's Merchant Fleets 1939: The Particulars and Wartime Fates of 6,000 Ships (2nd ed.). London: Chatham/Lionel Leventhal. ISBN 978-1-86176-293-1.
  • Kahn, D. (1973) [1967]. The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing (10th abr. Signet, Chicago ed.). New York: Macmillan. LCCN 63-16109. OCLC 78083316.
  • Lettens, Jan (2019). "Exterminator SS (+1942)". Wrecksite.eu. Retrieved 20 July 2026.
  • Macksey, K. (2004) [2003]. The Searchers: Radio Intercept in two World Wars (Cassell Military Paperbacks ed.). London: Cassell. ISBN 978-0-304-36651-4.
  • Mitchell, W. H.; Sawyer, L. A. (1990) [1965]. The Empire Ships: A Record of British-built and acquired Merchant Ships during the Second World War (2nd ed.). London (New York, Hamburg, Hong Kong): Lloyd's of London Press. ISBN 1-85044-275-4.
  • Paterson, Lawrence (2016). Steel and Ice: The U-boat Battle in the Arctic and Black Sea 1941–45. Stroud: The History Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-258-4.
  • Pitcairn-Jones, Lewis John (2007) [1954]. Llewellyn-Jones, Malcolm (ed.). The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys: A Naval Staff History. Naval staff Histories (pbk. facs. repr. Whitehall History Publishing and Routledge, London ed.). London: HMSO (Admiralty). ISBN 978-0-415-86177-9.
  • Rohwer, Jürgen; Hümmelchen, Gerhard (2005) [1972]. Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two (3rd rev. ed.). London: Chatham. ISBN 978-1-86176-257-3.
  • Roskill, S. W. (1957) [1954]. Butler, J. R. M. (ed.). The War at Sea 1939–1945: The Defensive. History of the Second World War United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. I (4th impr. ed.). London: HMSO. OCLC 881709135. Archived from the original on 27 February 2022.
  • Ruegg, R.; Hague, A. (1993) [1992]. Convoys to Russia: Allied Convoys and Naval Surface Operations in Arctic Waters 1941–1945 (2nd rev. enl. ed.). Kendal: World Ship Society. ISBN 0-905617-66-5.
  • Woodman, Richard (1994). Arctic Convoys 1941–1945 (hbk. ed.). London: John Murray. ISBN 0-7195-5079-3.
  • Woodman, Richard (2004) [1994]. Arctic Convoys 1941–1945. London: John Murray. ISBN 978-0-7195-5752-1.
  • Ziemke, Earl F. (1959). The German Northern Theatre of Operations, 1940–1945. Washington, DC: Headquarters, United States Deparlt of the Army. OCLC 610363660. 20-271.

Further reading

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  • Blair, Clay (1996). Hitler's U-Boat War: The Hunters 1939–42. Vol. I. London: Cassell. ISBN 0-304-35260-8.
  • Haynes, John L. (2010). Frozen Fury, The Murmansk run of Convoy PQ-13. Baltimore: Publish America. ISBN 978-1-4512-0156-7.
  • Kemp, Paul (1993). Convoy! Drama in Arctic Waters. London: Arms and Armour Press. ISBN 1-85409-130-1 – via Archive Foundation.
  • Mills, Morris O. (2000). Convoy PQ13 – Unlucky for Some. Bramber: Bernard Durnford Pub. ISBN 0-9535670-2-8.
  • Niestlé, Axel (2014). German U-boat losses During World War II: Details of Destruction (ebook ed.). London: Frontline Books. ISBN 978-1-4738-3829-1.
  • Ogden, William Graeme (1963). My Sea Lady: The story of H.M.S. Lady Madeleine from February 1941 to February 1943. London: Hutchinson. OCLC 8550141.
  • Sharpe, Peter (1998). U-Boat Fact File. Leicester: Midland Publishing. ISBN 1-85780-072-9.
  • Schofield, Bernard (1964). The Russian Convoys. London: BT Batsford. OCLC 862623.
[edit]
  • "Convoy QP.13". Arnold Hague Convoy Database. ConvoyWeb. Retrieved 8 July 2026.
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